K.N.B. v. M.D.

259 A.3d 341

K.N.B., Appellee

v.M.D., Appellant

No. 20 WAP 2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: January 25, 2021

Decided: September 22, 2021

Suzanne V. Estrella, Esq., Department of Human Services, for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape.

Blair Harry Hindman, Esq., Blair Hindman Law Firm, Clarion, for Appellant M.D.

Eric G. Hackenberg, Esq., Laurel Legal Services, Inc., for Appellee K.N.B.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

The main question in this appeal is whether a petition seeking a protective order under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act ("PVSVIA")¹ is subject to the two-year statute of limitations governing certain enumerated civil actions or the six-year catch-all statute of limitations that applies to non-enumerated actions. Because we conclude that the six-year limitations period applies, we affirm.

The Appellee in this case, K.N.B., was a freshman at Clarion University in 2015. K.N.B. claims that a fellow Clarion student, M.D., sexually assaulted her in September 2015. K.N.B. initially did not report the assault to the police. Only after seeing M.D. at a Walmart in early 2018 did K.N.B. report the assault to the Clarion University Police Department. By this time, K.N.B. was no longer a student at the University.

Along with reporting the incident to the police, K.N.B. also petitioned the Clarion County Court of Common Pleas for a Sexual Violence Protective Order ("SVPO") under the PVSVIA. The General Assembly enacted the PVSVIA in 2014 to give victims of sexual violence "safety and protection from further interactions with their offender, regardless of whether they seek criminal prosecution." 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A02(5). The law allows victims of sexual violence who would not be able to obtain a Protection From Abuse Order² to seek a SVPO prohibiting their abusers from contacting them, under penalty of arrest. Id. §§ 62A07(b)(1), 62A12. To establish a right to relief under the PVSVIA, a plaintiff must:

(1) assert that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation committed by the defendant; and

(2) prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.

Id. § 62A06(a).

After K.N.B. filed her petition, the court entered a temporary SVPO and scheduled a hearing to consider whether a final order should issue.³ Prior to that hearing, M.D. petitioned the trial court to vacate the temporary SVPO and dismiss K.N.B.’s petition with prejudice, claiming that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court rejected M.D.’s argument. Noting that the PVSVIA itself does not include a statute of limitations, the trial court held that claims under the Act are subject to the six-year catch-all statute of limitations under the Judicial Code. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527(b) (imposing a six-year statute of limitations for "[a]ny civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application of a period of limitation by section 5531 (relating to no limitation)"). Consequently, the court concluded that K.N.B.’s petition was filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

At the final hearing on her petition, K.N.B. testified regarding the details of the 2015 assault. K.N.B. also testified that, on the day after the assault, she and M.D. agreed to see each other again. According to K.N.B., she "felt like [she] did something wrong by not wanting to have sex with [M.D.] again" and "[she] felt like [she] owed him to have sex with him again." Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), 6/15/2018, at 17. During this second encounter, she started to have sex with M.D., but then she "just lost it, and ... was like I'm done." Id. at 18.

K.N.B. also testified that, in May 2016, M.D. sent her a Facebook message stating, "Okay, so I just want to say I'm sorry for being a douche. I know it was a dick thing, and I am sorry." Id. at 22. In addition to this virtual interaction, K.N.B. stated that she and M.D. occasionally would attend the same parties, including one in November 2016 where M.D. approached her, "cracked a joke," and tried to fist bump her. Id . at 25. When this happened, K.N.B. "[went] into [an] episode of traumatic stress, and ... the whole world [stopped], and [she could not] think ... of anything else but ... him being there." Id. at 24.

K.N.B. also testified that she would see M.D. on campus sometimes, and she once saw him walking his dog by her house. K.N.B. explained that these encounters triggered panic attacks, and that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. Indeed, K.N.B. testified that she suffered a panic attack after seeing M.D. in Walmart in 2018, which led her to seek the SVPO. K.N.B. explained that her reason for seeking a protective order was to no longer "worry about [M.D.] coming up to [her] ... in public." Id. at 32.

For his part, M.D. testified that the initial sexual encounter with K.N.B. in 2015 was consensual. With regard to the second encounter, M.D. testified that he and K.N.B. again had consensual sex, but he ejaculated quickly and, rather than admitting this to K.N.B., told her that he "was just not feeling it." Id. at 75. According to M.D., his May 2016 Facebook message to K.N.B. was meant to be an apology for saying that he was "not feeling it." Id. at 75-76.

After the hearing, the court entered a final SVPO prohibiting M.D. from contacting K.N.B. for one year. In its Rule 1925 opinion, the court found K.N.B.’s testimony to be credible in all respects and determined that M.D. was less credible than K.N.B. As for the "continued risk of harm" element, the court concluded that K.N.B. proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she risked ongoing harm from M.D. The court underscored that, even though M.D. did not make sexual advances toward K.N.B. after September 2015, K.N.B. experienced mental and emotional harm (including panic attacks) and feared that M.D. would approach her in public again. Given this risk of additional emotional trauma, the court found that K.N.B. met her burden under the PVSVIA of demonstrating a continued risk of harm.

On appeal to the Superior Court, M.D. again argued that actions brought under the PVSVIA are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Specifically, he emphasized that the Judicial Code provides that the following civil actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years:

(1) An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of process.

(2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another.

* * *

(5) An action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture.

* * *

(7) Any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding in trespass, including deceit or fraud, except an action or proceeding subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5524.

M.D. first argued that K.N.B.’s petition constitutes an action for battery under Subsection 5524(1), since the petition alleges that K.N.B. is victim of sexual battery. The Superior Court disagreed, explaining that the PVSVIA "does not provide victims of sexual violence with a cause of action for tortious conduct." K.N.B. v. M.D ., 227 A.3d 918, 924 (Pa. Super. 2020). Instead, "[i]t requires merely the assertion of tortious conduct." Id. at 925. In other words, the court interpreted the phrase "[a]n action for ... battery," as used in Subsection 5524(1), to mean a tort action for battery, which K.N.B.’s statutory action under the PVSVIA plainly is not.

M.D. next argued that Subsection 5524(2) applies here given that K.N.B. sought damages in her petition when she asked the court to "[d]irect [d]efendant to pay [p]laintiff for the reasonable financial losses suffered as a result of the abuse." SVPO Petition at ¶ 10. For the same reason, M.D. also asserted that K.N.B.’s petition is an action to recover damages for tortious conduct under Subsection 5524(7). The Superior Court rejected both of these arguments as well, explaining that the PVSVIA "does not provide for any recovery of damages to person or property. Rather, the PVSVIA provides ‘the victim with a civil remedy requiring the offender to stay away from the victim, as well as other appropriate relief.’ " K.N.B ., 227 A.3d at 925 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A02(6) ). Thus, the trial court lacked the authority to award K.N.B. damages under the Act, and K.N.B.’s futile request for damages did "not convert the petition for a SVPO into a civil complaint seeking damages." Id.

Finally, M.D. argued that SVPO petitions constitute "[a]n action upon a statute for a civil penalty" under Subsection 5524(5), since the PVSVIA provides that a trial court must assess a $100 surcharge against a defendant whenever it enters a SVPO. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A05(c.1). The panel was not persuaded by this argument either. It held that the $100 assessment is not a civil penalty, given that it is explicitly labeled as a surcharge and the funds are ultimately "paid to various governmental units, primarily for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the [Act]." K.N.B ., 227 A.3d at 926 ; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A05(c.1) (providing that $25 "shall be used by the Pennsylvania State Police to establish and maintain the Statewide registry of protection orders," $25 "shall be forwarded to the Department of Public Welfare for use for victims of sexual assault," and the remaining $50 shall be split between the sheriff and the court "to carry out the provisions of this chapter").

Having determined that K.N.B.’s petition did not fall within...