Judy v. Hinkle Trucking

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Diane Judy, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner v. Hinkle Trucking, a West Virginia Corporation, Gary Hinkle, individually and in his capacity as an officer of Hinkle Trucking, Inc., and Travis Hinkle, individually and in his capacity as an officer of Hinkle Trucking, Inc. Defendants Below, Respondents

No. 22-0101

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

February 14, 2023

(Pendleton County 17-C-5)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Diane Judy appeals three orders from the Circuit Court of Pendleton County granting summary judgment to respondents on all of petitioner's claims.^[1] Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's order is appropriate. See W.Va. R. App. Proc. 21.

Petitioner was an at-will employee of Respondent Hinkle Trucking as a driver on three separate occasions between 1998 and October 10, 2016, when petitioner resigned without notice. On August 31, 2016, petitioner filed a lawsuit against respondents alleging they violated West Virginia Code § 21-5-3 of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act ("WPCA") with respect to her compensation by failing to pay her all wages due under her employment agreement. That action, Pendleton County Civil Action No 16-C-24, was dismissed by agreed order on October 29, 2018. After resigning in 2016, petitioner filed Pendleton County Civil Action No. 17-C-5, and eventually filed a second amended complaint, advancing a claim under the West Virginia Human Rights Act ("WVHRA") in Count I, specifically asserting that, as a female, she is a member of a protected class.

Respondents filed motions for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted in three separate orders, including one that was filed under seal. A substantial portion of the circuit court's findings, and our findings related to petitioner's assignments of error on appeal, are based upon the "Settlement Agreement and General Release" ("Release") petitioner signed when resolving 16-C-24. That release provided, in relevant part, that petitioner fully and forever waives, releases, and discharges respondents

from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of actions, judgments, rights, fees, damages, debts, obligations, liabilities, and expenses (inclusive of attorneys' fees) of any kind whatsoever, whether known or unknown, that [petitioner] may have or has ever had against [respondents], or any of them, arising out of, or in any way related to [petitioner's] hire, benefits, employment, or separation from employment, by reason of any actual or alleged act, omission, transaction, practice, conduct, occurrence, or other matter from the beginning of time up to and including the date of [petitioner's] execution of this Agreement, including but not limited to: (a) any claims or causes of action arising under any federal, state, or local law, including but not limited to . . . the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA), W.Va. Code § 5-11-1, et seq. . . . any claims arising under tort, contract, or quasi-contract law, including, but not limited to . . . employment . . . or retaliatory discharge, claims based on Harless and its progeny . . . The only claims that shall not be released by [petitioner] are the causes of action asserted by her within her Second Amended Complaint in 17-C-5.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that the circuit court erroneously granted the motions for summary judgment. ^[2] As this Court has consistently stated, "'A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.' Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994)." Syl. Pt. 1, Goodman v. Auton, ___ W.Va. ___, 880 S.E.2d 57 (2022).

Although petitioner's argument headings do not follow her assignments of error, as required by Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, it appears that she contends that she presented a prima facie case of discriminatory motive so respondents' motions for summary judgment should have been denied. We have held that

[i]n order to make a prima facie case of employment discrimination . . . the plaintiff must offer proof of the following: (1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected class. (2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff. (3) But for the plaintiff's protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made.

Syl. Pt. 3, Conaway v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 178 W.Va. 164, 358 S.E.2d 423 (1986). Petitioner's discrimination claims are based upon her gender. However, in her deposition, she denied that three of the five pleaded acts of alleged discrimination ever occurred; she specifically denied that her loads changed, her pay changed, or that anyone failed to maintain her truck. With regard to the allegedly harassing text messages from Travis Hinkle and advertising her assigned truck on Facebook as available, petitioner admitted that those actions were not based upon her gender but were, instead, based on the fact that she filed her WPCA lawsuit. Further, a review of those text messages reveals that they address petitioner driving five days a week rather than four; petitioner bringing the truck back to the shop so another driver could use it in the evening and on her day off; petitioner's failure to keep the truck clean; necessary repairs on the truck; and petitioner keeping a dog inside of the truck when she drove. Therefore, we find...