Kan. Fire & Safety Equip. v. City of Topeka

62 Kan.App.2d 341

514 P.3d 387

KANSAS FIRE AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT, a Kansas corporation, Hal G. Richardson d/b/a Bueno Food Brand, Topeka Vinyl Top, and Minuteman Solar Film, Appellants/Cross-appellees,

v.CITY OF TOPEKA, Kansas, Appellee/Cross-appellant.

No. 123,063

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed June 24, 2022.

John R. Hamilton, of Hamilton, Laughlin, Barker, Johnson & Jones, of Topeka, and Jason B. Prier, of The Prier Law Firm, L.L.C., of Lawrence, for appellants/cross-appellees.

Shelly Starr, chief of litigation, City of Topeka, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before Hill, P.J., Powell and Cline, JJ.

Cline, J.:

Multiple month-to-month tenants sued the City of Topeka for relocation benefits under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 after they were forced to move once the City of Topeka bought the property where they operated their businesses. The district court granted the City summary judgment after finding the tenants were not "displaced persons" under that statute, nor did the tenants establish the City intended to condemn the property (two prerequisites for relocation benefits under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 ). Our Supreme Court reversed that decision after finding material disputed facts prevented summary judgment.

On remand, the City sought summary judgment on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the tenants’ claims because K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 does not provide the tenants a private right of action. It also repeated its factual arguments that the tenants did not qualify for relocation benefits. The district court agreed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment on that basis.

We find the district court properly held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the tenants’ claims. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 is part of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA), K.S.A. 26-501 et seq. Even if tenants are "displaced persons" under the Act, nothing in the EDPA permits a displaced person to file an independent action in the district court seeking relocation benefits under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518. However, we find a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice, so we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to vacate the order granting summary judgment for the City and instead enter an order of dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the district court's summary judgment order and remanded this case to the district court to resolve disputed facts. Nauheim v. City of Topeka , 309 Kan. 145, 154, 432 P.3d 647 (2019). Our Supreme Court summarized the factual and procedural background, including the arguments and outcome at this court:

"In 2011, the City authorized by ordinance a public works project to replace a structurally deficient drainage system on a tributary to Butcher Creek to alleviate potential flooding within the city limits. The authorizing language did not mention condemnation. After exchanging terms with the owner during 2013, the City bought real property where commercial tenants operated their businesses. During the negotiation, the City made clear it wanted the property vacant before obtaining title. The owner complied, and the transaction concluded without the City exercising its eminent domain power.

"Charles Nauheim and Hal G. Richardson, the former tenants, relocated their respective businesses to other property. They sued the City for relocation costs under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518, which states:

‘Whenever federal funding is not involved, and real property is acquired by any condemning authority through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action or through a condemnation action, and which acquisition will result in the displacement of any person, the condemning authority shall:

‘(a) Provide the displaced person , as defined in the federal uniform relocation assistance and real property acquisition policies act of 1970, fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance to or for displaced persons.’ (Emphases added.)

"The City argued the statute did not apply because it never intended to condemn the property had the negotiation failed. It also contended neither tenant was a ‘displaced person’ as statutorily defined. The City claimed the tenants relocated because of agreements with the property owner—also their landlord. All parties moved for summary judgment.

"The district court granted the City's motion. It held the tenants were not displaced persons as defined by law. It also found the uncontroverted facts proved the property acquisition was not made ‘in advance of a condemnation action,’ but occurred instead by the City exercising its corporate power. The tenants appealed." 309 Kan. at 147, 432 P.3d 647.

On appeal to this court, the panel ultimately reversed and remanded for the district court to resolve disputed material facts. Nauheim v. City of Topeka , 52 Kan. App. 2d 969, 970, 381 P.3d 508 (2016), rev. granted 306 Kan. 1319 (2017). The tenants petitioned our Supreme Court for review of the panel's finding that a displaced person must prove a condemning authority threatened condemnation or took affirmative action to condemn the property before acquisition. Nauheim , 309 Kan. at 149, 432 P.3d 647.

Employing canons of statutory interpretation, our Supreme Court disagreed with the panel's interpretation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518. Our Supreme Court concluded the panel's interpretation "too narrowly construes what evidence might show entitlement to benefits" and held "[w]hether a negotiation is in advance of a condemnation action is a question of fact a claimant needs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence." 309 Kan. at 152, 432 P.3d 647.

Our Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and found that "despite incorrectly imposing a higher evidentiary burden than the tenants needed to prevail," the panel correctly remanded for the district court to resolve disputed facts under the summary judgment standard. 309 Kan. at 154, 432 P.3d 647. Our Supreme Court determined: "Further proceedings are necessary to explore whether the City's negotiations were in advance of a condemnation action under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518." 309 Kan. at 154, 432 P.3d 647.

On remand, the City again moved for summary judgment on factual grounds, claiming K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 was inapplicable because the City had not intended to condemn the property. The City also argued the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims because K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 provides no private right of action.

In response, the tenants argued that the same genuine issues of material fact which our Supreme Court had found prohibited summary judgment still existed. They also argued that this court, and our Supreme Court, implicitly found subject matter jurisdiction since neither dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in the first appeal.

Upon detailing the uncontroverted facts and procedural history, the district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the tenants’ claims under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518. The district court reasoned that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 does not create a private cause of action for relocation benefits because it is contained within the EDPA, which only provides "an appeal process from an unsatisfactory condemnation compensation appraisers’ award." Instead, it acknowledged the City's argument that the procedure for tenants to pursue relocation benefits is found in the Kansas Relocation Act, K.S.A. 58-3501 et seq., or through another cause of action outside the EDPA.

The district court recognized the appellate courts unfortunately did not consider subject matter jurisdiction previously because the courts focused on the "narrow determination of whether [the tenants] qualified as ‘displaced persons’ under the law." The district court noted that despite the independent duty of the courts to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, "[t]here is a chance, as with all human endeavors that the issue was overlooked initially by the parties, then the District Court, and was later not squarely considered as the respective appellate courts narrowly received an issue of first impression in Kansas."

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the tenants claim the district court erred because they contend K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 creates either an outright or implied private right of action under which they can dispute the City's refusal to pay relocation benefits. They also claim the district court should have allowed them leave to amend their petition to assert a claim under K.S.A. 58-3509 or dismissed their case without prejudice rather than grant the City summary judgment. The City cross-appeals, claiming the district court incorrectly found factual issues prevented summary judgment. Since we affirm the court's summary judgment decision, we need not address the City's cross-appeal.

Since resolution of the tenants’ first issue on appeal involves interpreting the EDPA to determine whether it provides subject matter jurisdiction over the tenants’ claims, we review the district court's decision to dismiss those claims de novo. Nauheim , 309 Kan. at 149, 432 P.3d 647.

We review the tenants’ claim that the district court should have allowed them leave to amend their petition or dismissed their case without prejudice under an abuse of discretion standard. Luckett v. Kansas Employment Security Bd. of Review , 56 Kan. App. 2d 1211, 1221, 445 P.3d 753 (2019).

We find the district court correctly interpreted K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 26-518 and appropriately granted the City summary judgment. We also find that even if the tenants had properly sought to amend their petition to add claims under K.S.A. 58-3509, such an amendment would have been futile since the deadline to pursue these claims had passed.

The district court correctly found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's...