Kaiguang Xu v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.

254 Md.App. 205

272 A.3d 820

Kaiguang XU

v.MAYOR and City Council OF BALTIMORE

No. 0966, Sept. Term, 2020

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 30, 2022

Submitted by: Kaiguang Xu, Clarksburg, for Appellant.

Submitted by: Carolyn Powers-Brown (James L. Shea, City Solicitor, Rachel Simmonsen, Michael Redmond, Chief Solicitors, Baltimore City Department of Law, Baltimore, MD), all on the brief, for Appellee.

Panel: Fader, C.J., Wells, James A. Kenney III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Kenney, J.

This appeal arises from a condemnation action filed by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the "City"), in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Appellant, Kaiguang Xu, appeals the award of $24,000 as just compensation for her property, 1238 West Mosher Street (the "Property").

Ms. Xu, who is self-represented, presents two questions on appeal,¹ which, based on her argument, we have reworded as follows:

I. Was it legally correct to hold the trial without a jury?

II. Did the circuit court improperly limit Ms. Xu's testimony when she attempted to testify as to the value of her property?

Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that it was error to hold the trial without a jury and reverse. We address the second question for guidance in the event of a retrial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2018, the City petitioned to condemn the Property, which was then an uninhabitable, vacant, three-story group row house with the potential for commercial space on the first floor and residential space on the top two. It was then owned by Co. 351 LLC, a Florida-based limited liability company. Ms. Xu purchased the property on or about March 15, 2019, but the deed was not recorded until July 2, 2019. An Order of Default had been entered on the Petition for Condemnation on May 30, 2019, and a Judgment upon inquisition in the amount of $22,150 was entered on July 10, 2019. After Ms. Xu contacted the City challenging the award, the City moved to reopen the case in the interest of justice; it was reopened on December 11, 2019, and the earlier judgment was later vacated. Trial was scheduled for October 7, 2020.

On September 16, 2020, in a telephone status conference with the court, Ms. Xu and counsel for the City appeared to agree to a bench trial. According to a Status Order entered on October 2, 2020, the court had discussed whether Ms. Xu "was voluntarily waiving any right to a jury trial," but the only decision the court made in that conference was that a jury trial could not be held on October 7, 2020. On October 1, 2020, the day before the Status Order was entered, Ms. Xu requested "to change from no jury trial to a jury trial" in a filing with the circuit court captioned "Trial Memorandum, Response from Defendant."²

In the Status Order, the court stated that both parties "have important rights" but those rights "must be asserted within the requirements of the Maryland Rules." It explained that if Ms. Xu asserts a right to a jury trial, and if the court finds that that assertion was timely, then the trial would not be able to proceed as scheduled. That order further stated that "[a]ll requests for action by the Court shall be by written motion filed with the Clerk or by oral motion made on the record during a court proceeding." Ms. Xu did not file a second written request for a jury trial and she did not orally advance her jury request at the October 7, 2020 hearing. The case proceeded as a bench trial without reference to Ms. Xu's October 1, 2020 filing.

By way of an opening statement, Ms. Xu stated that she was contesting value but not the City's right to acquire the Property. Testimony began with the City's appraiser testifying that the Property's fair market value was $24,000. The appraiser, taking into consideration the Property's condition, used a sales-comparison approach to determine value. The Property had been vacant for years; drywall, ceilings, and flooring had been removed; there were exposed joists, plumbing, and wiring; and, even after Ms. Xu's improvements, it remained uninhabitable. His three comparables were all located within one-half mile of the Property; were of similar size as the Property and the end unit in a row of multiple structures; and each was zoned R-8.

Ms. Xu testified that the Property had been listed for sale for $46,999 a year before she purchased it. That price was later lowered to $24,999 and she purchased it for $15,000. When she bought it, it needed a new roof, the inside was wet and moldy, walls were falling down, and it required many other improvements. Since buying it, she had installed a new roof for $15,000, installed new air ducts, removed debris, cleaned the inside, fixed wiring, and installed lights.

Ms. Xu's appraiser valued the property at $81,500 using a sales-comparison approach, but his comparables were markedly different and further from the Property than the City's appraiser's comparables. For example, some were in a different neighborhood, some were two stories rather than three, half of them were not end-of-group structures, and some were over a mile from the Property. And although the Property was in the R-8 zone, three of the comparables were zoned C-1 commercial.

After hearing the testimony, reviewing the appraisal reports, and viewing the Property, the trial court found the value of the property to be $24,000. Explaining that both appraisers had acknowledged the improvements that Ms. Xu had made on the Property, the court found the City's appraisal more persuasive because the comparables were more similar to the Property in location, size, and zoning. According to the court, the City's comparables were "all corner properties, they all have the same feature of potential commercial space on the first floor with residential space above, and they all had the same zoning issue, that being in R-8 districts where, presumably, the commercial use would depend on reinstating some prior Neighborhood Commercial use for the properties." The court did not understand how Ms. Xu's appraiser "could possibly believe that the market has increased to the point where it would have a fair market value of $81,500 without any significant changes, except for the cleaning it up, and putting the new roof on it."

The inquisition, which was dated October 7, 2020, and entered on October 13, 2020, for $24,000, reflects that a jury trial had been "waived either by consent or default of parties."

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Trial Waiver

Standard of Review

"When a trial court's order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [an appellate court] must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review." Nesbit v. GEICO , 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 A.2d 879 (2004). The Maryland Rules are also interpreted under a de novo standard of review. Davis v. Slater , 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78 (2004).

Contentions

Ms. Xu contends that the trial court erred in holding a bench trial. She argues that "a condemnation case is always tried before a jury unless all parties to the suit agree in writing to submit the case for determination without a jury."

The City responds that Ms. Xu elected to have a bench trial during the telephone status conference with the court, and that, when she changed her mind, she did not "formally request a jury."

Analysis

This appeal involves who determines just compensation in a condemnation proceeding, but, more particularly, it involves the interplay between a Maryland constitutional provision, the general rules of civil procedure, and the specific rules related to condemnation actions. Here, Article XI-B of the Maryland Constitution, Maryland Rule 12-207(a), and Maryland Rule 1-101(a), (b), and (l) are all at play. Article XI-B of the Maryland Constitution states in pertinent part:

No land or property taken by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for [land development or redevelopment] or in connection with the exercise of any of the powers which may be granted to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore pursuant to this Article by exercising the power of eminent domain, shall be taken without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.³

The jury trial language of that provision invokes Maryland Rule 12-207(a), which states:

An action for condemnation shall be tried by a jury unless all parties file a written election submitting the case to the court for determination. All parties may file a written election submitting an issue of fact to the court for determination without submitting the whole action.

Maryland Rule 1-101 provides:

(a) Title 1 applies to all matters in all courts of this State, except the Orphans’ Courts and except as otherwise specifically provided.

(b) Title 2 applies to civil matters in the circuit courts, except for Juvenile Causes under Title 11, Chapters 100, 200, 400, and 500 of these Rules except as otherwise specifically provided or necessarily implied.

* * * (l) Title 12 applies to property actions relating to writs of survey, lis pendens, actions for release of lien instruments, condemnation, mechanics’ liens, partition, redemption of ground rents, replevin, detinue, severed mineral interests, and actions to quiet title.

The City acknowledges in its brief that the Maryland Constitution provides the right to a jury trial on the issue of "just compensation," but, citing Md. Rule 12-207(a), it contends that "a property owner can waive that right and elect a bench trial." And that contention is true as far as it goes.⁴ But to waive a jury and elect a bench trial, Rule 12-207(a) requires that "all parties file a written election submitting the case to the court for determination." Md. Rule 12-207(a) (emphasis added). Otherwise, a jury trial is the default position under the rule.

The City's jury waiver argument rests on Ms. Xu having agreed to a bench trial during the...