Juca v. Carranza

JHOANA JUCA and VICTOR ARTEAGA,as Parents and Natural Guardians of K.A. and Individually, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD CARRANZA,in his official capacity as the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education,and the NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants.

19 Civ. 9427 (ER)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 26, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

RAMOS, D.J.:

Plaintiffs are seven schoolchildren and their parents and natural guardians; all seven of the schoolchildren attend the same private school, the International Institute for the Brain ("iBrain"). Plaintiffs obtained administrative orders or agreements to pay for educational services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). In the instant case, they allege that Defendants Richard Carranza and the New York City Department of Education (collectively, "the Department") failed to pay for those services, and seek to enforce payment for the Department's obligations.

Pending before the Court is the Department's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs. See Docs. 39 and 51. For the following reasons, the Department's motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs' children acquired brain injuries, leaving them with severe learning disabilities. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 7, 21, 30, 39, 48, 58, 68. To address their children's learning needs, Plaintiffs brought due process complaints pursuant to the IDEA, seeking funding so that their children could attend iBrain during the 2019-2020 school year. Id. ¶¶ 9, 26, 32, 41, 53, 60, 70. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought funding for tuition, special transportation services, nursing services, and other related services. Id. ¶¶ 19, 26, 36, 41, 52-53, 60, 70. For five of the children, the impartial hearing officers presiding over their administrative hearings issued orders providing them funding during the pendency of their due process complaints. Id. ¶¶ 25 (J.B.), 35-36 (A.C.), 43-45 (O.F.), 55 (L.F.), 65 (E.P.). The Department agreed to fund one of the other children's educational services, but the Amended Complaint does not state whether that agreement was incorporated into an impartial hearing officer's order. See id. ¶ 74 (W.R.).

However, for Plaintiff K.A., the Department initially contested paying tuition and transportation costs for the duration of her due process complaint. Id. ¶ 16. While initially not contesting funding services during the pendency of that proceeding, id. ¶ 15, the Department subsequently refused to agree to an order to provide funding for the 2019-2020 school year, and a preliminary hearing on the matter was held on September 26, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. On October 18, 2019, the Department agreed by email to award K.A. funding for tuition at iBrain and related services until the completion of the due process proceeding. Doc. 15-1 at 2-3; see also Doc. 19.

At the time Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint, they alleged that the Department had failed to pay for tuition and services for the months of July through November 2019, though the specific months varied by child. See Doc. 20 ¶¶ 19, 28, 37, 46, 56, 66, 75. However, Plaintiffs now concede that the Department has paid for all of the services that were originally in dispute and that their children's education at iBrain was not interrupted due to any purported delay in payments. See Doc. 44 at 2-3.

B. Procedural History

Six of the seven families brought this suit on October 11, 2019, alleging that the Department failed to pay its obligations under the IDEA. Doc. 1. Plaintiffs subsequentlyamended their complaint on November 7, 2019, adding one more family. Doc. 20. On April 6, 2020, the Department moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).¹ Doc. 39. On May 19, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).² Doc. 47; Doc. 51.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper 'when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.'" Ford v. D.C. 37 Union Local 1549, 579 F.3d 187, 188 (2d Cr. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). A lack of standing constitutes a jurisdictional defect and "may be addressed through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion." Lyons v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 158 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Likewise, "[w]hen a case becomes moot, the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action," and the Court must dismiss it. Doyle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 722 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994)).

In asserting a challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may proffer evidence beyond the complaint and its exhibits. Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2016). In opposing such a motion, a plaintiff must put forward her own evidence to controvert the evidence presented by the defendant, or the plaintiff may instead rely on allegations in her pleading if the defendant's proffered evidence "isimmaterial because it does not contradict plausible allegations that are themselves sufficient to show standing." Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). "If a defendant supports [its] fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion with 'material and controverted' 'extrinsic evidence,' a 'district court will need to make findings of fact in aid of its decision as to subject matter jurisdiction.'" Nicholas v. Trump, 433 F. Supp. 3d 581, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Carter, 822 F.3d at 57).

In assessing whether a case is moot, a court "must examine all the facts and circumstances." Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1441 (2d Cir. 1991). The party who seeks to have the case dismissed as moot "bears the burden of demonstrating mootness and that burden is a heavy one." Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 579, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quotation omitted).

B. Analysis

The Department argues that Plaintiffs lack standing because they no longer suffer the injury in fact that they alleged in their Amended Complaint, as the schoolchildren's educational services have been fully funded and were not disrupted during this proceeding. Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction "to the resolution of 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). Emerging from Article III, the standing doctrine "imposes three requirements: '[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'" SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). Generally, standing is "determined when the complaint is filed." Chen-Oster, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 589 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 175 (2000)). There is no dispute that, at the time they filed their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact—namely, a lack of funding for their children's educational services—and thus had standing.

Still, "[w]hile the standing doctrine evaluates a litigant's personal stake at the onset of a case, the mootness doctrine ensures that the litigant's interest in the outcome continues throughout the life of the lawsuit." Id. (quoting Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1994)). "A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a 'Case' or 'Controversy' for purposes of Article III—'when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'" Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). Plaintiffs now concede that they have received "all of the relief they sought through this litigation" and "agree with [the Department] that there are no remaining legal issues set forth in the Amended Complaint for the Court to resolve." Doc. 44 at 3. Because Plaintiffs have now received all the relief they sought, and no longer suffer an injury as a result, there is "no longer a 'Case' or 'Controversy,'" and Plaintiffs' suit is moot. Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim. Doyle, 722 F.3d at 80.

Plaintiffs argue that there remains a case or controversy because they seek attorney's fees and costs in connection with their representation before this Court. However, "fee shifting provisions cannot themselves confer subject matter jurisdiction" where the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying claim. W.G. v. Senatore, 18 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1994). As such, Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and costs does not provide the Court with subject matter jurisdiction over their underlying claim. See id. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' underlying claim, it must dismiss that claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).³ Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Doyle, 722 F.3d at 80.

III. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

A. Legal Standard

In any action brought under the IDEA, a court may award reasonable attorney's fees "to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). Similarly, Rule 54(d) provides that litigation costs other than attorney's fees "should be allowed to the prevailing party" in a...