Kammerdiener v. Armstrong Cnty.

RONALD E. KAMMERDIENER, Plaintiff, v. ARMSTRONG COUNTY, PHILLIP SHAFFER, REGINA HIMES,and ERIKA KIRKPATRICK, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-1484

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 1, 2020

District Judge Cathy Bissoon

Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 28

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Ronald E. Kammerdiener ("Plaintiff") initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of allegations that Plaintiff was wrongfully imprisoned for six months without a hearing and denied access to a lawyer after he failed to pay financial penalties associated with his prior criminal convictions.

Presently before the Court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Submitted on Behalf of Regina Himes and Erika Kirkpatrick in their Official Capacities Only ("Motion to Dismiss"). ECF No. 28. For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted.

II. REPORT

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

In the operative First Amended Complaint (the "Amended Complaint"), ECF No. 26, Plaintiff claims that he was arrested on a bench warrant from Armstrong County for contempt of court on November 8, 2016. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff allegedly had failed to make payments of fines and costs as required by a March 6, 2015 Consent Order (the "2015 Order"). Id. In relevant part, the 2015 Order states:

[T]he Defendant having consented to the entry of this Order, the Defendant is hereby ADJUDGED to be in civil contempt. In connection therewith, the Defendant is sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Armstrong County Jail, not to exceed six months commencing on November 1, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. The Defendant may purge him/herself of this contempt and thereby do away with the necessity of serving any portion of the jail term hereby imposed by complying with the following conditions:

PAY $25.00 MONTHLY, BEGINNING MAY 1, 2015, UNTIL ALL MONIES DUE HAVE BEEN PAID AND INFORM THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT OF ALL ADDRESS CHANGES.

If the Defendant fails to comply with any of the above stated purge conditions, the date that his/her jail term is to commence shall accelerate to the day immediately following the date of first noncompliance. If the Defendant fails to report to the jail as required, a bench warrant will be issued for his/her arrest and incarceration without further hearing or notice.

ECF No. 25-1.¹

After being incarcerated in the Clarion County Correctional Facility for eight days without a hearing or ability to speak with a counselor, Plaintiff was transported by two Armstrong County probation officers, including Defendant Erika Kirkpatrick ("Kirkpatrick"), to the Armstrong County Jail. ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 18-19. He remained incarcerated at the Armstrong County Jail for six months. Id. ¶ 40. Throughout this time, Plaintiff claims he was not provided access to a hearing and was unable to speak with a public defender, despite his repeated efforts to do so. Id. ¶¶ 20-37, 40, 43-44.

On December 9, 2016, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Kirkpatrick describing his situation and requesting information regarding his options. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Kirkpatrick responded on January 18, 2017, indicating that Plaintiff would remain incarcerated until the balance of his costs was paid or at the end of a six-month incarceration period. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

On May 5, 2017, Plaintiff met with Kirkpatrick. She directed him to sign a new consent order (the "2017 Order"). Id. ¶ 39. The 2017 Order contains substantially the same provisions as the 2015 Order, but it includes amended dates in the portion of the Order related to his payment plan and starting date of his term of incarceration. ECF No. 25-1 at 3. The 2017 Order was entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County on May 19, 2017, and the 2015 Order was vacated on the same date. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff claims that both Kirkpatrick and Chief Adult Probation Officer Regina Himes ("Himes") required inviduals, including Plaintiff, to sign "consent" orders, which stated that if the individual failed to make payments, they would automatically be placed in jail. ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 7, 46.

Plaintiff claims that the Armstrong County Jail and its warden, Defendant Phillip Shafer, executed a "policy and/or custom and/or practice of automatically holding and jailing, without a hearing or appointment of counsel, individuals who failed to make paments of costs and fines." Id. ¶ 69. With respect to Himes and Kirkpatrick, Plaintiff broadly alleges that they had "actual knowledge" of his incarceration without a hearing, "acquiesced" to individuals being detained without a hearing, and that Himes has "personally directed" individuals be detained without a hearing. Id. ¶¶ 67-68.

2. Plaintiff's Original Complaint

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on November 6, 2018. ECF No. 1. Based upon the underlying factual allegations above, Plaintiff claimed that the 2015 Order was "facially defectiveas, on its face, it permitted incarceration for six months without a court hearing (or any process) to determine the individual's ability to pay, in violation of multiple Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pennsylvania statutory law, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the federal constitution." Id. ¶ 14.

Plaintiff asserted five claims. He alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights (Count I); Sixth and/or Fourteenth Amendment right of counsel (Count II); Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment right against wrongful detainment (Count III); and Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Count IV). Id. ¶¶ 44-103. Plaintiff also asserted a claim for false imprisonment (Count V). Id. ¶¶ 104-107. Plaintiff asserted Counts I through IV, only, against Defendants Himes and Kirkpatrick in their official and individual capacities.

3. Defendants' Prior Motion to Dismiss

Himes and Kirkpatrick filed a partial Motion to Dismiss the claims against them in their official capacities on January 7, 2019. ECF No. 11. Per the Court's order, ECF No. 19, the parties filed supplemental briefing on the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and whether Heck barred the claims raised in Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF Nos. 21, 22 and 23; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

4. The Court's Disposition of the Prior Motion to Dismiss

On August 7, 2019, the undersigned filed a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), recommending that Plaintiff's federal Constitutional violations (Counts I through IV) be dismissed with prejudice, as each is barred by Heck and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF No. 24. Wefurther recommended that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim for false imprisonment (Count V).

On August 29, 2019, District Judge Cathy Bissoon issued a Memorandum Order adopting in part, and rejecting in part, the R&R. ECF No. 25. Upon review, Judge Bissoon agreed that "those aspects of the Complaint that attack the 2015 and 2017 Orders are barred by Heck." Id. at 3. However, she found the record was not developed enough to conclusively say that Counts I though IV are barred, noting that "Plaintiff's supplemental briefing clarifies that the gravamen of his allegations appears to be that he was injured by Defendants' conduct that was not dictated or necessitated by the contempt conviction or the 2015 Orders." Id.

As set forth in the Memorandum Order:

It is true that the 2015 Orders accelerated Plaintiff's incarceration to the day immediately following his first noncompliance, and authorized a bench warrant to be issued and him to be initially incarcerated without notice or hearing. Plaintiff appears to agree that the 2015 Orders did so and he states in his Brief that he does not challenge those aspects of the Orders in this suit. Heck is no bar if Plaintiff is not challenging his conviction for contempt nor actions by Defendants caused by the 2015 Orders. SeeHeck, 512 U.S. at 487 ("[I]f the district court determined that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should not be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.").

Second, as the Court sees it, Plaintiff's filings do plausibly allege that his rights were violated, and it is where the Consent Orders stop that his actual injuries begin. As for Plaintiff's allegation he should have been afforded an attorney, the 2015 Orders do not mention Plaintiff's right to counsel, or any waiver thereof, during his incarceration. Additionally, regarding the term of incarceration to be served, the 2015 Orders do not state that Plaintiff will be incarcerated for six months if he fails to comply; rather, they read that "Defendant is sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Armstrong County Jail, not to exceed six months." It appears then, if reading Plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him, that he is complaining of injuries that can in fact be separated from the 2015 Orders. SeeTarapchak v. Schuylkill Cty., 2014 WL 4626701, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2014) (Finding Rooker-Feldman did not bar plaintiff's injury when it "while indirectly related, did not stem from, nor was it 'caused by' the same contempt order that [the plaintiff] complains about in her amended complaint.").

Where Plaintiff's incarceration occurred under the circumstances alleged in the Complaint and in Plaintiff's Brief, and persisted without access to counsel or a hearing of any kind, the Court cannot say at this juncture that his Complaint is wholly barred. SeeTurner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 449 (2011) (incarceration for civil contempt without counsel or alternative procedures to assess ability to pay violated Due Process Clause); see also

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