Kaper v. Pa. Game Comm'n

1

RICHARD KAPER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA GAME COMMISSION, Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:24-CV-164

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

October 7, 2024

MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Richard Kaper advances claims against defendant the Pennsylvania Game Commission for disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Kaper alleges the Commission violated his rights under those laws by failing to provide meaningful access to state game lands and the hunting opportunities those lands offer. The Commission moves to dismiss Kaper's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We will deny the motion.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Kaper is a 71-year-old resident of Renfrew, Pennsylvania, who suffers from “spinal stenosis, which is a narrowing of the spinal column as a result of arthritis.” (See Doc. 10 ¶¶ 11-12). Due to his medical condition, Kaper experiences difficulty walking and other mobility issues. (See Id. ¶ 13).

The Commission “purchases, manages and maintains” state game lands to provide recreational sport-hunting opportunities to the public. (See Id. ¶ 29). There are over 1.5 million acres of state game lands across the Commonwealth, split into six regions (southwest, southcentral, southeast, northwest, northcentral, and northeast).^[1](See id. ¶ 30). According to Kaper, the game lands provide access to two sporting programs; each requires a distinct permit or tag issued by the Commission. (See id. ¶¶ 31-39). “The first program is the general ability to hunt and trap wildlife” in all six regions, which members of the public access by obtaining a hunting license. (See id. ¶¶ 31-34). The second, more exclusive program is the ability to hunt and trap elk within designated zones of the elk management area, located within the northcentral region of the state game lands. (See id. ¶¶ 3738). Individuals must possess an elk-specific permit or “tag” to hunt elk. (See Id. ¶ 39). The Commission issues those tags in an annual randomized lottery; however, the number of lottery applicants greatly exceeds the limited supply of elk tags issued annually. (See id. ¶¶ 40-42). For example, the Commission issued just 178 elk tags for the 2022-2023 season in a lottery of over 100,000 applicants. (See Id. ¶ 42).

The Commission “promote[s] public access . . . for persons with mobility disabilities” by creating and maintaining “designated routes” throughout the state game lands. (See id. ¶¶ 47-48 (citations omitted)). The designated routes allegedly are the only means for disabled individuals to access the state game lands. (See Id. ¶ 51). They are also only available to those with disabled access permits. (See Id. ¶ 52 (citation omitted)). Kaper had two such permits. He was permitted to use certain types of vehicles as hunting blinds,^[2](see id. ¶¶ 53, 55), and to access the designated routes using mobility devices and motor vehicles, (see id. ¶¶ 59-60 (citation omitted)). Kaper owns a Mahindra 750 utility task or terrain vehicle (“UTV”) and he claims it is covered by both permits. (See id. ¶¶ 55-56).

In addition to the disability-specific permits, Kaper possessed a generalpurpose hunting license at all relevant times. (See id. ¶¶ 34-36). After entering the elk tag lottery for over 20 years, Kaper finally won an elk tag, allowing him to hunt female elk (“cow”) in elk zone 13 during the 2022-2023 season. (See id. ¶¶ 38, 45). On December 31, 2022, Kaper set out for an eight-day hunting trip to elk zone 13. (See id. ¶ 81). Nine other individuals who are not disabled joined him. (See Id. ¶ 109). During the trip, Kaper attempted to access state game land 100-which consists of over 21,000 acres within elk zone 13-using three designated routes provided by the Commission. (See id. ¶¶ 81, 85). According to Kaper, the routes were geographically clustered in the northeast quadrant of game land 100 and were not subject to any posted restrictions. (See id. ¶¶ 86-87).

Kaper alleges the three routes were not accessible to him. The first was too narrow to accommodate his UTV. (See Id. ¶ 88). He fell twice while attempting to walk into the first trail. (See id. ¶¶ 89-90). He then discovered the access gates to the two other trails were locked, but ultimately gained access by driving around the gates. (See id. ¶ 93). He could only proceed for a short distance because the trails were too narrow for his vehicle and a fallen tree blocked the path. (See id. ¶ 93).^[3] At some point during his trip, Kaper spoke about his experience with a local land manager who informed him that “additional locked gates likely could have been opened for him.” (See id. ¶ 100). Kaper alleges the nine non-disabled travelers had access to far more game lands than he did. (See id. ¶ 109). He asserts that he spent more than $3,000 on travel, lodging, a guide, the elk tag, and other expenditures for the trip. (See id. ¶¶ 82-83).

Apart from his individual experience, Kaper also advances more general allegations regarding accessibility of the state game lands. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 69-72, 99). He contends, for example, that just 24% of the 314 game lands have designated disabled-access routes. (See id. ¶ 99). He alleges the existing routes are either too narrow for mobility devices by design, (see id. ¶ 70), or are inaccessible due to detritus, including fallen trees and other blockages, (see id. ¶ 71). He also cites comments supposedly made by a Game Commissioner during a September 2017 Commission meeting concerning amendments to the regulatory framework governing disabled access to state game lands. The (unnamed) Commissioner allegedly stated that ADA “lawsuits are history” thanks to the new regulations, (see id. ¶¶ 75-76), and he “expect[ed] to see more” large four-wheel vehicles on state game lands as a result, (see id. ¶¶ 78-79). Kaper avers the Commission, despite these comments, did not take any further action to maintain the accessible routes after amending the regulations. (See id. ¶¶ 76, 78-79).

Kaper brings two claims on behalf of himself and a putative class, which he defines as “all Pennsylvania residents who have a mobility disability and have attempted to or will attempt to access the State Game Lands.” (See id. ¶¶ 117-118). First, he asserts that the Commission violates Title II of the ADA (Count I) by failing to provide meaningful access to the state game lands. (See id. ¶¶ 129-140). He specifically alleges that there are too few designated routes, and those in existence are poorly maintained, too narrow, or both, rendering them inaccessible. (See Id. ¶¶ 135-137). Kaper also brings a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Count II) based on the same alleged facts. (See id. ¶¶ 141-147). He seeks compensatory damages, declaratory relief, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs, as well as an injunction compelling the Commission to: (1) prepare a Self-Evaluation Plan and Transition Plan; (2) remediate, clear, and repair all existing disabled access routes; (3) construct new compliant disabled access routes; (4) adopt and implement methods, policies, and practices to gain and maintain compliance with federal accessibility standards; (5) continually ensure a sufficient number of disabled access routes exist; and (6) issue replacement elk tags for himself and the putative class members who won the elk tag lottery, but were unable to access state game lands. (See Id. at 19-20 ¶¶ C-H).

The Commission moves to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, we conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

The Commission advances three arguments in support of its motion....