Joyner v. Nationwide Hotel Mgmt. Co.

DOROTHEA L. JOYNER, Plaintiff, v. NATIONWIDE HOTEL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLCf/k/a WOODSPRING HOTELS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:20-cv-42 (CDL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION

March 8, 2021

ORDER

Dorothea Joyner alleges that her former employer, Nationwide Hotel Management Company, LLC, subjected her to intentional infliction of emotional distress because two management-level employees, including Joyner's direct supervisor, spread a false rumor throughout the workplace and corporate office that Joyner was not qualified for her job and had been promoted only because she had a sexual affair with her former boss. The Court previously concluded that Joyner's complaint contained sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to avoid summary dismissal. Joyner v. Nationwide Hotel Mgmt. Co., No. 4:20-CV-42 (CDL), 2020 WL 5046869, at *3-*4 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2020). The Court dismissed all of Joyner's other claims. See generally id. Nationwide now seeks summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, arguing that Joyner cannot prove the essential elements of her claim. Joyner, on the other hand, asks the Court to strike Nationwide's defenses from its answer. As discussed below, Joyner's motion to strike (ECF No. 22) is denied, and Nationwide's summary judgment motion (ECF No. 31) is granted.

I. Joyner's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 22)

The Court may strike an "insufficient defense" from a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Nationwide's answer contains sixteen "separate defenses." Answer 11-13, ECF No. 20. Joyner wants the Court to strike them all. Her main contention is that Nationwide did not allege enough facts to support the defenses. But most of these defenses are fairly read as denials of Joyner's allegations, and all of them give Joyner notice of the nature of the defenses and the issues Nationwide intends to raise. The Court thus finds that Joyner's arguments raised in her motion to strike lack merit. In particular, her request to strike the fifteenth defense—the defense most pertinent to the present motion for summary judgment—is denied. That defense is essentially a denial of Joyner's allegations regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress. This defense puts Joyner on notice that Nationwide intends to argue that she cannot meet her burden of proving the elements of the claim, including the element of severe emotional distress. The Court finds no basis to strike it.

II. Nationwide's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31)

Nationwide seeks summary judgment on Joyner's lone remaining claim: her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Summary judgment may be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

A. Factual Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to Joyner, the present record reveals the following facts. Nationwide operates two hotels in Columbus, Georgia. The hotels are next to each other and are referred to by the parties as Building 1 and Building 2. Joyner began working in Building 2 as a guest services representative. Her direct supervisor was Nelwyn Smith, and her second level supervisor was Bill Mark. After working at thehotel for approximately seven months, Joyner was offered a promotion to be general manager of Building 2, and Smith was to be transferred to Building 1. Joyner asserts that after her promotion was announced but before she began her new role, Smith began to resent her. After Joyner began her new role, she reported directly to Mark. Several months later, Mark was assigned to a new region and Robyn Evans became Joyner's supervisor.

Shortly after Joyner's promotion was announced, an employee told Joyner there was a rumor circulating about her: Smith said that Joyner had received the promotion to general manager because she slept with Mark. Joyner overheard Smith tell Evans the same rumor, and she heard from other employees on several occasions that Smith was saying that she got the promotion because she slept with Mark. This rumor was false; Joyner did not have an affair with Mark.

Around the same time Joyner overheard Smith tell Evans the rumor, Evans told Joyner that she needed to improve her work and placed Joyner on a performance improvement plan. Joyner believes that she was only placed on the performance improvement plan because of Smith's rumor. Joyner began to experience stress because of Smith's rumor and Evans's performance improvement plan. Joyner did not seek any medical treatment for her emotional distress, and she did not see a psychologist,psychiatrist, or counselor. Joyner Dep. 190:24-191:7, ECF No. 33. One of Joyner's children stated that Joyner would "cry almost daily." J. Edley Aff. ¶ 13, ECF No. 35-6. Joyner asserts that she felt "pressure [to] outperform" and do her best so she could "show" her employer that she was qualified for her job. Joyner Dep. 165:4-9, 188:9-16. Joyner was determined not to go down because of the rumor, and she wanted to stay strong for her family. Joyner contends that she performed at a high level, was a model employee, and even outperformed Smith. Joyner also did well in her online university classes that she took while working at the hotel. Id. at 13:5-7, 14:16-21. Joyner claims that notwithstanding her efforts, Evans terminated her employment. Soon after Joyner's employment with Nationwide ended, she began an enjoyable, rewarding, paid job at an organization for which she had been volunteering, and she continued her university education. E.g., Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 10-11, ECF No. 35.

B. Discussion

To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Joyner must prove (1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) that is extreme and outrageous and (3) causes emotional distress (4) that is severe. Plantation at Bay Creek Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Glasier, 825 S.E.2d 542, 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). She must prove all four elements. Withoutsevere emotional distress, Joyner's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails, even if Joyner did present enough evidence to establish intentional or reckless outrageous conduct that caused some distress and a sufficient basis for holding Nationwide liable for the acts of its employees. See id. (stating that all four elements—including severe emotional distress—must be present to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress).

"Emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." Id. at 551 (quoting Abdul-Malik v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 555, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)). Liability only arises where emotional distress is "extreme." Id. (quoting Abdul-Malik, 678 S.E.2d at 560). "The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Id. (quoting Abdul-Malik, 678 S.E.2d at 560). In Plantation at Bay Creek, for example, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had not established severe emotional distress. Id. at 551. There, the plaintiff "suffered headaches for approximately a week" and mentioned "them to her doctor during her annual physical," and she experienced "fears for her safety and that of her children" after her homeowners association encouraged its members to crossher property to access a lake. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals found that these feelings, "while certainly unpleasant, [did] not constitute emotional distress 'so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.'" Id. (quoting Abdul-Malik, 678 S.E.2d at 560). Likewise, in Abdul-Malik, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had not established severe distress; although he had trouble sleeping and gained weight, there was no evidence that he took medication or sought professional help. Abdul-Malik, 678 S.E.2d at 560. "While unpleasant,...