Kampuries v. Am. Honda Motor Co.

204 F.Supp.3d 484

Andrew KAMPURIES, Plaintiff,

v.AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., TRW Automotive Holding Corp, and Autoliv Asp Inc., Defendants.

No 15-CV-5061 (JFB) (AKT)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 6, 2016

Plaintiff proceeds pro se. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is represented by Grace Jang, Segal McCambridge Singer and Mahoney, 850 Third Avenue, Suite 1100, New York, NY 10022. TRW Automotive Holding Corp is represented by James C. Ughetta and Brian Keith Gibson, Littleton Joyce Ughetta Park & Kelly LLP, 4 Manhattanville Road, Suite 202, Purchase, NY 10577; and Matthew Coveler and Benjamin T. Zinnecker, Weinstein Tippetts & Little LLP, 7500 San Felipe, Suite 500, Houston, TX 77063. Autoliv Asp Inc. is represented by Peter Joseph Fazio, Aaronson, Rappaport, Feinstein & Deutsch, 600 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge:

Plaintiff, Andrew Kampuries (hereinafter, "plaintiff"), proceeding pro se , brings this action asserting a claim for negligence, including design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn, and a claim for fraudulent concealment.

Defendants, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (hereinafter, "Honda"), TRW Automotive Holding Corp (hereinafter, "TRW"), and Autoliv Asp Inc. (hereinafter, "Autoliv") (collectively, hereinafter, "defendants") now move to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. In particular, the Court concludes that plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for fraudulent concealment, and there is no basis for equitable tolling of his claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from plaintiff's filings, and are not findings of fact by the Court. Instead, the Court will assume these facts to be true and, for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, will construe them in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.

On December 5, 2007, plaintiff, while driving his 2006 Honda Civic, drifted off the road and struck a tree. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Honda's Mot. to Dismiss (hereinafter, "Honda Opp'n") 13, ECF No. 42.) Plaintiff claims that, although he was traveling at 55 miles per hour, his airbag did not deploy upon impact. (Id. )

Over seven years later, on April 6, 2015, allegedly prompted by an October 2014 recall notice he received concerning malfunctioning Takata brand airbags installed in certain Honda vehicles,¹ plaintiff filed a complaint against Honda and Takata in the Southern District of Florida as part of a pending class action related to defective Takata airbag inflators used in Honda cars. However, it was later determined that plaintiff's vehicle contained an Autoliv, not Takata, brand airbag inflator, and therefore his case was removed from the class action and transferred to this Court. (See ECF No. 21; Ex. to Honda Opp'n 176, ECF No. 42-1.) Plaintiff thereafter added Autoliv and TRW as defendants. (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 36.)

Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed September 21, 2015, alleges only that "this was negligent and [r]eckless not alerting the public for years and hided (sic) this [d]eath trap car from my self (sic) and family,[ ]not knowing if the airbags will deploy or not." (Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 33.) His oppositions to defendants' motions to dismiss elaborate somewhat on these allegations, asserting that "[d]uring the accident, the Autoliv[ ]airbag with trw.aribag (sic) sensor installed in the 2006 Honda [C]ivic failed to deploy," and that "[t]he speed and circumstances of the accident were such that the airbag, if not defective, should have deployed." (Honda Opp'n 13; see also Pl.'s Opp'n to Autoliv and TRW's Mots. to Dismiss (hereinafter, "Autoliv/TRW Opp'n") 2, ECF No. 54.)

He further contends that, "upon information and belief, Honda has known of the [i]nflator [d]efect in the Honda airbags in Honda's vehicles since 2000 s (sic) ... [and] [t]he [v]ehicle [m]anufacturer [d]efendants² have known or should have known of the [i]nflator [d]efect in the Honda airbags since 2000³ ." (Id. at 3.) He claims, however, that defendants "concealed from or failed to notify [him] and the public of the full and complete nature of the [i]nflator [d]efect" and that they "actively concealed the true character, quality and nature of the vehicles and knowingly made misrepresentations about the quality, reliability, characteristics and performance of the vehicles." (Id. )

Finally, he states that "[t]his is a cause of action for negligence, including design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn." (Id. at 2.) However, based on the allegations in his amended complaint and oppositions, it appears he also seeks to assert a claim for fraudulent concealment.

B. Procedural History

Honda filed its motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint on October 14, 2015 (ECF No. 31), and plaintiff submitted a document, presumably intended to be his opposition, on November 2, 2015 (ECF No. 42). On November 23, 2015, Autoliv moved to dismiss (ECF No. 48), and on December 2, 2015, TRW moved to dismiss (ECF No. 52). Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court on December 21, 2015 (ECF No. 54), on which he wrote "opposition," though he did not specify whether he was responding to Autoliv's motion, TRW's motion, or both. Honda, Autoliv, and TRW replied on November 30, 2015, January 6, 2016, and January 13, 2016, respectively. (See ECF Nos. 49, 57, 58.) The Court has considered all of the parties' submissions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g. , Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters. , 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006) ; Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc. , 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC , 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This standard does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The Supreme Court clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal , setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court instructed district courts first to "identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. Second, if a complaint contains "well pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id.

The Court notes that in adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is entitled to consider: "(1) facts alleged in the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, (2) documents ‘integral’ to the complaint and relied upon in it, even if not attached or incorporated by reference, (3) documents or information contained in defendant's motion papers if plaintiff has knowledge or possession of the material and relied on it in framing the complaint, (4) public disclosure documents required by law to be, and that have been, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and (5) facts of which judicial notice may properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." In re Merrill Lynch & Co. , 273 F.Supp.2d 351, 356–57 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (internal citations omitted), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. , 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.2005).

Finally, where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se , courts are " ‘obliged to construe his pleadings liberally.’ " Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant , 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting McEachin v. McGuinnis , 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004) ); see also McPherson v. Coombe , 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be interpreted "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, a pro se plaintiff's complaint, while liberally interpreted, still must " ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Mancuso v. Hynes , 379 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 ); see also Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Claims

1. Statutes of Limitations

"It has long been established as a matter of federal law that state statutes of limitations govern the timeliness of state law claims under federal diversity jurisdiction[,] [and that] [s]tate law also determines the related questions of what events serve to commence an action and to toll the statute of limitations in such cases." Personis v. Oiler , 889 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir.1989).

In addition, "[b]ecause the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiff's claims accrued." Overall v. Estate of Klotz , 52 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir.1995). "However, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a particular statute of limitation has been tolled." Voiceone Commc'ns, LLC v. Google Inc. , No. 12 CIV. 9433(PGG), 2014 WL 10936546, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,...