K.S.D. v. Ryan

1

K.S.D., Plaintiff, v. ERIC BRUCE RYAN, RODERICK NEWBOLD RYAN, and SEWARD JOHNSON RYAN, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-20270 (RK) (JBD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 17, 2024

OPINION

ROBERT KIRSCH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff K.S.D.'s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 54.) Defendants Seward Johnson Ryan (“Seward”) and Eric Bruce Ryan (“Eric”) opposed, (ECF Nos. 56, 57), and Defendant Roderick Newbold Ryan (“Roderick”) did not, (ECF No. 58). Plaintiff replied separately to Seward and Eric. (ECF Nos. 59, 60.) Also pending before the Court are Seward's and Eric's separate Motions to Dismiss, (ECF Nos. 45, 48), filed shortly before Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend (ECF No. 54) is GRANTED. Seward's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 45) and Eric's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48) are DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background^[1]

This matter arises from the alleged sexual abuse of Plaintiff by her four adult stepbrothers-Eric Bruce Ryan, Seward Johnson Ryan, Roderick Newbold Ryan, and Hillary Armstrong Ryan (“Hillary”)-when Plaintiff was a child in the 1970s. Plaintiffs father married the four brothers' mother in June of 1972, shortly after Plaintiffs thirteenth birthday. (PSAC ¶¶ 1, 3.) At that time, Eric was approximately twenty-one (21) years old, Seward was twenty (20) years old, Roderick was eighteen (18) years old, and Hillary was approximately seventeen (17) years old. (Id. ¶¶ 4-7.) Throughout the duration of the parents' marriage, from 1972 to 1976, Plaintiff and her stepbrothers resided, on a regular basis, at a house in Far Hills, New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.)^[2]

Plaintiff alleges that between 1972 and 1976, each of the stepbrothers committed various sexual offenses against Plaintiff. The PSAC alleges that the sexual abuse and rape began in June and July of 1972, when Plaintiff was thirteen (13) years old. (PSAC ¶¶ 3, 13-15.) That summer, Seward kissed Plaintiff on the lips, which Plaintiff alleges was “an initial step in grooming her as a sexual object for the Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Around that same time, Seward, Roderick, and their acquaintance, played a “game” with Plaintiff in which each of the participants removed articles of clothing. (Id. ¶ 12.) Seward and Roderick required Plaintiff to remove her shirt and expose her breasts and prevented her from covering herself. (Id.) Seward was the oldest person present, and afterwards left Plaintiff alone with Roderick, at which point Roderick performed oral sex on Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) That night, and in subsequent encounters that occurred between September 1972 and June of 1973, Roderick penetrated Plaintiffs vagina with his fingers and touched her breasts beneath her shirt. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16, 19.) During one of these instances, Roderick told Plaintiff that they needed to stick together as the “black sheep” of the family, which Plaintiff contends was another instance of “grooming.” (Id. ¶ 19.)

During the summer of 1972, Hillary penetrated Plaintiffs vagina with his penis. (Id. ¶ 15.) Hillary continued to penetrate Plaintiffs vagina with his penis on “countless” occasions between 1973 and March of 1976, after Hillary had turned 18 and while Plaintiff was still under 18. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 20-22.) Hillary did not use contraception, which led to Plaintiffs pregnancy and subsequent abortion during the winter of 1974, at the age of fifteen (15) years old. (Id. ¶ 21.) On or about March 14, 1976, Eric penetrated Plaintiffs vagina with his fingers while giving her a back massage in his New York, New York apartment. (Id. ¶ 23.)

While Defendants and their parents knew about the “romantic relationship” between Hillary and Plaintiff, “[a]t no time did anyone attempt to prevent Hillary or any of the other Defendants from sexually abusing [Plaintiff.]” (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that these instances of ongoing sexual abuse resulted in long-lasting emotional trauma and fear, affecting Plaintiffs ability to earn a consistent income or form healthy romantic relationships. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26-27.) Plaintiff further alleges that she was unaware of and unable to fully understand what constituted sexual assault or abuse until she engaged in therapy in or about 1993. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 47.)

The PSAC asserts, as against all Defendants-Seward, Eric, and Roderick-claims for assault, (Count Two, PSAC ¶¶ 54-59); battery, (Count Three, id. ¶¶ 60-66); and intentional infliction of emotional distress, (Count Five, id. ¶¶ 72-78). Count Four claims false imprisonment as to Eric and Roderick. (Id. ¶¶ 67-71.) Count Six of the PSAC brings a claim for “endangering the welfare of children” against Seward and Eric. (Id. ¶¶ 79-83.) Finally, Count One claims sexual battery and a violation of the Child Sexual Abuse Act (“CSAA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:61B-1, against Roderick alone. (Id. ¶¶44-53.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint against Defendants on November 30, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) All Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint on April 27, 2022, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 21, 23-25.) In opposing Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff acknowledged a jurisdictional pleading error and attached a proposed amended complaint. (ECF No. 28-1.) On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as against Hillary. (ECF No. 35.)

On December 13, 2022, the Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint without prejudice based on the lack of complete diversity among the parties and the resulting lack of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 37 at 6.) The Court's Opinion did not address Defendants' arguments that the Complaint failed to state a claim. (See generally id.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading, limited to remedying the jurisdictional defect identified in the Opinion, within fourteen (14) days. (Id.) Further amendment would require Plaintiff to “seek leave from the Magistrate Judge within 14 days to file a Motion to Amend her Complaint.” (Id.)

On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), fixing the jurisdictional defect. (ECF No. 39.) On the same day, in accordance with the Court's Order, Plaintiff also filed a letter, styled as a motion, that sought leave to move to file a second amended pleading that would make substantive changes in response to Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) arguments leveled against the Complaint. (ECF No. 40 at 2.) The three remaining Defendants-Roderick, Seward, and Eric-submitted a joint letter objecting to Plaintiffs request. (ECF No. 44.) Before receiving a decision on Plaintiffs letter request, Roderick filed an Answer to the FAC, (ECF No. 46), and Seward and Eric filed separate Motions to Dismiss the FAC, (ECF Nos. 45 & 48).

On February 7,2023-the day Plaintiffs opposition to the Motions to Dismiss were due- the Honorable Lois H. Goodman granted Plaintiffs request for leave to move to file a second amended complaint, ordering that the motion be filed no later than February 24, 2023. (ECF No. 52.) On that day, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 54), along with the PSAC, (ECF No. 54-2). The PSAC adds specificity to the pleading's statement of facts, particularly related to several Defendants' alleged acts of “grooming,” (PSAC ¶¶ 11,19); sexual acts committed by each Defendant, (id. ¶¶ 12-16,20,23); and Plaintiffs reasons for not bringing suit earlier, (id. ¶¶ 29-31). The PSAC also removed all Defendants from Count One except for Roderick, (id. ¶¶ 44-53), and added Seward to Count Six, the claim for “endangering the welfare of children,” which previously had only been alleged against Eric, (id. ¶¶ 79-83). '

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The grant or denial of leave to amend is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Arab Afr. Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 instructs courts to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Amendments are favored because, assuming the underlying facts “may be a proper subject for relief, [the plaintiff] ought to be afforded an opportunity to test [their] claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Notwithstanding this permissive standard, courts will not allow amendment if “equitable considerations render [amendment] otherwise unjust.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). Those equitable considerations include “(1) undue delay on the part of the party seeking to amend; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive behind the amendment; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies through multiple prior amendments; (4) undue prejudice on the opposing party; and/or (5) futility of the amendment.” Munenzon v. Peters Advisors, LLC, 553 F.Supp.3d 187, 209 (D.N.J. 2021) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 178). The “touchstone” of a leave to amend analysis is prejudice to the non-moving party. Arthur, 434 F.3d at 204 (citing Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Defendants bear a “heavy burden” of demonstrating that Plaintiffs proposed amendments are futile. Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau Co., 106 F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (D.N.J. 2000). “The futility analysis on a motion to amend is essentially the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marjam Supply Co. y Firestone Bldg. Pros. Co., LLC...