Kalliope R. v. New York State Dep't of Educ.

279 Ed. Law Rep. 640

827 F.Supp.2d 130

KALLIOPE R., A Minor Child, by Her Parents, Dr. IRENE D. and Dr. George R.; Spiridonna D., A Minor Child, by Her Parents, Dr. Irene D., and Dr. George R.; Peter John S., A Minor Child, by His Father, Peter S.; Andrew M., A Minor Child, by His Parents, Dorothy M. and Louis M.; and School for Language and Communication Development, Plaintiffs,

v.NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 09–CV–1718 (JFB)(WDW).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 1, 2010.

Farrell Fritz, P.C. by James M. Wicks and Jonathan Kashimer, Uniondale, NY, for plaintiffs.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, by Susan M. Connolly, Hauppauge, NY, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiffs, parents suing on behalf of four minor children and the special education school the children attend, bring this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They seek a declaratory judgment that defendant, the New York State Education Department (“NYSED”), has unlawfully promulgated a policy prohibiting the use of a particular student-teacher ratio. They also seek to permanently enjoin NYSED from carrying out this alleged policy, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. NYSED has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. For the reasons set forth in the following memorandum and order, the Court denies the motion in its entirety.

I. Background

A. Factual Allegations

The following facts are taken from the complaint (“Compl.”), which the Court assumes to be true for the purposes of deciding this motion and construes in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-moving party.

Plaintiff School for Language and Communication Development (“SLCD”) operates non-profit, private schools serving children with handicapping conditions. (Compl. ¶ 17.) An SLCD school for preschool through eighth graders is located in Glen Cove, New York, and a school for sixth through twelfth graders is in Woodside, New York. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs Dr. Irene D. and Dr. George R.; Peter S.; and Dorothy M. and Louis M. (“the individual plaintiffs”) bring this action on behalf of their children with disabilities, each of whom attends SLCD. (Compl. ¶¶ 2; 14–16.)

Defendant, the New York State Department of Education (“NYSED” or “defendant”), is responsible overseeing the provision of educational services to disabled school-age students in New York State. (Compl. ¶ 19.)

As will be discussed in detail infra, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) entitles disabled children, such as the children of the individual plaintiffs, to a “free and appropriate public education.” ( See Compl. ¶ 2). Pursuant to IDEA and implementing New York state statutes, a Committee on Special Education (“CSE”) develops an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for a disabled child to ensure that the child receives such an education. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23–26.)

In 1985, SLCD's pre-school program began combing two groups of students with a “6:1:1” student-teacher staffing ratio—meaning a class with six students, one teacher, and one teacher's aide. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 58–59.) The combined class is known as a “12:2:2” or “6:1:1S” class.¹ (Compl. ¶¶ 58–61.) In 1994, SLCD requested that NYSED approve use of the 12:2:2 class ratio for SLCD's school-age program. (Compl. ¶ 63.) According to plaintiffs, David A. Payton, an NYSED official, responded in a letter that NYSED approval was not required. Specifically, the letter stated

[T]here is flexibility within existing regulations and your approved 6:1:1 student/staff option to implement a 12:2:2 instructional model by simply combining two 6:1:1 classes into a 12:2:2 instructional configuration. Local Committees on Special Education (CSE) would [need to] recommend on the student's Individualized Education Program (IEP) at 6:1:1 class with the IEP annotated to indicate that two 6:1:1 classes would be combined for instructional purposes appropriate to the individual needs of the students in the class. If a student's IEP recommended a 12:2:2 student/staff ratio, there would be no disruption in SLCD's program. Students would be referred back to the CSE and remain in their current class pending the amendment of the IEPs.... There is no further approval necessary from the Department [of Education].(Compl. ¶¶ 64–65.) In accordance with Payton's guidance, parents of disabled children and disabled children's CSEs have “routinely recommended,” as part of the IEP development process, that children be placed in 12:2:2 classes at SLCD. (Compl. ¶ 66.)

In April 2007, Bruce Schachter, an SED Regional Associate, wrote a letter to SLCD that appeared to tell SLCD that it could not use 12:2:2 classes at its Glen Cove school. (Compl. ¶¶ 69–70.) SLCD appealed the April 2007 letter to the Commissioner of the Department of Education. (Compl. ¶ 71.) The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Compl. ¶ 72.) In May 2007, however, Schachter wrote back to SLCD and stated that, “as long as” a student's IEP indicated that two 6:1:1 classes could be combined for instructional purposes, the school could continue “ ‘to combine 6:1:1 classes on an individual basis.’ ” (Compl. ¶ 75.)

A few months after SLCD received Schachter's letter, NYSED began contacting children's CSEs and told them to stop placing students, including the children of the individual plaintiffs in this case, in 12:2:2 classes. (Compl. ¶ 77.) Additionally, NYSED Regional Associate Susan Bandini told SLCD that each 6:1:1 class would require its own classroom and that 6:1:1 classes could not be combined with each other for the entire school day. (Compl. ¶¶ 77–78, 83–84.) To provide each 6:1:1 class with its own classroom, SLCD would need to spend no less than $600,000.00 modifying its buildings. (Compl. ¶ 80.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action on April 27, 2009. Each of the individual plaintiffs alleges that their children's IEP's recommended a 12:2:2 class size and/or that they were assured by their children's CSEs that the children would be educated in a 12:2:2 class. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 99–101; 106–08; 113–15; 120–21). Plaintiffs claim that defendants, by promulgating a policy prohibiting use of the 12:2:2 class size, violated IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act. They seek a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctions, costs, and attorneys' fees.

In May 2009, defendant notified the Court that it intended to move to dismiss the complaint. The Court set a briefing schedule, and both sides fully briefed the motion. Defendants argue that plaintiffs (1) have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; (2) have failed to state a claim under IDEA; (3) lack standing under the Rehabilitation Act; and (4) have failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

Thereafter, the scheduled oral argument on the motion was adjourned several times based on the Court's schedule and on the parties' representations that they were attempting to settle the matter. ( See Docket 14–17.) These negotiations were unsuccessful, and oral argument took place on May 26, 2010.

II. Standard of Review

Defendant has moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006); Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. The Court instructed district courts to first “identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Defendant asserts that the complaint must be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and, for their Rehabilitation Act claim, lack standing. As set forth below, the Court disagrees.

A. IDEA Claim

1. The IDEA Statute

The purpose of IDEA is to provide children with disabilities access to a “free appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c), (d). In passing IDEA, “Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and...