Kacmarik v. Mitchell, CASE NO.1:15CV2062

MICHAEL KACMARIK, Plaintiff, v. STEWART L. MITCHELL, Defendant.

CASE NO.1:15CV2062

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

March 1, 2018

JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J:

This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendants Stewart Mitchell, Wayne Gillam, Joseph Soltesz and Gary Meyers to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. (ECF # 71). For the following reasons, the Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, the Motion.

I. Background Facts

According to his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Michael Kacmarik ("Kacmarik") was an inmate of the Mansfield Correctional Institution ("Mansfield") in Richland County, Ohio but has subsequently been released. Years prior to the incident in question, Kacmarik had his lumbar spine surgically fused by placement of surgical screws and posterior stabilization rods in his back, significantly impairing his mobility. He alleges his primary means of transport has been via wheelchair. At the time of the incident giving rise to this suit, Mansfield Correctional was aware of Kacmarik's disability.

On October 8, 2014, Kacmarik was in the Receiving and Delivery ("R & D") area of Mansfield awaiting transfer to Cuyahoga County jail. Kacmarik was transported to R & D via wheelchair. Upon arrival at R & D, Kacmarik was transferred from a wheelchair to a chair where he awaited transport in a hallway. Kacmarik was in belly chains, handcuffs and leg shackles and was holding a cane. Defendant Corrections Officer Stewart Mitchell ("Mitchell") approached Kacmarik and informed him he could not have a cane in R & D and ordered Kacmarik to walk to a holding cell. Kacmarik informed Mitchell he could not walk to the cell but needed a wheelchair to move. Rather than place Kacmarik in a nearby wheelchair for transfer to the holding cell, Mitchell took Kacmarik's cane, pulled him onto his feet and allegedly threw Kacmarik to the ground, causing Kacmarik to strike his head on the floor. Mitchell then grabbed Kacmarik's belly chain and dragged Kacmarik into the holding cell. Mitchell then allegedly went to make a phone call, came back to the holding cell where Kacmarik was left lying on the floor, stepped on Kacmarik and proceeded to drag him further into the cell. According to Kacmarik, he never struck, attempted to injure nor threatened Mitchell.

Kacmarik further alleges in his Second Amended Complaint that four staff members of Mansfield Correctional, Wayne Gillam ("Gillam"), Joseph Soltesz ("Soltesz"), Gary Myers ("Myers") and a Jane Doe ("Doe") witnessed the incident and failed to take any action to intervene. After the incident, Kacmarik contends Mitchell wrote a false incident report describing the cause of Kacmarik's injuries as related to a fall in the holding cell.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges claims for Excessive Force, Failure to Prevent Use of Excessive Force and Failure to Provide Medical Care/Deliberate Indifference in violation of Kacmarik's constitutional rights. Kacmarik also asserts a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") for Defendants' failure to accommodate Kacmarik's disability by failing to provide him with a wheelchair. Kacmarik further asserts a claim for violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in their use of excessive force and/or failing to prevent the use of excessive force against him. Lastly, Kacmarik alleges Defendants' conduct was an assault and battery upon him in violation of Ohio law.

II. Defendants' Motion

Defendants tell a very different story than that recounted by Kacmarik. Defendants argue that Kacmarik was not confined to a wheelchair while incarcerated at Mansfield. Defendants dispute that Mitchell was even in R & D when Kacmarik was allegedly wheeled in on a wheelchair. Mitchell contends he was escorting a backhoe as part of his assignment as a special duty officer when Kacmarik was brought to R & D. Therefore, he never witnessed Kacmarik's use of a wheelchair and only saw Kacmarik sitting in a chair with a cane. The incident was captured on video yet no wheelchair was seen in the hallway until after Kacmarik is seen sitting with a cane in R & D.

According to Mitchell, Kacmarik refused to comply with Mitchell's order for Kacmarik to walk to a holding cell. Defendants contend prisoners are not permitted the use of a cane in R & D per prison policy as no state issued property may be taken from the facility except for the inmate's clothing. Furthermore, there is a danger of an inmate using it as a weapon. Instead, Mitchell pulled Kacmarik from the chair to assist him to the holding cell bysupporting Kacmarik's left arm and placing Mitchell's right arm around Kacmarik's back. Kacmarik walked a few steps and fell. Kacmarik fell near an exit door which, according to Defendants, posed a security issue. Mitchell determined that he had to move Kacmarik to the holding cell but rather than risk picking him up only to have him fall again he simply dragged Kacmarik a few feet into the holding cell and called for medical assistance. When a nurse came to examine Kacmarik, he refused to let her examine him and was verbally abusive. There were no apparent injuries to Kacmarik that the nurse was able to observe nor has Kacmarik produced any evidence of any substantial injury.

Defendants contend that Kacmarik had no medical restriction card required by Mansfield Correctional that would have permitted him to use a wheelchair, cane or walker during transport. As of the date of the incident, there was no medical evidence demonstrating that Kacmarik required the use of a wheelchair. In fact, the medical evidence at that time demonstrated he could walk and there was no medical reason for his inability to walk. Lastly, Mansfield Correctional is not equipped to handle wheelchair bound inmates and any inmate requiring a wheelchair is transferred to a different facility capable of housing them.

Because both Plaintiff and Defendants rely on evidence outside the pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) requires that the Court treat the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment and requires that the Court provide all parties "a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Here, discovery has already been completed and no party has asked for additional discovery in order to present their motion or opposition. Therefore, the Court will address Defendants' Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment as all parties have been offered the reasonable opportunity to present their arguments.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, which may be demonstrated by "portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Inferences drawn "from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The court does not have the duty to search the entire record to establish that no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (1989). The non-moving party must present affirmative evidence supporting a genuine dispute of fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1479. If the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element of which it has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "[T]he inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986).

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

"The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.825, 832 (1994) Helling v. McKinney 509 U.S. 25, 31, (1993). "The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984). "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992)

"Under the Fourteenth, Fourth, or Eighth Amendments, assaults on subdued, restrained and nonresisting detainees, arrestees, or convicted prisoners are impermissible." Coley v. Lucas Cty., Ohio, 799 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir. 2015). Defendant violates the Eighth Amendment if its "offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir.1995). "To make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective component." Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). See, e.g., Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1993). "The subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials. The relevant inquiry is 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S.Ct....