K. K.-M. v. Gloucester City Bd. of Educ.

K. K.-M., individually and as Kinship Legal Guardian of theMinor Children A.W. and R.M., Plaintiff, v. GLOUCESTER CITY BOARD OF EDUCATIONd/b/a/ GLOUCESTER CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS Defendant.

Civil No. 19-15808 (RBK/KMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

August 25, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

KUGLER, United States District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19) filed by Defendant Gloucester City Board of Education (the "District") and the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20) filed by Plaintiff K.K.-M. The focus of this lawsuit is Plaintiff's challenge to the adverse decision of an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on her claims brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, the District's Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The IDEA Statutory Framework

In exchange for federal funding, the IDEA requires states to guarantee a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") to all children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). A FAPE "consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique need of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982). If the state is unable to provide a FAPE, the state must compensate the child's parents for the cost of attendance at a private school that can. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012).

To provide a FAPE, school districts must work with the child's parents to design and implement an individual education program ("IEP"), "which is a program of individualized instruction for each special education student." Id. The IEP "must include an assessment of the child's current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide." Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)).

In addition to providing a FAPE, the IDEA also imposes a number of procedural requirements upon school districts. These include providing parents of children with disabilities the opportunity to review their children's education records, 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1), and evaluating students prior to providing them with special education services, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a).

Parents may challenge the adequacy of an IEP or seek redress for other violations of the IDEA by initiating an administrative "impartial due process hearing." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). At this hearing, all parties have "the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses." Ridley, 680 F.3d at 270. "Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision" made at the administrative due process hearing may then bring a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

While a plaintiff alleging a denial of a FAPE may seek substantive relief, such as compensatory education or tuition reimbursement, a plaintiff alleging a procedural violationdivorced from any FAPE denial "may only seek injunctive relief for prospective compliance." C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 66 (3d Cir. 2010). However, "[i]n some cases, a procedural violation may rise to the level of a denial of a FAPE, entitling the plaintiff to compensatory education or tuition reimbursement." Id. A procedural violation amounts to a denial of a FAPE if it "'(i) impeded the child's right to a FAPE; (ii) significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent's child; or (iii) caused a deprivation of the educational benefit.'" Id. at 67 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2)).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

A.W. and R.M. are high school students with disabilities who are eligible for special education and related services. (Doc. No. 20-1 ("Pl. SUMF") at ¶¶ 2-4). Previously, A.W. and R.M. lived with their birth mother in Gloucester City, New Jersey, and were registered in the Gloucester City School District. (Doc. No. 19-13 ("HD") at 4). But since September 2015, the children have been residing with K.K.-M. at an address outside the jurisdiction of the District, and a May 16, 2017 court order awarded K.K.-M. Kinship Legal Guardianship ("KLG") over A.W. and R.M. K.K-M. ex rel. A.W. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Gloucester City, 229 A.3d 210, 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020).

In October 2017, the District informed K.K.-M. that A.W. and R.M. should be enrolled in the school district in which K.K.-M. resides. (Id.). In January 2018, K.K-M. appealed this determination, and her appeal was set before New Jersey Office of Administrative Law ("OAL") ALJ Lisa James-Beavers under docket number EDU 2505-18. K.K.-M. ex rel. A.W. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Gloucester City, No. EDU 2505-18, 2018 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 944, at *15-16 (O.A.L. Aug. 28, 2018). On August 28, 2018, ALJ James-Beavers issued a decision finding that A.W. andR.M. were not entitled to attend school in the District as of May 16, 2017, and the Commissioner of Education affirmed on October 4, 2018. (Id. at *1-10). K.K.-M. appealed to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, which affirmed the Commissioner's decision on March 10, 2020. K.K.-M., 229 A.3d at 216. A.W. and R.M. remained enrolled in the District for the 2017-18 and the 2018-19 school years. (Pl. SUMF at ¶ 6).

Parallel to her appeal of the District's residency determination, on November 20, 2017, K.-K.M. filed separate requests for due process hearings on behalf of A.W. and R.M., creating OAL Case Nos. EDS 18461-17 and EDS 18462-17, which were consolidated and set before ALJ James-Beavers. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 11). In these cases, K.K.-M. invoked the "Stay Put" provision of the IDEA in an attempt to force the District to maintain A.W. and R.M.'s IEPs during the pendency of all special education proceedings. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-25).

Prior to filing these due process complaints, on November 18, 2017, K.K.-M.'s counsel sent the District's counsel letters demanding access to A.W. and R.M.'s educational records. (Doc. No. 20-3 at 1-12). On December 1, 2017, the District produced records that it believed were responsive to Plaintiff's demand. (Id. at 15-16). On February 7, 2018, K.K.-M.'s counsel responded, identifying numerous alleged deficiencies in the District's production. (Id. at 17-30). Unable to resolve the records production dispute, on May 14, 2018, K.K.-M. filed due process petitions alleging that the District's failure to produce complete educational records for A.W. and R.M. violated the IDEA, creating Case Nos. EDS 8360-18 and EDS 8361-18. (Doc. No. 19-3; Doc. No. 19-4).

Meanwhile, on April 17, 2018, Judge James-Beavers entered an order requiring the District to provide independent educational evaluations ("IEEs") for A.W. and R.M. (Doc. No. 20-3 at 50-61). On May 2, 2018, the District sent K.K.-M. letters inviting her to an "Identification/EvaluationPlan meeting," apparently in preparation to conduct its own evaluations of A.W. and R.M. (Id. at 62). After a series of disputes about these proposed evaluations by the District and the IEEs ordered by Judge James-Beavers, on May 29, 2018, K.K.-M. filed two more due process complaints alleging that the District's actions with respect to the evaluations also constituted a violation of the IDEA. (Doc. No. 19-5; Doc. No. 19-6). These complaints created Case Nos. EDS 9245-18 and EDS 9247-18.

Case Nos. EDS 8360-18, EDS 8361-18, EDS 9245-18, and 9247-18, were all consolidated and set before ALJ Jeffrey N. Rabin. In September 2018, the parties cross-moved for summary disposition of these consolidated cases. (HD at 3).

C. The ALJ's Decision

On June 25, 2019, ALJ Rabin issued a decision granting the District's motion for summary disposition and denying K.K.-M.'s. (HD at 8). For ALJ Rabin, the "determinative factor" was ALJ James-Beaver's determination in Case No. EDU 2505-18 that A.W. and R.M. had not been domiciled in the District since K.K.-M. obtained KLG over them in May 2017. (Id. at 7). Noting that "[i]f a child is not domiciled within a district for residency purposes, that school district is not responsible for providing FAPE," he found that the circumstances underlying K.K.-M.'s due process complaints could not constitute a violation of the IDEA because they occurred after the school district's IDEA obligations to A.W. and R.M. terminated. (Id. at 7). Based on that finding, he dismissed all four of K.K.-M.'s due process complaints. (Id. at 8).

D. Proceedings in This Court

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on July 25, 2019, seeking to reverse ALJ Rabin's decision and bringing claims under the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705, and the New Jersey LawAgainst Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. On June 26, 2020, Plaintiff and the District cross-moved for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20). These motions are now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing an administrative determination in an IDEA case, "the District Court applies a modified version of de novo review and is required to give due weight to the factual findings of the ALJ." L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this standard, "[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct." Shore Reg'l High School Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004). If the district court departs from the ALJ's factual findings, "it is obliged to explain why." S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2003). When the parties decline to present...