Kalpoe v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.

222 Cal.App.4th 206

166 Cal.Rptr.3d 80

Deepak KALPOE et al., Petitioners,

v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;Phillip C. McGraw, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. B246154

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Filed December 17, 2013

Review Denied March 19, 2014

See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 629 et seq.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. William A. MacLaughlin, Judge. Petition denied. (Super. Ct. No. BC363201)

Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, Kristina M. Beck, William J. Cremer (pro hac vice), Joshua D. Yeager (pro hac vice) and I. Brian Marquez (pro hac vice); Girardi Keese, Thomas V. Girardi and Graham B. Lippsmith, Los Angeles, for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, William C. Haggerty, Long Beach, and Neil S. Tardiff, San Luis Obispo; Jackson Walker, Charles L. Babcock and Nancy W. Hamilton for Real Parties in Interest.

WOODS, J.

Deepak Kalpoe and Satish Kalpoe (individually referred to by their first names, collectively referred to as petitioners) filed a petition for writ of mandate after the trial court granted a motion in limine brought by Phillip C. McGraw, CBS Paramount Domestic Television, and Peteski Productions, Inc. (collectively real parties).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioners, residents of Aruba, were questioned in connection with the 2005 disappearance of Natalee Holloway, an American teenager on a high school trip to Aruba. McGraw is the host of a television show (the Show) produced by Peteski Productions Inc. (Peteski) in association with CBS Paramount (CBS) and broadcast on a national television network.

Real parties hired a private investigator, Jamie Skeeters, to travel to Aruba in the summer of 2005 to investigate Holloway's disappearance. Skeeters arranged to meet with Deepak by representing that he would help exonerate him. Skeeters secretly recorded and videotaped the meeting with Deepak. During the meeting, Skeeters asked Deepak if he and Satish had sex with Holloway the night she disappeared.

On September 15, 2005, real parties broadcast an episode of the Show which was devoted entirely to Holloway's disappearance. It was the first episode of the 2005 fall television season. The videotape showed that when asked by Skeeters, Deepak indicated that Holloway had sex with him and Satish.

After the episode aired, Deepak claimed he had not consented to the videotaping and recording of the meeting, and had not known that Skeeters was recording it. He also claimed that when Skeeters asked if Holloway had sex with him and his brother, he responded “No,” shaking his head, and that the videotape played on the Show had been manipulated.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 13, 2006, petitioners filed a complaint alleging several causes of action against real parties.¹ A First Amended Complaint was filed on February 22, 2008. It contains causes of action for defamation, defamation per se, invasion of privacy, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit, negligent misrepresentation and deceit and civil conspiracy.

In October 2011, real parties filed a motion in limine (“Motion in Limine No. 1”) seeking to bar petitioners from introducing any evidence at trial regarding general or punitive damages for defamation, defamation per se, false light, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.² The motion was based on Civil Code section 48a (further statutory references are to the Civil Code) which requires that a plaintiff must demand a correction or is limited only to recovering special damages, as defined by the statute. Real parties argued that because petitioners had not demanded a correction, they could not introduce evidence of general or exemplary damages. Petitioners did not dispute that they did not demand a correction. The motion was initially heard on August 24, 2012, along with several other motions in limine, and the court took the matter under submission. At a continued hearing, on November 13, 2012, the trial court granted real parties' motion.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on December 19, 2012.

Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court on January 14, 2013.

On January 31, 2013, we issued an order to show cause to the superior court directing a written return to be filed by real parties in interest and allowing petitioners to file a reply.

DISCUSSION

Section 48a, enacted in 1931 and amended in 1945, provides in pertinent part that “1. In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.” (Italics added.)

The statute goes on to define “special damages” as those damages suffered in respect to plaintiff's property, business, trade, profession or occupation including monies expended as a result of the alleged libel (§ 48a, subd. 4(b)) and “general damages” as those for loss or reputation, shame, mortification and hurt feelings. (§ 48a, subd. 4(a).)

Prior to this time, common law provided that a plaintiff could recover general damages without proving actual injuries. (Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 30, 81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912.)

In 1949, section 48.5 was enacted to include “both visual and sound radio broadcasting” within the definitions of “radio,” “radio broadcast” and “broadcast” as used in the division of the Civil Code containing section 48a.

Petitioners contend the trial court erred in applying section 48a to claims arising from or relating to the Show because the statute is only meant to apply to media which are engaged in the business of immediate dissemination of news. We examine the words of the statute, the case law, and the facts presented by the parties in determining whether the trial court's ruling was correct in holding that petitioners were subject to the retraction requirements of section 48a.

1. Statutory Interpretation

We first examine the language of the statutes. Real parties argue that the plain language of sections 48 and 48.5 does not distinguish between types of the content in “visual and sound radio broadcasting,” and thus the retraction requirement applies to all television shows whether or not they are engaged in the immediate dissemination of news.

In interpreting a statute, the objective is to ascertain the Legislature's intent and thereby effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1147, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 179 P.3d 882; Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 137 P.3d 218.) To ascertain that intent, we begin with the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857, 92 P.3d 350.) “If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196; see also Smith v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 83, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 137 P.3d 218.)

“If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we ‘ “select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” ’ ” (Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196.)

We do not construe a statute in isolation, but rather construe in context with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole scheme may be harmonized and still be effective. (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14, 177 Cal.Rptr. 325, 634 P.2d 352.) We presume that when enacting a statute, the Legislature was aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules. (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. California State Lottery Com. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 118, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 326.)

Given this framework, the plain language of section 48a only applies to “publications of a libel in a newspaper or of a slander by radio broadcasts.” Section 48a does not qualify what “type” of newspaper or radio broadcast, nor does it mention the content of a particular newspaper or broadcast. Similarly, section 48.5 does not qualify the type of visual or sound broadcast which comes under its purview. Thus, real parties contend, there is no ambiguity in the section, and there is no necessity to look at extrinsic sources such as legislative history.

We note that reviewing courts may examine the legislative history of an unambiguous statute if it supports or bolsters their interpretation of that statute. (In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, 519, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608.) In any event, we find nothing in the legislative history of section 48a to alter our interpretation of its language. The first version of section 48a, enacted in 1931, included only newspapers. The 1945 amendment added radio broadcasts to the statute's reach. Nothing in the committee reports or communications from the governor's office shows any intent to limit the types of radio...