Joseph v. Target Corp.

TIMOTHY JOSEPH, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation; DEBBIE HEEKE; SONYA MOORE; et al., Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-01962-KJM-EFB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

January 23, 2015

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the motion by Target Corporation (Target), Debbie Heeke, and Sonya Moore (collectively "defendants") for summary judgment. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 31 (Defs.' Mot). Plaintiff Timothy Joseph opposes the motion. Opp'n, ECF No. 36. The court decides the matter without a hearing. As explained below, the court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part defendants' motion.

I. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff makes several objections to defendants' evidence submitted with their motion. Pl.'s Obj. to Evidence, ECF Nos. 36-1, 36-2, 36-3, 36-4. Because the court does not consider the materials to which plaintiff objects in ruling on the instant motion, the court need not address plaintiff's objections. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010).Even if the court were to consider the evidence to which plaintiff objects, it would not change the conclusions reached below.

Defendants also object to portions of plaintiff's evidence. Obj. to Pl.'s Evidence, ECF No. 50-2. Defendants object specifically to (1) Exhibits A, B, C, D, and R attached to the Declaration of Lynn Garcia in support of plaintiff's opposition (ECF Nos. 42, 43, 47), saying they lack foundation or personal knowledge, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 602, or are not properly authenticated, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 901; (2) several statements made in depositions as vague, conclusory, hearsay, lacking personal knowledge or foundation; and (3) to several statements made in plaintiff's and other's sworn declarations for being irrelevant, lacking personal knowledge, or being vague, conclusory, or hearsay. Id.

To the extent defendants object on the basis of relevance, such objections "are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself . . . [the court] cannot rely on irrelevant facts, and thus relevance objections are redundant." Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

The court also finds little merit generally in the objections on the basis of lack of personal knowledge. Plaintiff recounts his experiences in the course of employment, and the other declarants state their relationship with plaintiff and recount their observations in working at Target with plaintiff. To the extent plaintiff or other declarants make statements regarding matters to which they do not have personal knowledge, or which constitute legal conclusions, the court does not rely on them in resolving the pending motion. To the extent the court does rely on plaintiff's declarations or depositions, it finds the statements cited to be based on the declarants' personal knowledge and overrules the objection.

To the extent defendants argue plaintiff's or other declarants' statements misstate the evidence, those objections are also overruled as "go[ing] to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility of the testimony." Galvan v. City of La Habra, No. SACV 12-2103 JGB, 2014 WL 1370747, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014); Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF Brands, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

Defendants' numerous hearsay objections also will not be sustained at this stage. Quanta Indem. Co. v. Amberwood Dev. Inc., No. CV-11-01807-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 1246144, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2014) ("evidence containing hearsay statements is admissible only if offered in opposition to the motion"). On summary judgment, "objections to the form in which the evidence is presented are particularly misguided where, as here, they target the non-moving party's evidence." Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (emphasis in original).

The court considers carefully the objections to the documents defendants argue are not properly authenticated, specifically Exhibits A, B, C, and D attached to the Garcia Declaration. Defendants do not say these documents, consisting of copies of other Target employees' Corrective Action Reports and copies of plaintiff's medical records, contain inaccurate information, but question the conclusions plaintiff draws from them. "[W]here the objecting party does not contest the authenticity of the evidence submitted, but nevertheless makes an evidentiary objection based on purely procedural grounds," such as that the documents have not been properly authenticated, then the court should consider the evidence. Tompkins, 2011 WL 3875643, at *7; see also Schwarz v. Lassen Cnty. ex rel. Lassen Cnty. Jail, No. 2:10-CV-03048-MCE, 2013 WL 5425102, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (plaintiff able to authenticate the documents at trial or provide evidence in admissible form). Moreover, the documents themselves do not have any indicia of unreliability, Exhibit A consists of documents produced by defendants during discovery, and defendants do not point to any particular aspect of any document to undermine its authenticity. With the exception of Exhibit A-2, which appears to be aggregated Corrective Action data but is not self-authenticating, the Corrective Action Reports provided by plaintiff appear identical in form to plaintiff's own Corrective Action Reports; the medical records are files produced by medical providers in response to subpoenas. See King v. San Joaquin Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. CIV S-04-1158 GEB KJM P, 2009 WL 577609, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009), adopted, No. 2:04CV1158 GEB KJM P, 2009 WL 959958 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2009) (plaintiff's submitted copies of medical records containing his identifying information authenticated by their contents, substance and distinctive characteristics).

The court may infer authenticity, and does so here for the purposes of the motion as to Exhibits A-1, B, C, and D. Thomas v. Quintana, No. CV 10-2671-JGB CWX, 2014 WL 5419418, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2014) ("The characteristics of the records themselves in terms of appearance, contents, and substance allow the Court to conclude that the documents have been authenticated by their distinctive characteristics and that they are what they appear to be."). Defendants' objection to Exhibit A-2, however, is sustained.

The court finds defendants' remaining numerous objections to several of plaintiff's statements offered in the form of sworn depositions and declarations, including plaintiff's own sworn declaration, are premature in the summary judgment context. See Estate of Hernandez-Rojas ex rel. Hernandez v. United States, No. 11CV522 L DHB, 2014 WL 4829459, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2014). As in Burch, "[t]he court cannot ignore the fact that a non-movant in a summary judgment setting is not attempting to prove its case, but instead seeks only to demonstrate that a question of fact remains for trial" Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (quoting Lew v. Kona Hosp, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985)). In these circumstances, "treat[ing] the opposing party's papers more indulgently than the moving party's papers" is appropriate. Id.; see also Scharf v. U.S. Atty. Gen, 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1979). The remaining objections to plaintiff's evidence are overruled. Of course, this determination will not preclude defendants' objecting at trial on any of the grounds not sustained here.

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS¹

The claims in this employment discrimination case arise out of plaintiff's employment and termination from defendant Target. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff, an African American, began working at Target in May 1995 as a warehouse worker. Joseph Decl. ¶ 1 Ex. A, ECF No. 49. Among his duties were to load and unload cartons from trailers, check receipts, key entries into a handheld computer and verifyfigures. Moore Dep. 127:18-25; Heeke Dep. 131:15-132:1; Cason Dep. 44:1-15, 47:11-20, 50:851:12, 51:22-52:5. Plaintiff received positive employment reviews throughout his employment (ECF Nos. 49-2, 49-3), with the only incident prior to 2010 occurring on or about June 12, 2009, when he was issued a Corrective Action for an unsafe act because he sat on a conveyor belt known as an "extendoveyer." Joseph Decl. ¶ 8. He also worked as a team trainer, responsible for training new employees coming to his department. Id. ¶ 3.

Although the nature and extent of plaintiff's disability remains disputed, it is undisputed plaintiff suffered a heart attack on November 13, 2009, and as a result, had difficulties with memory loss. Physician's Supplementary Certificate, ECF No. 49-4 Ex. E (noting plaintiff "has short-term memory loss [and] cognitive issues from the cardiac arrest"). Following his heart attack, plaintiff took a leave of absence from work beginning November 13, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 9-13, 16; UMF 3. Plaintiff returned to work on March 1, 2010. Id. Before returning to work, plaintiff was treated by a neurologist, Dr. Halima Karim. Karim Dep. Ex. O, ECF No. 46-4 26:23-25. Dr. Karim testified that a patient cannot entirely recover from short-term memory loss, but can "work fine with some help" such as "taking notes." Id. 21:18-23. She expects plaintiff to permanently experience problems with 5-20 percent of his memory. Id. 31:9-12; 41:9-20. His memory is worsened by stress. Id. 49:1-4. Upon his return to work, plaintiff required assistance on a few basic aspects of the job, such as using the handheld scanner. Joseph Dep. 68:13-24, 103:2-104:20. He explained to his coworkers he was having trouble with his memory. Joseph Decl. ¶ 17.

After his return to work, defendant Team Leader Heeke had discussions on at least two occasions with plaintiff about his bathroom breaks. Id. ¶¶ 28, 40. In these discussions, she advised him to take breaks at better times, and to use the bike provided to travel to the restroom to shorten the length of the break. Id. On another occasion, plaintiff placed a record-breaking number of cartons from the trailer to the processing line, which is part of his job...