Jusino v. Quiros

JOSE A. JUSINO, Plaintiff, v. ANGEL QUIROS, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-620 (SRU)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

November 3, 2021

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Stefan R. Underhill United States District Judge

Plaintiff Jose A. Jusino (“Jusino”) is a sentenced inmate currently confined at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution. He has filed a civil rights complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Angel Quiros William Mulligan, Daniel Papoosha, Antonio Santiago, and David Maiga. Doc. No. 1. The claims asserted in the complaint arise from his alleged retaliatory transfer to phase one of the Security Risk Group (“SRG”) program at Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”) in April 2019. He paid the filing fee to commence this action. For the reasons set forth below, I dismiss the complaint in part.

I. Allegations

Based on his 2009 designation as a member of an SRG, Jusino was transferred to a more restrictive housing status on July 31 2018. Doc. No. 1 at 3 ¶ 11; Jusino v. Rinaldi, Case No. 3:18-cv-2004 (SRU), Doc. No. 98 at 9 ¶ 38. In 2018, Jusino filed a civil rights action, Jusino v. Rinaldi, et al., ^[1] challenging that placement in the SRG program on the ground that it violated the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. No. 1 at 3 ¶ 11; see Case No. 3:18-cv-2004 (SRU). On April 15, 2019, Judge Shea dismissed the complaint filed in that action in part. Id.; Jusino v. Rinaldi, Case No. 3:18-cv-2004 (SRU) (Compl., Doc. No. 1 (dated 12/7/18), Initial Review Order, Doc. No. 8 (dated 4/15/19)).^[2]

The next day, on April 16, 2019, SRG Coordinator Papoosha issued Jusino a “fabricated” disciplinary report charging him with possession of paperwork demonstrating that he was a member of the security risk group called the Latin Kings. Doc. No. 1 at 3-4 ¶¶ 11-12. SRG Coordinator Papoosha requested that Jusino be transferred to Northern Correctional Institution, a “supermax facility, ” to be placed in phase one of the SRG program. Id. at 4 ¶ 12.

During his eleven-month confinement in phase one, Jusino was subjected to the following conditions: loss of television privileges, restrictions on commissary spending and the retention of personal property, three fifteen-minute showers per week, lack of access to programs and prison employment, exercising in a recreation yard in handcuffs behind his back with seven other inmates for one hour on each week day, confinement in his cell for twenty-three hours per day during the week and twenty-four hours per day on weekends, and lack of interaction with other people. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 13, 15. Due to the limited space in the recreation yard and the fact that Jusino's wrists were handcuffed behind his back, he could not engage in meaningful exercise during the one-hour period. Id. at 5 ¶ 18. Recreating in handcuffs behind his back also caused him to experience pain and injuries that interfered with his daily activities. Id.

II. Standard of Review

Under section 1915A of Title 28 of the United States Code, I must review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This standard of review “appl[ies] to all civil complaints brought by prisoners against governmental officials or entities regardless of whether the prisoner has paid [a] filing fee.” Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).

Although detailed allegations are not required to survive initial review, a complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Nevertheless, it is well-established that “[p]ro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).

III. Analysis

Jusino claims that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by “deliberate indifference, malicious and sadistic intent, deprivation of the right of bodily liberty, and atypical and significant hardship with retaliation for exercising the right of free speech.” Doc. No. 1 at 1 ¶ 1. I liberally construe these allegations as claims that the defendants violated Jusino's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

For relief, Jusino requests compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 7. The claims seeking monetary damages for violations of Jusino's federal constitutional rights by the defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment, which protects the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects state officials sued for damages in their official capacities); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (Section 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).

A plaintiff seeking to recover money damages under section 1983 from a defendant in his or her individual capacity must demonstrate “the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). In Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020), the Second Circuit held that “after Iqbal, there is no special rule of liability for supervisors, ” and instead, “[t]he violation must be established against the supervisory official directly.” Id. at 618. Therefore, a government or prison official is not personally involved in the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights simply “by reason of [the official's] supervision of others who committed the violation.” Id. at 619. Rather, “a plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.'” Id. at 618 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) requires that a plaintiff must “exhaust such administrative remedies as are available” prior to bringing a civil suit challenging prison conditions. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Because Jusino is incarcerated in a Connecticut correctional facility, the administrative remedies available to him for resolving administrative issues are provided by the Connecticut Administrative Directives, written guidelines that establish “the parameters of operation for Connecticut correctional facilities.” Nicholson v. Murphy, No. 02-CV-1815 (MRK), 2003 WL 22909876, at *7 n.2 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2003).

Jusino alleges that he informed officials of his complaints through “administrative remedy” and states that he exhausted such administrative remedies with respect to all defendants, but he attaches no grievance forms demonstrating that he has done so. Compl., Doc. 1 at 3, 5 ¶¶ 9, 17. Because it is not clear whether Jusino was able to timely file grievances, whether he exhausted administrative remedies, or whether an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies, dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies would be premature at this stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44 (discussing various exceptions to the exhaustion requirement).

B. First Amendment - Retaliation

Jusino asserts two First Amendment retaliation claims. The first arises from his placement in the SRG program in 2018 by Director of Security Santiago and the second arises from his placement in phase one of the SRG program in April 2019.

To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, an incarcerated plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against [him], and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2015).

With respect to the second prong, the Second Circuit has instructed district courts to “‘approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official- even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation- can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.'” Id. at 295 (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003)). Thus, prisoners' retaliation claims must be “supported by specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.” Id. (cleaned up).

With respect to the third prong, the plaintiff must state facts “suggesting that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the [defendant's] decision to take action against [him].” Moore v Peters, 92 F.Supp.3d 109, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). “Some of the facts often used to determine retaliatory motive may include (1) temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliatory act, (2) the prisoner's prior good...