Julian v. DeJoy

1

JENNIFER T. JULIAN, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS DEJOY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-00718-O-BP

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

July 17, 2023

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

HAL R RAY, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant Louis DeJoy's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief and Appendices in Support (ECF Nos 30-34, respectively), Plaintiff Jennifer T. Julian's Response to the Motion with Brief and Appendices in Support (ECF Nos. 40-41, 46-47), and Defendant's Reply and Amended Reply to the Motion (ECF No. 42, 51). After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Reed O'Connor GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISS Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) hired Jennifer T. Julian (“Julian”) as a parttime mail carrier at the Olney, Texas post office in 1999. ECF No. 32-1 at 3. Julian left that position in 2004 when she became Postmaster of a small, one-employee post office in Scotland, Texas (“Scotland Post Office” or “Scotland”). Id. at 6. Beginning in 2014, the USPS initiated a reorganization and reduction in force (“RIF”) plan. Id. at 7-8. The USPS converted small post offices, including Scotland, to Remotely Managed Post Offices (“RMPOs”) that reported to Administrative Post Offices. Id. at 8. RMPO Postmasters became Non-Traditional Full-Time (“NTFT”) clerks. Id. at 9-10. These positions were non-management, bargaining unit positions designed to reduce costs and improve efficiencies. Id.

On October 15, 2014, Julian received a letter regarding the RIF and learned of her options for continued employment. Id. at 9. She elected to downgrade from Postmaster to NTFT clerk to stay in Scotland. Id. at 9-10. As a result, on February 7, 2015, Julian gave up her management position and became an hourly employee. ECF Nos. 32-1 at 9-10; 34-5 at 35, 40.

In February, Julian also voluntarily accepted a temporary, six-month supervisory position in Stephenville, Texas (“the detail”). Id. at 10. The detail lasted from February 25 to August 25, 2017. Id. In April 2017, Sid W. Winn (“Winn”) became Manager of Post Office Operations (“MPOO”) of her area. ECF No. 32-2 at 5. Winn made a business decision not to renew Julian's detail, and in September 2017, Julian left Stephenville and resumed her work as NTFT clerk in Scotland. Id. at 6-7, 45. There, she reported to Lea Farney (“Farney”), then-Postmaster of the Henrietta, Texas post office, not the MPOO as she previously had done. Id. at 10.

After returning to Scotland, Julian had a series of disputes and problems with Winn and Farney. See generally ECF Nos. 22, 41. Thereafter, Julian filed an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint with USPS alleging age discrimination, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and a hostile workplace. ECF Nos. 34-1 at 5, 24, 34-2. Julian received her right to sue letter on March 2, 2021. ECF No. 33-1 at 101. She now brings suit on those claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Slaughter v. S. Talc. Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “An issue is ‘material' if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Burgos v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)).

When a movant carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that the entry of summary judgment would be improper. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden.” Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative will not defeat a properly supported motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).

The Court must view summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.

In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the Court's function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242-43. The Court grants movant's motion only if the movant meets its burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Duckett, 950 F.2d at 276.

B. Proper Party Defendant

Title “42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(c) . . . provides the exclusive remedy for the employment discrimination claims of federal employees.” Lamb v. United States Postal Service, 852 F.2d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1988). The proper defendant in a federal employee's ADEA or RA action is the “head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Honeycutt v. Long, 861 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1988). As the head of the USPS, Postmaster Louis DeJoy (“DeJoy”) in his official capacity is the only proper defendant here. Id.; Lamb, 852 F.2d at 846-47.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Julian has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding her age discrimination claim.

Julian alleges that Farney and Winn discriminated against her because of her age by improperly denying her out-of-schedule overtime pay (“OOS”) and removing her from the detail. ECF Nos. 22 at 6, 31 at 30, 41 at 13-14. Under the ADEA, an employer may not “discharge . . . or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [her] age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2023).

When the plaintiff contends that circumstantial evidence establishes her claim of age discrimination, as Julian does here, the Court will apply “the familiar framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green for allocating the burden of production and the order of presenting proof.” Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADEA claims).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Julian must first create a presumption of discrimination by making a prima facie case of age discrimination. Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). To establish a prima facie case, Julian must show that “(1) [she was] within the protected class; (2) [she was] qualified for the position; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) [was] replaced by someone younger or treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees.” Smith, 351 F.3d at 196. Under the ADEA, persons at least forty years of age are in the protected class. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631.

If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Smith, 351 F.3d at 196. If the defendant meets this burden of production, the inference of discrimination drops, and the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant's stated reason is pretextual. Id.

1. Julian has not established a prima facie case of age discrimination.

The parties agree that Julian is over forty and that she was qualified for her job. See generally ECF Nos. 31 at 29-31, 41. The parties disagree whether Julian suffered an adverse employment action or was treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees.

a. Julian did not show an adverse employment action.

“Adverse employment actions include only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.” Welsh v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. 941 F.3d 818, 824 (5th Cir. 2019). An employment action that “does not affect job duties, compensation, or benefits” does not qualify. Id. (quoting Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 282 (5th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, a “mere ‘loss of some job...