Joyce v. State

167 N.E.3d 682 (Table)

Lucretia JOYCE, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1586

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED February 5, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Tyler D. Helmond, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Samuel J. Dayton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Lucretia Joyce was convicted of Class C misdemeanor reckless driving. On appeal, she alleges that her conviction is void and should be vacated because the State initiated the criminal case against her by filing a citation rather than an information or indictment. In the alternative, she claims that it was fundamental error to proceed with trial in the absence of an information or indictment.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In July 2019, a section of Pollack Avenue in Vanderburgh County was under construction while a pipeline was being installed. The road was closed to through traffic, allowing local traffic only. The section at issue was a two-lane roadway, with one lane open for traffic, and was marked with signs in both directions that warned drivers of the road closure and "Workers Ahead." Transcript at 10.

[4] On July 12, Gabriel Cartwright, a foreman with Miller Pipeline, and his crew were working on the project. Cartwright was standing at the rear of a work van when he heard a loud engine. He stepped out to the side to check on the source of the sound and observed a pick-up truck "barreling" past at a speed exceeding the posted thirty-five miles per hour limit. Id. at 11. Cartwright had to step back behind the van to avoid being hit by the truck's side mirror. He held up his hands to indicate to the driver to slow down, but the driver, later identified as Joyce, yelled obscenities out of her window and "sped up and went even faster." Id.

[5] Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Deputy Joshua Wargel was off duty but working as security for Miller Pipeline at the work site that day, when he observed the pick-up truck speed past. He activated his emergency lights and followed it, keeping it in sight until he initiated a traffic stop about a quarter mile from the construction site. As Deputy Wargel approached the truck, Joyce was confrontational, "yelling" and asking "what she had done" and "what gave [him] the authority to stop her." Id. at 18. Deputy Wargel issued a citation to her.

[6] On September 3, 2019, the State charged Joyce with reckless driving by filing an Indiana Citation Report (the Citation) in Vanderburgh Superior Court. The Citation indicated that the offense occurred on July 12, 2019 at 10:57 a.m. and the charges were "Traffic - reckless Driving." Appendix at 17, 18 (capitalization in original). Next to that typed description was handwritten "9-21-8-52 [CM]", referring to the applicable Indiana Code statute. Id. In addition to filing the Citation, the State filed, on green paper, an "Incident/Investigation Report" and attachments, including the BMV's driver record for Joyce.¹ Id. at 4. The State also filed a "Notice of Exclusion of Confidential Information" (Notice), stating that the "Information" tendered on green paper was excluded from public access. Id. at 16.

[7] The Incident Report included Deputy Wargel's Narrative, which outlined the circumstances of the occurrence giving rise to the charge. Deputy Wargel described that, on July 12 at 10:57 a.m., he was in his fully-marked SUV, facing east in the westbound lane, when he observed the pick-up truck traveling "at an extremely high rate of speed" eastbound on Pollack Avenue and past the construction area. Id. at 36. Deputy Wargel reported that "[t]he vehicle never slowed" and required one worker to quickly move out of the way. Id. Deputy Wargel "had to accelerate rapidly" to follow it and estimated it was traveling at over sixty miles per hour. Id.

[8] The court held an initial hearing on September 10, where the court appointed counsel to represent Joyce. Thereafter, a review hearing was held on October 15 and a pretrial conference on December 20, with Joyce appearing in person and with counsel at both hearings. A bench trial was held on January 28, 2020. Cartwright, Deputy Wargel, and Joyce each testified.² At trial, Joyce's theory of defense was that it was not her that sped through the construction zone and was, instead, a different green pick-up truck that was ahead of her.

[9] At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Joyce guilty as charged and entered judgment of conviction for Class C misdemeanor reckless driving. The court then sentenced her to sixty days in jail, all suspended on the condition that she complete twenty-four hours of community service. Joyce thereafter requested and received permission to file a belated appeal.

Discussion & Decision

[10] Joyce claims that the State's failure to file an information or indictment rendered the trial court's judgment void. While Joyce and the State frame the issue somewhat differently from each other, they agree that, where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, "a jurisdictional question involving the trial court's ability to render a valid judgment is reviewed de novo." Appellant's Brief at 7 (citing Peele v. State , 141 N.E.3d 838, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied ); see also State v. D.B. , 819 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (whether a lower court had jurisdiction is reviewed de novo when facts are not in dispute), trans. denied.

[11] Joyce argues that Indiana requires that all prosecutions of crimes be initiated by the filing of either an information or an indictment and that the failure to do so here rendered her conviction void. In support, she cites to Ind. Code § 35-34-1-1(b), which provides that "all prosecutions of crimes shall be instituted by the filing of an information or indictment by the prosecuting attorney, in a court with jurisdiction over the crime charged." She maintains that this language reflects a clear determination by the legislature that a prosecution may be initiated "solely with the filing of a charging information or indictment, and in no other way." Appellant's Brief at 5.

[12] Taking her point one step further, she argues that a trial court does not have power to render judgment – i.e., does not have jurisdiction – in a case that has not been properly initiated. In this regard, she refers us to Pease v. State , 74 Ind. App. 572, 129 N.E. 337, 339 (1921), where this court stated:

In this state it has been held consistently that a criminal action can be commenced only in the manner provided by law, and that is the filing of the accusation in lawful form that invokes the jurisdiction of the court in the particular cause. It is a universal principle as old as the law that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment void. There can be no conviction or punishment for crime, except on accusation made in the manner prescribed by law.

(Internal citations omitted). Joyce claims that, in line with Pease , the State's failure to file an information or indictment renders her conviction void. We disagree.

[13] More recently, and more applicable to the matter before us, our Supreme Court has noted that "a uniform traffic ticket or citation is the functional equivalent of an information or indictment." Butler v. State , 658 N.E.2d 72, 75 n.8 (Ind. 1995) (citing to Watt v. State , 249 Ind. 674, 234 N.E.2d 471 (1968) (rejecting claim that only an indictment or affidavit may initiate a criminal action)). Accordingly, we reject Joyce's claim that the filing of the Citation, rather than an information or indictment, was fatal to the State's prosecution of her.

[14] Alternatively, Joyce argues that, even if we were to find that the judgment was not void, the Citation in this case failed to comply with the statutory requirements for an information or indictment. Joyce acknowledges that, generally, the failure to challenge an information by motion to dismiss constitutes waiver. She urges, however, that waiver does not apply in the present case because "it is not that the charging information is insufficient. It is that the charging document does not exist in the first place." Appellant's Brief at 9. Having found that a charging document does exist, i.e., the Citation, we find that Joyce has waived her claim that the Citation was inadequate and therefore must show that fundamental error occurred. Grimes v. State , 84 N.E.3d 635, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) ("Failure to timely challenge an allegedly defective charging information results in waiver unless fundamental error has occurred."), trans. denied. Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule, and the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged error is so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to make a fair trial impossible. Id.

[15] We have recognized that " ‘[t]he purpose of the charging information is to provide a defendant with notice of the crime of which he is charged so that he is able to prepare a defense.’ " Gilliland v. State , 979 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Laker , 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied ). I.C. § 35-34-1-2(a), addressing contents of an information or indictment, provides in pertinent part that a charging information must be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:

(2) stating the name of the offense in the words of the statute or any other words conveying the same meaning;

(3) citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated, except that any failure to include such a citation or any error in such a citation does not constitute grounds for reversal of a conviction where the defendant was not otherwise misled as to the nature of the charges against the defendant;

(4) setting forth the nature and elements of the

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