Karaahmetoglu v. Res-Care, Inc.

480 F.Supp.2d 183

Parisa KARAAHMETOGLU, Individually and in her capacity as mental retardation advocate for N.K., Plaintiff, v. RES-CARE, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 02-1062 (RJL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 28, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bijan Amini, Sangita A. Shah, Storch, Amini & Munves, P.C., Marianne R. Merritt, New York City, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth Gordon Stallard, Matthew Wesley Carlson, Sarah Elizabeth Roland, Thompson, O'Donnell, Markham, Norton & Hannon, Washington, DC, Charlene A. Vaughan, West Virginia Attorney General's Office, Charleston, WV, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEON, District Judge.

Parisa Karaahmetoglu, individually and in her capacity as the Mental Retardation Advocate for N.K., has sued Res-Care, Incorporated, RSCR West Virginia, Incorporated, Mark Landis, a Res-Care administrator and Paul Spaulding, a former Res-Care employee, for, violations of the District of Columbia Code and federal law, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, breach of contract and fraud. Currently before the Court is the defendants¹ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. On the basis of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendant's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

N.K., a developmentally disabled adult, was committed to the custody of the District of Columbia Superior Court in 1988.² Amended Complaint, ¶ 10. In 1997, D.C. contracted Res-Care to provide care and housing for N.K. at its West Virginia residential care facility.³ Id at ¶ 12.

Plaintiff alleges that between 1998 and 2000, N.K. was physically abused by Paul Spaulding, a Res-Care staff member. Among other incidents, plaintiffs allege that in July 1999, Spaulding "punched N.K. in the head" during a patient outing. Id. at ¶ 45.

In July 1999 West Virginia's Adult Protective Services began investigating allegations that Spaulding had sexually abused another Res-Care resident. Pl.'s Opp. to the Mot. to Dismiss, p. 13." During the course of that investigation, Spaulding's physical assault of N.K. was reported. Id. A criminal investigation was initiated in August 1999 and Spaulding was eventually charged with two felony counts of abuse of an incapacitated person. Id at p. 14. The case was resolved when he later pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges of neglect of an incapacitated person. Id.

Plaintiff contends that Res-Care hired Spaulding despite a history of misconduct and failed to take corrective action when allegations of his sexual and physical abuse arose. Plaintiff further alleges that Res-Care employees fraudulently concealed N.K.'s abuse from her family.

In May 2003, the plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint in this Court alleging: violations of the District of Columbia Code by all defendants (Counts I, II and III); negligence, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision by Res-Care, and Landis (Count IV, VI and VII); intentional infliction of emotional distress by all defendants (Count V); assault and battery by Res-Care and Spaulding (Count VIII); breach of contract by Res-Care (Count 9); intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment by all defendants (Count X and XI); and violation of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count XII). Plaintiff seeks $20 million in compensatory damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees and costs.

Defendants have moved to dismiss, or for summary judgment, of plaintiff's claims for punitive damages, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, violations of D.C. and federal law, as well as the claims against Mark Landis and the individual claims of Parisa Karaametoglu. For the reasons stated below, the Court will GRANT the motion in part and DENY the motion in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court should grant a defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when it is clear that no relief could result under any facts consistent with the complaint's allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997). In evaluating the defendant's motion, the Court will assume the truth of all of the factual allegations set forth in plaintiff's Complaint. Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C.Cir.1985).

Under Rule 56, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where the court finds that facts material to the outcome of the case are at issue, a case may not be disposed of by summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

ANALYSIS

1. Statutory Claims

In Counts I, II and III of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of the "Mentally Retarded Citizens Constitutional Rights and Dignity Act of 1978," (the "Act"), D.C.Code § 7-1305.10(a), (e) and (f), respectively. Defendants argue that the Act does not create an independent cause of action and, therefore, plaintiffs are limited to remedies provided for under the common law. The Court agrees.

Section 7-1305.10 of the District of Columbia Code makes it unlawful to mistreat, neglect or abuse mentally retarded wards of D.C. and requires that alleged instances of abuse be reported to the patient's family and advocate. D.C.Code § 7-1305.10(a),(e),(f). Under § 7-1305.14(c), "any person who violates or abuses any rights or privileges protected by this chapter shall be liable for damages as determined by law, for court costs and attorney's fees." D.C.Code § 7-1305.14(c). Although the statute may create a statutory duty, the fact that it allows for damages "as determined by law" suggests that the statute creates only a common law remedy. As the Code does not support an independent cause of action for violations of the statute, and in the absence of any authority to the contrary, the Court must dismiss Counts I, II and III.

Plaintiff has also brought suit under the "Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act"("DDABRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 15001, et seq., and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Count XII).⁴ Defendants have moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the DDABRA is merely a funding statute and does not create a private right of action. Defendants further argue that even if the statute allows for suits against state actors to force compliance with the Act, defendants cannot be considered state actors and, therefore, are immune from suit. Again, the Court agrees.

The DDABRA provides funding to assist state created and managed programs which are directed to the Act's purpose of assuring that developmentally disabled persons and their families have access to services and support. 42 U.S.C. § 15001, et seq.; Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Haldeman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1536-37, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). As such, the statute does not provide plaintiff a private cause of action, but does allow individuals to bring suit against state actors for noncompliance. Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc., 894 F.Supp. 1479 (D.Kan.1995); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F.Supp. 171, 201 (D.N.H.1981). Accordingly, plaintiff must establish that Res-Care was a state actor in order to make out a claim under the DDABRA and § 1983.

In determining whether Res-Care should be considered a state actor for the purposes of liability under Section 1983, the Court will consider: 1) whether there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the state itself; 2) whether the state has exercised coercive power or provided significant encouragement to the private action; and 3) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982). Such a determination is necessarily a "fact-bound inquiry," Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 924; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), and here the facts strongly favor the defendant.

First, plaintiff appropriately points out that Res-Care's operations are extensively regulated and that the company benefits from state and federal funding. However, such conditions do not establish per se state action for the purposes of § 1983. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-841, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982); Blum, 457 U.S. 991, 1010-1011, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982). Indeed, plaintiff has not even established that the provision of residential and rehabilitation services for voluntary commitments should be considered a traditional state function.⁵

Moreover, plaintiff's allegation that the state of West Virginia played an active role in the day to day operation of Res-Care facilities is not supported by the evidence. In particular, Mark Landis, a Res-Care administrator, testified that Res-Care "had a very close relationship with West Virginia Advocates as far as monitoring admissions, discharges, attending ISPs, a lot of different input from a lot of different agencies, outside...