Juarez v. State

LAURA JUAREZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

No. 08-12-00365-CR

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

January 28, 2015

Appeal from the 210th District Court of El Paso County, Texas

(TC#20120D02286)

OPINION

Appellant Laura Juarez was convicted of murdering her husband by striking him with a motor vehicle and was sentenced to ninety-nine years' confinement. On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to suppress her recorded statement and in denying her request to submit criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense. Appellant also asserts there is no evidence of mens rea to support her murder conviction. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 10, 2012, Appellant and her husband, Salvador Juarez, went to a nightclub with friends and became inebriated. At some point, Appellant became upset and jealous when Salvador introduced himself to three other women who had joined them at their table. Later thatnight after Appellant and Salvador had returned home, Appellant called 9-1-1. She told the responding firemen she had awakened to find Salvador was not breathing. When the firemen informed Appellant that Salvador was dead, she told them they had consumed two bottles of liquor at the club, and Salvador had been so drunk when they had returned home, she was required to carry him into the apartment.

Appellant later repeated to police officer Melendez that she had awakened to find Salvador not breathing. When Officer Melendez asked about marks he saw on Appellant's neck, however, Appellant admitted that she and Salvador had fought after she had caught him talking to one of her friends. She said Salvador then left the apartment, and she later saw him standing by the front gate of the apartment complex. Appellant asserted that she drove out and picked up Salvador in their van, drove him back to the apartment, and then was forced to drag him out of the van and back into the apartment bedroom because he had passed out. She had then fallen back asleep and awakened later to find Salvador was not breathing.

When Sergeant Cox arrived, he and Officer Melendez found marks on the lower right leg of Salvador's body. Sergeant Cox also observed damage and tearing on the right side of Salvador's jeans in the same area. The officers overheard Appellant telling her friends that she had crashed into the apartment complex gate. Officer Melendez examined the apartment complex gate and verified it had been damaged. Sergeant Cox inspected the van and found damage on the driver's side fender and side panels. He also found green transfer paint on the damaged portion of the white van and observed that the apartment complex gate was the same green color. Cox examined the gate and found damage and debris indicating a vehicle hadpossibly struck the fence.¹

Officer Soto, who photographed the scene, noted the green fence had white paint on it and that the Dodge Durango van driven by Appellant was white. Officer Madrid, who collected evidence from the scene, collected paint scrapings from the green fence that contained white paint transfer marks. She also observed green paint transfer marks on Salvador's belt and shirt.

Charles Harmon, a collision re-constructionist, examined tire marks at the scene, the damage to the fence, and the debris left from the vehicle. He noted that white paint had transferred onto the green fence and that green paint had transferred onto the white Dodge Durango van. Harmon found an acceleration mark on the roadway that matched the tires on Appellant's white Dodge Durango van, and found no signs of braking. Harmon determined that the Durango van had struck the fence. The medical examiner, Dr. Juan Contin, performed an autopsy and determined Salvador had been hit by a vehicle and had received multiple crush injuries causing his death.

In Appellant's custodial interview taken the morning of February 11, Appellant admitted she had been driving the Dodge Durango van and had possibly struck Salvador when she turned the steering wheel toward him and ran up on the sidewalk. Appellant admitted that she was still upset at Salvador at the time, but denied aiming the car at Salvador or intending to kill him.

MOTION TO SUPRESS

At trial, Appellant sought to suppress the DVD recording of her custodial interview. In her first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress becauseshe did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her rights under Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure² and Miranda v. Arizona.³ Appellant specifically contends that "merely [nodding] her head" after a night of heavy drinking was "not a sufficient indication of understanding and appreciat[ing]" her rights.

The trial court held a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine whether Appellant's statement was knowing and voluntary and thus admissible. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). At the hearing, the DVD recording of Appellant's interview was played for the trial court. Detective Hernandez, who performed the recorded interview, testified that he first made contact with Appellant in the morning and began her custodial interview at the police headquarters around 9 a.m. Prior to recording, Hernandez spent about an hour establishing rapport, obtaining identifying information, and allowing Appellant to provide whatever details she wanted to give. During this time, Appellant was allowed to go to the restroom. Hernandez advised Appellant that she was a suspect in the investigation into the death of her husband and informed her of her Miranda rights. Appellant was allowed to read a Miranda card setting out her rights. Appellant signed the Miranda card at 9:24 a.m. Hernandez testified that Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or medication that would affect her understanding or comprehension of her Miranda rights. Hernandez also testified, and the DVD recording showed, that once the recording began, Hernandez advised Appellant of her Miranda rights a second time, and that when Hernandez asked if Appellantunderstood and waived those rights, Appellant responded "uh-huh" and nodded her head in assent, and when asked to clarify, responded "yes." At no time did Appellant ask to terminate the interview or request counsel. She was provided water and restroom breaks during the course of the interview. Appellant did not indicate she did not understand English nor did she seek any assistance from Hernandez in explaining the Miranda rights. Hernandez did not promise Appellant anything in return for her statement, nor did he threaten, coerce, or place her under any duress while she was giving the statement.

The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether Appellant's statement was voluntary and knowingly given. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6 (West 2005). The trial court concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant's statement was obtained in compliance with Article 38.22 and that Appellant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived her rights both before and during her recorded statement. The trial court found that Appellant was calm, voluntarily answered the questions, and did not appear to be under duress, and that Appellant was not threatened or coerced in any way so as to render the statement involuntary. She was given restroom breaks and was offered water. No promises were made in exchange for her statement. The court also determined that the dialogue between Hernandez and Appellant showed that Appellant's understanding was not hindered by intoxication arising from medications, drugs, or alcohol. At no time did Appellant indicate that she did not understand what she was doing. Appellant never asked to terminate the interview, to seek counsel, nor did she indicate she did not understand her rights. Appellant was calm, and there was no indication from the recording that she did not understand what was being asked.

A trial court's ruling at a suppression hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 417-18 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). In reviewing the trial court's decision, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts. See Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We afford the same deference to the trial court's resolution of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and review de novo only the court's resolution of mixed questions not falling within this category. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The trial court's ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418.

Appellant argues that the record does not show she explicitly waived her rights. But we note that "a waiver [of] one's right to an attorney may be found in an express written or oral statement or may be inferred from actions and words of the person interrogated." Barefield v. State, 784 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (citing Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 946 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)); Joseph v, State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated). The oral-confession statute does not require an express verbal statement from an accused that he waives his rights prior to giving a statement. Barefield, 784 S.W.2d at 40-41. Rather, the voluntariness of a confession is assessed by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Appellant "explicitly" waived her Miranda rights, but whether she did so knowingly, intelligently, and...