Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. v. Allen

KANSAS CITY CHIEFS FOOTBALL CLUB, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.TAJE ALLEN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:12-CV-00238-BCW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

DATED: March 30, 2013

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award (Doc. #15, at p. 8) and Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award (Doc. #23). The Court being duly advised of the premises, for good cause shown, and for the following reasons, grants Plaintiffs' Motion (Doc. #23) and denies Defendants' Motion (Doc. #15).

BACKGROUND

This matter stems from an arbitration provision that is standard language in the contract entered between National Football League ("NFL") players and the players' certain NFL Club.

NFL players are bound by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") negotiated between the National Football League Management Council ("NFLMC"), on behalf of all NFL teams including the Kansas City Chiefs ("Chiefs"), and the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), on behalf of NFL players. The CBA includes a collectively-bargained standard NFL Player Contract that each player enters with an NFL Club.

The NFL Player Contract and Article IX of the now-expired CBA provide all disputes involving the interpretation or enforcement of the CBA or NFL Player Contractmust be submitted to final and binding arbitration before a mutually selected arbitrator. See Doc. # 1-1. Pursuant to the CBA, a "non-injury grievance" may be initiated by a player, a member team, the NFLMC or the NFLPA by filing a written notice to the opposing parties. Each NFL Player Contract at issue in this case stated it was made under and governed by Missouri law and contained a clause governing the resolution of disputes concerning workers' compensation claims, as follows:

[J]urisdiction of all workers' compensation claims and all matters related to workers' compensation . . . shall be exclusively determined by and exclusively decided in accordance with the internal laws of the state of Missouri . . . without resort to choice of law rules. In addition, Player agrees that the Contract calls for performance in Jackson County, Missouri, and jurisdiction and venue for any and all workers' compensation disputes shall lie exclusively in the State Courts of Jackson County, Missouri.¹ See Doc. # 15-1, at 8.

At various times from 2009 through 2011, Scott Connot, Donald Edwards, Jr., Taje Allen, Rocky Boiman, J.R. Niklos, Eric Warfield, Greg Wesley, R-Kal Truluck, Morten Andersen, Shaunard Harts, Patrick Surtain, Gary Stills, Jerome Woods, Damion McIntosh, William Bartee, and Steve Williams ("Players") filed "cumulative injury" claims with the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("WCAB"), each alleging injuries sustained in at least in part while playing NFL games in California.

In response, the NFLMC filed grievances against the Players, claiming each application for workers' compensation benefits in California violated the choice-of-law and/or choice-of-forum provisions of each player's NFL Player Contract with the Chiefs.

On September 22, 2011, the grievances against the Players were cumulatively submitted to Arbitrator Michael H. Beck. All parties were represented by counsel, presented argument, and entered exhibits into evidence. The parties stipulated each"individual player[] named in the grievance [had] ongoing Workers' Compensation claims pending before the [WCAB] in California." See Doc. #15-1, at p. 9.

On February 23, 2012, the arbitrator issued an award sustaining the consolidated grievance in favor of the Chiefs and NFLMC. The arbitrator held he was bound by the CBA's terms and three earlier arbitration decisions rejecting nearly identical challenges to the choice-of-law and/or choice-of-forum provision. The arbitrator also held the Players were required to abide by their agreements and cease and desist from pursuing their California workers' compensation claims, "through the withdrawal of their claims before the applicable tribunal." See Doc. #15, at 15.

On February 24, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter to confirm and enforce the Arbitration Award pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C § 185, et seq (Doc. #1). On April 10, 2012, Defendants filed an unopposed motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint (Doc. #5). The Court granted the motion and ordered Defendants to answer or otherwise respond by June 7, 2012 (Doc. #6). Defendants filed their Answer, Motion, and Counterclaim (Doc. #15), which included Defendant's Motion to Vacate the Award, on June 7, 2012.

On June 25, 2012, the parties filed a Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Regarding Briefing Schedule (Doc #17), noting the parties' agreement "that this case presents purely legal issues to be decided solely on the briefs. . . ." The Court ordered opening briefs in support of each parties' respective positions be filed by July 26, 2012, opposition briefs be filed by August 16, 2012, and reply briefs be filed by September 6, 2012 (Doc. #18). Following full briefing, Plaintiffs filed three supplemental suggestions in support of their Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award (Docs. #42, #43, & #45). Because motions areruled "upon the written motion, supporting suggestions, opposing suggestions, and reply suggestions," the Court advised Plaintiffs they could file supplemental suggestions without first requesting leave. L.R. 7.0(b). However, the Court is not bound to consider any arguments set forth by Plaintiffs' supplemental suggestions.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm the Arbitration Award (Doc. #23) argues the Court must confirm the arbitration award because the Court's limited review of the Award is based upon an underlying CBA that does not offend public policy. Defendants argue the Court should vacate the Award due to the the choice-of-law and/or choice-of-forum provision of the CBA. Defendants argue such provision renders the NFL Player Contracts against public policy because they operate as a waiver to the Players' rights to pursue workers' compensation in states other than Missouri.

LEGAL STANDARD

The CBA at issue falls under federal jurisdiction under § 301 of the LMRA. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457-58 (1957). The Court may enforce CBAs and arbitration awards issued pursuant to a CBA. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Local 245 v. Kansas City Piggy Back, 88 F.3d 659, 660 (8th Cir. 1996).

When parties have agreed to use an arbitrator to interpret what their agreement means, the Court will set aside the arbitrator's award "only in rare circumstances." E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (citation omitted). "Judicial review of a labor-arbitration award is narrow and deferential. An arbitrator's award must be upheld if it 'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely [the arbitrator's] own brand of industrial justice.'" Breckenridge O'Fallon, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 682, 664 F.3d 1230,1233-34 (8th Cir. 2012). "If an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision. Id. (citing Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).

"As with any contract, however, a court may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy." W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). Such a public policy that would prevent a court from enforcing a CBA must be explicit, well-defined, and dominant, and must be "ascertained by reference to positive law and not from general considerations of supposed public interests[.]" E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 63.

DISCUSSION

1. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO VACATE IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue the Court should deny Defendants' Motion to Vacate (Doc. #15, at p. 8) because it was filed out of time. "A party seeking to challenge the validity of an arbitration award generally must file a timely motion to vacate. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36 v. Systemaire, Inc., 241 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2001). The statute of limitations for a motion to vacate under the LMRA is drawn from the most analogous forum state law. Id. In this case, the most analogous state law is the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act which imposes a 90-day statute of limitations. Id., (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 435.405.2 (2012)). Typically, the failure to timely file a motion to vacate also "bars a party from later raising any defenses to the confirmation of the award that could have been raised in the vacation motion." Systemaire, Inc., 241 F.3d at 975.

In this matter, the arbitrator issued his decision on February 23, 2012. Within 90 days, Defendants filed an unopposed extension motion, requesting additional time to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. #5). The Court issued an Order granting Defendants until June 7, 2012 to answer or otherwise respond (Doc. #6). Although the June 7, 2012 filing date of Defendants' Motion to Vacate is outside the 90-day limitations period to challenge the validity of an arbitration award, because Plaintiffs did not oppose Defendants' extension motion and the Court granted the Defendants' request for additional time, interests of justice and fairness require the Court consider the merits of Defendants' Motion.

2. THE COURT'S REVIEW OF THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD IS LIMITED.

In his decision, the arbitrator noted his review was limited in scope to the merits of the consolidated grievance, while the question of public policy "'is wholly independent from the collective bargaining agreement and is...