Jurado v. Davis

12 F.4th 1084

Robert JURADO, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Ronald DAVIS, Warden, San Quentin State Prison, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 18-99009

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 23, 2021 Pasadena, California

Filed September 10, 2021

Stephen M. Lathrop (argued), Lathrop & Villa, Rolling Hills Estates, California; Robert E. Boyce (argued), Boyce & Schaefer, San Diego, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Marvin E. Mizell (argued) and Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General; Ronald S. Matthias, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Attorney General's Office, San Diego, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Susan P. Graber and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

THOMAS, Chief Judge:

Robert Jurado, a California inmate on death row, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We review de novo a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition and review for clear error any factual findings made by the district court. Hurles v. Ryan , 752 F.3d 768, 777 (9th Cir. 2014). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Stanley v. Cullen , 633 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2011).

Because Jurado's petition was filed in the district court after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), "we may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court ...; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ " Davis v. Woodford , 384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ).

"A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the Supreme Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different from its precedent." Lambert v. Blodgett , 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of federal law if it "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Lockyer v. Andrade , 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (quotations and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that the exceptions based on "clearly established" law refer only to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." (Terry) Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

With respect to § 2254(d)(2) claims, "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen , 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010). If " ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's ... determination.’ " Id. (quoting Rice v. Collins , 546 U.S. 333, 341–42, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) ).

"[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Id. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) "preserves authority to issue the writ [only] in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents. It goes no further." Id. Under AEDPA, then, habeas corpus is a guard only "against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," and is not a means for "ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. at 103, 131 S.Ct. 770 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

Applying these standards, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

On May 17, 1991, Teresa Holloway's body was found off of Highway 163 in San Diego County. The cause of death was determined to be "blunt force head injuries and strangulation."

According to the evidence adduced at trial, Petitioner Robert Jurado and his roommate, Denise Shigemura, hatched a plan to kill a drug dealer named Doug Mynatt, with whom the two had an ongoing dispute. Jurado and Shigemura became concerned that their acquaintance and Mynatt's former roommate, Teresa Holloway, would reveal their plan. Jurado, Shigemura, and Jurado's girlfriend, Anna Humiston, apparently killed Holloway in a car by strangling her with an 18-inch weed-eating cord and beating her with the car's scissor-jack. Jurado was interviewed by police soon after the murder, and he confessed to killing Holloway, cooperated with law enforcement, and took police to the scene of the crime where they located the tire jack.

Jurado was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit murder and one count of first degree murder committed while lying in wait, a special circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty. Jurado was tried separately from his co-defendants, Shigemura and Humiston. The jury convicted him of first degree murder and determined that death was the appropriate penalty. After denying a motion for new trial and to modify the verdict, the trial court sentenced Jurado to death.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in People v. Jurado , 38 Cal. 4th 72, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400 (2006). Jurado petitioned for writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied Jurado's petition in Jurado v. California , 549 U.S. 956, 127 S.Ct. 383, 166 L.Ed.2d 276 (2006). While his direct appeal was pending, Jurado filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing.

Jurado's first federal habeas petition was stayed in order to allow him to exhaust his claims in state court. The California Supreme Court subsequently denied his second state petition.

The district court denied habeas relief on Jurado's second amended federal habeas petition, and also denied his motions for investigation, evidentiary development, and an evidentiary hearing. The district court subsequently issued a certificate of appealability, and stayed execution pending appeal. This timely appeal followed.

II

A

The California Supreme Court's conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar further prosecution of Jurado was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning of § 2254(d).

After Jurado's indictment, the state trial court granted Jurado's motion to set aside the special circumstance based on insufficiency of the evidence, and Jurado immediately pleaded guilty to all pending charges. The prosecutor acknowledged that Jurado "can plead to the face at any time," but indicated that "the People would not be signing the change of plea form," and specified that "there's a possibility that the People may take a writ on the ruling by the court." Additionally, the prosecutor noted that he "wanted counsel to be aware that the plea could conceivably be set aside at a later time depending on how that procedure goes."

The following month, the prosecution sought reinstatement of the special circumstance allegation in the California Court of Appeal. People v. Superior Court (Jurado) , 4 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 (1992). The Court of Appeal held that the special circumstance had been improperly dismissed. See id. at 1229, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242. The Court of Appeal further held that double jeopardy posed no bar to the reinstatement of the special circumstance, relying on Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493, 500–02, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar prosecution of more serious crimes when defendant pleaded to less serious crimes). Id. at 1229–30, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242. The California Supreme Court denied Jurado's petition for review, and Jurado withdrew his guilty plea and entered a plea of not guilty. Jurado raised this issue again on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court rejected it, relying on Johnson .

In Johnson , the defendant was indicted on one count of murder, one count of involuntary manslaughter, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of grand theft. Id. at 495, 104 S.Ct. 2536. At his arraignment, the defendant offered to plead guilty to the involuntary manslaughter and grand theft charges, and despite the prosecutor's objection, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment. Id. at 496, 104 S.Ct. 2536. The defendant subsequently requested that the trial court dismiss the murder and aggravated robbery charges on the ground that involuntary manslaughter and grand theft were lesser included offenses, and that the continued prosecution of the greater offenses after acceptance of the defendant's guilty pleas on the lesser offenses was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. The trial court dismissed the charges and the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed because under Ohio law, a defendant can only be found guilty of either murder or involuntary manslaughter (but not both), and either aggravated robbery or grand theft (but not both). Id. at 496–97, 104 S.Ct. 2536.

The Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that, contrary to the Ohio Supreme Court's determination, the case did not ...