K.A. ex rel. J.A. v. Abington Heights Sch. Dist.

28 F.Supp.3d 356

K.A. o/b/o her minor child, J.A., Plaintiff

v.ABINGTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:12–CV–2486.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 27, 2014.

Harry P. McGrath, O'Malley Harris Durkin & Perry PC, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiff.

William J. McPartland, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Moosic, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.

I. Introduction and Procedural History

On December 13, 2012, the plaintiff, K.A., filed a Complaint on behalf of her son, J.A. Prior to the filing of this claim, she had filed a special education due process action against Abington Heights School District which resulted in an appeal of the Hearing Officer's decision to this Court by the School District, and ultimately a settlement agreement between the parties. (See generally, 3:12–cv–804–RDM; Release and Settlement Agreement, Doc. 23, Ex. A).

Following unsuccessful mediation proceedings in the present case, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on June 21, 2013 (Doc. 21). Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss on July 9, 2013. (Doc. 23). The parties have fully briefed the motion, and it is ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff, K.A., brings this action on behalf of her son, J.A., a student enrolled in the Abington Heights School District (First Amended Complaint, Doc. 21, ¶¶ 4, 16) against Defendants Abington Heights School District (“Abington Heights”); Michael Mahon, superintendent of Abington Heights; Thomas Quinn, assistant superintendent of Abington Heights; Michael Elia, principal of Abington Heights Middle School (“AHMS”); Eduardo Antonetti, vice-principal of AHMS; and Brian Kelly, school counselor at Abington Heights (Id. at ¶¶ 5–10).

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint makes the following allegations:

J.A. was born in 1997, and later diagnosed with two neurological disorders : Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”) and Dysthymic Disorder (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 12–15)¹ . Beginning in 2008, J.A. was enrolled in the Abington Heights School District, where he was provided with an instructional support plan pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 due to his neurological disorders. (Id. at ¶ 16). However, K.A. avers that Abington Heights failed to properly implement this plan. (Id. at ¶ 17).

On the morning of February 24, 2011, J.A. gave his friend, A.W., a quantity of “spice”² , in exchange for a debt he owed to A.W. (Doc. 21, ¶ 36). J.A. had previously purchased this synthetic marijuana over the internet. (Id. ). Later that same day, J.A. and A.W. reported to detention for unrelated reasons. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37). During detention, A.W. was removed by vice-principal Antonetti. (Id. at ¶ 37). J.A. remained in detention until approximately 4:00 p.m., after which A.W. told him that another student, W.F., had “squealed” that A.W. possessed, and had given him, “spice”, causing A.W. to be searched and administrators to find a small quantity of the product on him. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 39, 43). In turn, A.W. told the administrators that he had obtained the “spice” from J.A. (Id. at ¶ 40). Once J.A. left detention, A.W. contacted him and told him what had happened and that A.W.'s father had come to the school to meet with administrators. (Doc. 21, ¶ 41). W.F.'s parents were also contacted on, or around, this time. (Id. at ¶ 42). Despite Abington Heights' Policy that “ ‘the parent will be contacted, the situation described and an immediate conference arranged’ when a student is suspected of possessing, using, or distributing drugs, alcohol, or contraband”, J.A.'s mother was not contacted on this day. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 43, 104). Instead, J.A. was not confronted by any administrator, teacher, or counselor, and upon leaving detention, was allowed to go home. (Doc. 21, ¶ 43). However, on this same day³ , Defendants contacted detectives from the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office to ask for assistance “in a drug investigation.” (Id. at ¶ 44).

On February 25, 2011, immediately upon arriving at school, J.A. was approached by counselor Kelly, who asked J.A. to accompany him. (Doc. 21, ¶ 49). When J.A. arrived in Antonetti's office, Kelly told J.A. that A.W. had identified J.A. as the supplier of the “spice” found on him the prior day. (Doc. 21, ¶ 51). For approximately two to three hours, Antonetti and Kelly spoke with J.A., who ultimately admitted to bringing the “spice” to school, (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 54, 55). During this time, Principal Elia also joined the “interrogation.” (Id. at ¶ 56). Defendants also searched J.A.'s cell phone and backpack. (Id. at ¶ 61).

At the end of this questioning, Kelly escorted J.A. to the school suspension room next to the vice-principal's office and told him to remain there while Kelly and Antonetti had a “private conversation.” (Id. at ¶ 63). J.A. subsequently was returned to Antonetti's office where the vice-principal and Kelly asked him questions about his home life, including how his parents treated him and whether marijuana was used in the home. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 65, 66). J.A. admitted that he had seen marijuana in his mother's home twice,⁴ but that he did not believe she and her fiance, J.R., used other drugs. (Id. at ¶¶ 67, 72). At this time, J.A. was again placed in the school suspension room and remained there throughout the rest of the day, except for periodic times when he was brought back into Antonetti's office. (Id. at ¶¶ 73, 75). Throughout the day, Defendants were in contact with members of local law enforcement. (Doc. 21, ¶ 74). At no time was J.A. told that he could, or should, contact his parents or an attorney. (Id. at ¶ 92).

When J.A. failed to arrive home on the school bus at 2:15 p.m., his mother, K.A., contacted the school district. (Doc. 21, ¶ 79). She was told that J.A. was at school, that there was a problem, and that she needed to come to campus. (Id. at ¶ 80). Immediately after arriving at the school, police officers and law enforcement officials arrived on campus with a search warrant for KA's residence. (Id. at ¶¶ 81, 82). She was also informed that her son was accused of selling drugs in school. (Id. at ¶ 81). After speaking with school officials, K.A. and J.R. were allowed to take J.A. home, under police escort. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 84, 85). Upon arriving home, the police officers executed the search warrant and recovered a “small” amount of marijuana.⁵ (Doc. 21, ¶ 85).

On March 14, 2011, J.A., K.A., and J.R., attended an expulsion hearing before the Abington Heights Board of Directors, wherein the Board found J.A. guilty of possession of contraband on school property. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 108–110). As a result, J.A. was expelled for the remainder of the 2010/2011 school year and the entire 2011/2012 school year. (Id. at ¶ 111).

Plaintiff has sued Defendants under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that they deprived J.A. of his liberty and property interests without due process of law and discriminated against him based on his disability (Count I), that these actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), that Defendants therefore breached their fiduciary duty owed to J.A. (Count III), that J.A. is entitled to punitive damages as a result of the aforementioned conduct (Count IV), and that Defendants' behavior amounted to negligence given J.A. was a disabled student and a special education student (Count V). Plaintiff is also suing Defendants under Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, claiming that Defendants discriminated against J.A. due to his disability and failed to provide him with the same or equal protection that other non-disabled students were provided (Count VI); and brings a catch-all claim against Defendants for violations to JA's civil rights provided for in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution, the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the rules, policies, customs and procedures of the Abington Heights School District (Count VII).

III. Standard of Review

A complaint must be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” DelRio–Mocci v. Connolly Prop. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In other words, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir.2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, but ... disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n. 14 (3d Cir.2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a

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