Kalejaiye v. Quality Investigations, Inc.

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ABAYOMI KALEJAIYE, Plaintiff, v. QUALITY INVESTIGATIONS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-02647 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 21, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RE DOCUMENT NO.: 86, 87, 88

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Quality Investigation, Inc.'s (“QI”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF. 86-1, and Abayomi Kalejaiye's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 87-2. Both QI and Kalejaiye filed memoranda in opposition to the respective moving party's motion for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 90 and 92-2 (“Def.'s Opp.” and “Pl.'s Opp.,” respectively). Both parties also filed replies ECF Nos. 93 and 94 (“Pl.'s Reply” and “Def.'s Reply,” respectively). Additionally, Kalejaiye filed a Motion for Sanctions (“Sanctions Mot.”), ECF No. 88, to which QI filed an opposition (“Sanctions Opp.”), ECF No. 91, and in support of which Kalejaiye filed a reply, (“Sanctions Reply”), ECF No. 95. For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part QI's motion for summary judgment, denies Kalejaiye's motion for summary judgment, and grants in part and denies in part Kalejaiye's motion for sanctions.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Prior to its dissolution, QI contracted with the federal government to provide security officers at government facilities. See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 (“Response to Undisputed Facts”), ECF No. 92-1. As relevant here, QI contracted with the government to provide security officers at a Department of Transportation (“DOT”) facility and a Department of Labor (“DOL”) facility. Id. at 1, 45. Kalejaiye-Plaintiff in this case-was one of the officers that QI employed to staff its DOT facility contract. Id. at 4.

When QI hired Kalejaiye, he had a beard. Id. at 7. Under QI's policies, QI employees were required to maintain certain grooming standards. Id. at 46. Specifically, QI employees were required to either (1) shave, (2) maintain a beard shorter than 1/4 of an inch with a medical waiver, or (3) receive an accommodation to grow their beard longer than 1/4 inch. Id. at 5-6, 46. Prior to beginning work at QI, Kalejaiye obtained a medical waiver permitting him to grow a beard of 1/4 inch in length, but after starting work with QI he requested a religious accommodation so that he could grow his beard longer. Id. at 6-7. QI's grooming policies ostensibly regulated beard length to ensure that security guards at the DOT facility could use gas masks effectively if the need arose.^[1] Id. at 4-6, 14. The parties disagree about what precisely happened next.

QI points to evidence showing that its contract with DOT required it to obtain DOT's approval before it could grant a religious accommodation allowing Kalejaiye to grow his beard beyond 1/4 inch. Id. at 11-12, 18, 26-27, 30-31. And QI points to evidence showing that it took Kalejaiye's request to DOT and that DOT denied the request. Id. at 19, 25, 31. Kalejaiye rejects these contentions. Specifically, Kalejaiye's proffered evidence shows that QI was obligated to grant his accommodation request in the first instance and that DOT could review that decision subsequently. Id. at 25-27, 30-31. Additionally, Kalejaiye points to evidence calling into question whether QI ever presented his accommodation request to DOT. Id. at 25.

The parties also dispute whether QI considered transferring Kalejaiye to its DOL facility contract-where Kalejaiye asserts gas masks were not required-as an accommodation for Kalejaiye's religious practice of beard growth. Id. at 39-41. QI presents evidence that it considered the possibility of transferring Kalejaiye but determined that it had no vacant positions at the DOL site, that reassignment was impracticable, and that Kalejaiye would still be required to shave his beard to 1/4 inch even if reassigned to the DOL site. Id. at 39-44. Kalejaiye disagrees. Kalejaiye points to contradicting evidence suggesting that QI did not seriously consider moving him to its DOL contract. Id. at 39-44.

The parties do not dispute that QI eventually informed Kalejaiye that DOT would not permit an accommodation and that if Kalejaiye did not shave his beard to 1/4 inch or shorter he would not be allowed to work on the DOT contract. Id. at 7, 28, 37. Kalejaiye did not shave his beard and, consequently, QI eventually removed him from the security guard rotation at the DOT facility. Id. at 27-28, 38. In June of 2018, Kalejaiye filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging religious discrimination under Title VII and in July of 2019 the EEOC issued Kalejaiye a notice of his right to sue. Id. at 38; Complaint at 2 (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.

At some point before April of 2019, QI lost its security guard contract with the federal government. See Response to Undisputed Facts ¶ 49. After QI lost its contract, the new contractor replacing QI held a job fair for security officers who worked at the DOT facility. Id. at 49-50. The new contractor received a list of employees under the current contract from the government, presumably based on a list of employees provided to DOT by QI. Id. When the new contractor held a job fair for current employees-approximately nine months after Kalejaiye's last shift at the DOT facility-Kalejaiye's name was not included on the list of employees DOT provided to the new contractor. Id. QI relies on testimony that Kalejaiye was removed from the list because he was terminated from QI and removed from the DOT facility guard rotation prior to the job fair. Id. at 49. Kalejaiye, by contrast, asserts that he was not informed of his termination until after the job fair. Id. at 49-50.

In September of 2019, Kalejaiye sued QI for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as common law tortious interference with prospective business advantage under District of Columbia common law. See Compl. at 7-8. After discovery, both QI and Kalejaiye moved for summary judgment and Kalejaiye moved for sanctions. See generally Def.'s Mot.; Pl.'s Mot.; Sanctions Mot. The Court addresses all three motions below.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). And a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. On summary judgment, the Court views all evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the [C]ourt [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

With respect to Kalejaiye's motion for discovery sanctions, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the Court to “order measures no greater than necessary to cure prejudice” arising from a party's “fail[ure] to take reasonable steps to preserve” electronically stored information that should have been preserved in anticipation of litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(e). Rule 37(e)(1) “does not place a burden of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other” and the “rule leaves judges with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Sanctions

Because the Court's resolution of Kalejaiye's motion for sanctions could impact the evidence the Court considers when deciding the parties' motions for summary judgment, the Court addresses Kalejaiye's request for sanctions before proceeding to the merits. Kalejaiye's motion for sanctions requests relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(1) to cure the prejudice that Kalejaiye contends arises from QI's failure to preserve certain electronically stored information. See Sanctions Mot. at 9. In particular-and for reasons that will become clearer below-Kalejaiye requests that the Court preclude QI from arguing that: (1) QI did not have over 500 employees, (2) QI did not have space to hire Kalejaiye pursuant to its DOL contract, and (3) QI punished other security officers for violations of its grooming standards. See Sanctions Mot. at 14, 18-19. Kalejaiye “does not request sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2).” Id. at 9 n.8.^[2]

1. Number of Employees

The Court begins with Kalejaiye's request that the Court preclude QI from arguing that QI had fewer than 500 employees. Kalejaiye bases his motion on QI's failure to preserve records reflecting the number of its employees. See Sanctions Mot. at 7, 11. The D.C. Circuit has explained that the “duty to preserve documents exists where litigation is reasonably foreseeable.” Gerlich v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 711 F.3d 161, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “Once a court has determined that future litigation was reasonably foreseeable to the party who destroyed relevant records, the court must then assess . . . whether the destroyed records were likely relevant to the contested issue.” Id. at 171; see Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 332 F.R.D. 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Once a party anticipates litigation, it must preserve potentially relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary.”). Thus, the Court must determine whether (1) “future litigation was reasonably foreseeable” to QI when it ceased preserving records reflecting its...