Kamienski v. Ford

PAUL KAMIENSKI, et al. Plaintiff, v. MARLENE LYNCH FORD, THOMAS F. KELAHER, JAMES W. HOLZAPFEL,RONALD F. DELIGNY, SAMUEL J. MARZARELLA, E. DAVID MILLARD, JAMES A. CHURCHILL,and DANIEL T. MAHONY. Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 3:11-cv-03056 (PGS)(DEA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

September 17, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment by Defendants Marlene Lynch Ford, Thomas F. Kelaher, James W. Holzapfel, Ronald F. DeLigny, John Mercun, Samuel J. Marzarella, E. David Millard, James A. Churchill, and Daniel T. Mahony (hereinafter "Defendants") (ECF No. 155); and a motion to supplement the record brought by Plaintiff (ECF No. 224). The case arises from an alleged wrongful prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiff, Paul Kamienski, for the murders of Henry (Nick) and Barbara DeTournay committed on September 19, 1983. The history of this case has previously been set out in a number of issued opinions by several courts, and the Court incorporates herein the facts and procedural history as set forth in those opinions. See, Kamienski v. Hendricks, 332 F. App'x 740, 744 (3d Cir. 2009)¹.

The motion for summary judgment was filed more than two years ago, and the delay in deciding it is due to supplemental briefing and updating the record. More specifically, at the timeof filing, the Defendants moved for summary judgment primarily based upon prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity for each defendant. In response, Plaintiff set forth sixteen specific allegations of acts or omissions concerning the investigation and prosecution of Kamienski which he argues constituted a breach of his constitutional rights. Upon review of the original filing, Defendants did not address each of the sixteen acts or omissions. As a result, the Court requested that each of these sixteen allegations be addressed in supplemental briefing.

For organizational purposes, a summary of the applicable law is set forth initially, followed by the identification of each Defendant to understand his or her role in the prosecution of Kamienski, then a separate section on each of the sixteen allegations with corresponding facts and legal analysis.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the evidence establishes the moving party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant, and it is material if, under substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence "is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1995). "[U]nsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment." Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorp, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial). Moreover, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If a court determines, after drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and making all credibility determinations in his favor "that no reasonable jury could find for him, summary judgment is appropriate." Alevras v. Tacopina, 226 Fed. App'x. 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2007).

II.

As noted, this case revolves around the alleged deprivation of civil rights in the investigation and prosecution of Kamienski. Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "By its own terms, the statute does not create substantive rights. Instead, it only provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federallaws." Williams v. Consovoy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 297, 299 (D.N.J. 2004) (quoting Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2003)). To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) conduct by a "person"; (2) who acted "under the color of state law"; (3) proximately causing; and (4) a deprivation of a federally protected right. See Section 1983, Federal Judicial Center, at 133 (Third Ed. 2014); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government . . . ." Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1998). Thus, to establish a substantive due process claim under §1983, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the particular interest at issue is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the government's deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience. Connection Training Servs. v. City of Phila., 358 Fed. App'x 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2009).

Generally, to show such deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment due process right "requires the Plaintiff to establish that a state [actor] . . . intentionally or deliberately caused the deprivation of" the right. Section 1983 Litigation, Federal Judicial Center, at 12-13 (3d Edition 2014). "The Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (emphasis in original).

Through sixteen allegations, Kamienski alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by: (1) not conducting a full and fair investigation; (2) failing to provide exculpatory evidence; (3) creating false or misleading statements; (4) coercing witnessesto give false testimony; (5) presenting false or misleading evidence to the jury; (6) filing false and misleading briefs with the Court; and (7) failing to supervise the investigation, prosecution, and post-conviction litigation. (See ECF No. 186, at 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34). In response, Defendants argue that none of these allegations amount to a violation of due process, and at most, "Kamienski's criticisms consist of second guessing as to additional areas of investigation which could have been conducted. Lacking any evidence of intentional or bad faith acts, Kamienski essentially accuses the OCPO [Ocean County Prosecutors Office] Defendants of negligence." (Def. Supp. Br., ECF No. 194, at 13-14). Defendants also assert qualified immunity and absolute prosecutorial immunity apply to their actions. Both prosecutorial and qualified immunity are explained below.

III.

Prosecutorial immunity applies when a prosecutor advocates for the state by engaging in conduct that is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). "A prosecutor bears the 'heavy burden' of establishing entitlement to absolute immunity." Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2008). The presumption is that qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, "is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties." Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1939 (1991). In order to overcome this presumption, a "prosecutor must show that he or she was functioning as the state's advocate when performing the action(s) in question." Odd, 538 F.3d. at 208 (citing Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (2006)). Thus, courts evaluate whether a prosecutor may assert absolute immunity by engaging in a "functional analysis" of the prosecutor's actions. Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994). The functional analysis looks to the nature of the function performed, not the actor who performed the function. Buckleyv. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). Moreover, the functional analysis "focuses on the conduct . . . not on the. harm the conduct may have caused or the question whether it was lawful." Id. at 271.

Essentially, "acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his [or her] role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protection of absolute immunity." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. "This includes activity taken while in court, such as the presentation of evidence or legal argument, as well as selected out-of-court behavior intimately associated with the judicial...