E.K. v. N.C.

1

E.K., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. N.C., Defendant and Respondent.

A168873

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division

September 18, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 23-FAM-00870)

BURNS J.

E.K filed a petition for dissolution of his purported marriage to N.C. N.C. moved to quash and dismiss the petition on the ground that E.K. lacked capacity (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(a), (b)(1)), because the two had never been legally married. The trial court agreed, granted the motion dismissed E.K.'s dissolution petition, and ordered him to pay N.C. 's attorney fees as a sanction. E.K. appeals primarily contending that he had the legal capacity to petition for dissolution because he was a putative spouse that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing oral testimony on that issue; and that the sanctions order was not supported by the governing law. We agree on the latter point and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Background

A.

E.K. and N.C. began dating in 2016 and separated in October 2022. In early 2019, N.C. bought a house, in Redwood City, where the couple lived together until their split. Although E.K. asserts that he paid half of the down payment and closing costs pursuant to an agreement that the two would own the property 50/50, title to the house remains in N.C. 's name alone.

On November 30, 2019, E.K. and N.C. held a wedding ceremony, in Mexico, where they exchanged rings and vows, and agreed to take each other as husband and wife. They never obtained a marriage license or certificate. Nor did they attempt to comply with Mexican civil marriage requirements.

Eleven days before the ceremony, they each signed a document (before a notary) that acknowledged the ceremony was symbolic only and would not give rise to a legally binding marriage. Specifically, the written acknowledgement provides: "This statement is to confirm that our ceremony in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico on November 30th, 2019 is not legally binding and should we decide to legally get married, we will do so in California and according to the laws of our residential jurisdiction. We are not availing ourselves to California marriage laws or community property laws with our ceremony on November 30th, 2019. [¶] Furthermore, even though we are currently living together, we are not availing ourselves to any laws (common laws) that grant asset division or spousal support until eight years from the date of this statement or until we have children together, whichever comes first." (Italics added.)

B.

In December 2022, E.K. filed a civil action against N.C., which sought (amongst other causes of action) to quiet title to the Redwood City house. In the quiet title action, E.K. admitted-in both his complaint and a later-filed declaration-that he understood the parties were not legally married.^[1] In April 2023, E.K. petitioned for dissolution of marriage, seeking attorney fees, spousal support, and a determination of property rights. His petition asserts he and N.C. were married on November 30, 2019. In response to the petition, N.C. declared that she and E.K. were not legally married and asked the trial court to quash and dismiss the proceeding on the ground that E.K. lacked capacity to file a dissolution action. She also requested sanctions "in the amount of $25,000 or in the amount of [her] actual attorney fees" under Family Code section 271.^[2]

E.K. filed an opposition, which totaled over 460 pages (including his declaration and 31 third-party declarations). In his declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, E.K. acknowledged signing the notarized document, dated November 19, 2019, stating the parties' intention was that the wedding would not create a legally binding marriage. He also acknowledged that they never obtained a license. He further stated that N.C. promised and represented that they would get a marriage certificate in California upon return from Mexico and that they would then be legally married according to California law. Nonetheless, after the ceremony in Mexico, he "subjectively and in good faith believed that [he and N.C. ] . . . were lawfully married under Iranian culture and tradition."

After a hearing (where no oral testimony was taken on the merits of the motion to quash), the trial court granted the motion, awarded N.C. $18,427.38 in attorney fees, pursuant to section 271, and ordered the matter dismissed with prejudice (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(f)).

The court explained: "[E.K.] has failed to raise any legally sufficient basis for filing a dissolution petition. The Court finds that [E.K.] has not made any attempt to demonstrate a legally valid license under either Mexican or California law. He does not describe compliance with legal formalities. [¶] Regarding putative spouse status, the Court does not find that [E.K.] can claim relief under . . . section 2251[, subdivision] (a). That statue only allows a party to claim putative spouse status when the party actually believes at the time of the wedding that they had entered into a legally binding marriage. The papers here indicate no such belief at the time of the Mexican wedding, the filings instead indicate that [E.K.] has only recently come to believe that the marriage may have been legally binding based on the advice of his attorney. And even in argument today that counsel . . . said that basically . . . [E.K.] expected when the parties return[ed] to California that it would be binding. It was not binding at the time of the ceremony. It was not a legal ceremony."

Discussion

A.

E.K first maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that he lacked capacity to petition for dissolution. We assume that E.K. is correct that we review the order de novo. (Cf. McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 [demurrer standard of review]; but see Miller v. Miller (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 111, 116 (Miller) [abuse of discretion standard of review applied to dismissal after order granting motion to quash].) Nonetheless, we find no error.

1.

"In California, there are several requirements for a valid marriage. The parties must consent to the marriage; consent must be followed by the issuance of a license; and the marriage must be solemnized by an authorized person. (§§ 300, [306], 400.) In addition, the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. (§ 420.)" (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.) A marriage may be legally dissolved- and the spouses thereby restored to the status of "unmarried persons" (§ 2300)-only by (a) death of one of the parties, (b) a judgment of dissolution of marriage, or (c) a judgment of nullity of marriage. (§ 310.)

Dissolution is an in rem proceeding. Marriage is the res that is adjudicated. (In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1444.) Thus, the existence of the marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite, which can be challenged as invalid via motion to quash. (See Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-727 [challenge to the existence of marriage may be waived if not raised via motion to quash]; Carbone v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 768, 771.)

" 'Parties to an "invalid" marriage generally do not have the rights and obligations granted to and imposed upon spouses under the Family Code. But there is an important exception: A party to an invalid marriage who has "putative" spouse status may be entitled to property, support and attorney fees/costs rights similar to those attaching upon the dissolution of a valid marriage.'" (In re Marriage of Aviles &Vulovic (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 694, 699 (Aviles &Vulovic); accord Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a).) A putative spouse is one who "believed in good faith that the marriage was valid" (Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a), italics added) "in the past, at the time of the marriage." (Aviles &Vulovic, at p. 701; accord, Estate of DePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 92, 108, disapproved on another ground by Ceja v. Rudolph &Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1126 (Ceja).) "The good faith inquiry is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of mind of the alleged putative spouse. While there is no requirement that the claimed belief be objectively reasonable, good faith is a relative quality and depends on all the relevant circumstances, including objective circumstances."

(Ceja, at p. 1128 [considering analogous Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (b)].)

Although we review a finding that a party is a putative spouse under the substantial evidence standard of review (In re Marriage of Guo &Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1497, disapproved on another ground by Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126), here the court determined E.K. could not claim putative spouse status, quashed his petition, and dismissed it with prejudice (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(f)). The trial court's order was akin to a judgment of dismissal.^[3]

2.

The trial court did not err in concluding E.K. had no capacity to petition for dissolution because it was undisputed that E.K. and N.C. were never lawfully married and that E.K. did not have a good faith belief that they were.

In family law proceedings, "the respondent may move to quash the proceeding" for "[l]ack of legal capacity to sue." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.63(b)(1); accord, Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) Here, the trial court determined that the record demonstrates that E.K. cannot prevail as a matter of law. (See Miller, at pp. 117, 121 [although alleged father did not lack standing, dismissal after motion to quash affirmed because alleged father "cannot prevail on the merits as a matter of law"].)

E.K makes no attempt to show the marriage was legally...