Karmue v. Moore

654 F.Supp.3d 118

2023 DNH 012

Kormahyah KARMUE v. Brenton MOORE, et al.

Civil No. 17-cv-107-LM

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

Filed February 3, 2023

James S. Lawrence, Lawrence & Associates, Inc., Warwick, RI, I. Lester Makofka, Pro Hac Vice, Makofka Legal Group, PLLC, Jacksonville, FL, for Kormahyah Karmue.

Bethany N. Wong, DOJ-USAO, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Providence, RI, Matthew C. Reeber, Patrick J. McBurney, Pannone Lopes Devereaux & O'Gara LLC, Johnston, RI, for Brenton Moore, et al.

ORDER

Landya McCafferty, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Kormahyah Karmue, a former federal pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics¹ against Deputy U.S. Marshals Brenton Moore, Elden DaSilva, Justin Carvalho, and John Doe. Karmue also brings a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), against the United States. Karmue alleges that, on April 23, 2015, the defendant deputy marshals injured him while transporting him to a federal courthouse in Rhode Island for a pretrial hearing in his criminal case.

Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor, and Karmue objects. Karmue also moves for sanctions against defendants "for their intentional and/or negligent spoliation of critical evidence in this case." Doc. no. 170 at 1. Specifically, Karmue contends that defendants failed to preserve the van used to transport Karmue on April 23, 2015; a partial video recording from that day; and a Taser carried by Deputy Moore. Karmue argues that, as a result, the court should draw certain adverse inferences against defendants.

For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 174) is granted as to Karmue's civil rights claims, Counts I through IV. The motion is granted in part and denied in part as to Karmue's negligence claim, Count V. Karmue's motion for sanctions (doc. no. 170) is denied. The court also grants defendants' unopposed motion to seal certain summary judgment exhibits relating to Karmue's medical records (doc. no. 177) and denies as moot the parties' joint motion to stay (doc. no. 192).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A movant is entitled to summary judgment when he "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party succeeds in making that showing, "the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, with respect to each issue on which she would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in her favor." Borges v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). The nonmoving party's failure to meet that burden by reference to "significantly probative" materials "of evidentiary quality" entitles the moving party to summary judgment. Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d 849, 853 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Guldseth v. Family Medicine Assocs. LLC, 45 F.4th 526, 533-34 (1st Cir. 2022) (stating that a litigant cannot use "conclusory allegations," "improbable inferences," or "unsupported speculation" to defeat a motion for summary judgment). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, and may neither make credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence. Harris v. Scarcelli, 835 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2016); Hicks v. Johnson, 755 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir. 2014).

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Karmue filed his complaint, pro se, in 2017. The court narrowed Karmue's claims, and defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment and to dismiss, arguing, in part, that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Noting that Karmue had not had an opportunity to engage in discovery, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion, without prejudice to defendants' ability to renew their qualified immunity defense after the close of discovery. Karmue v. Remington, No. 17-cv-107-LM, 2020 WL 1290605, at *11 (D.R.I. Mar. 18, 2020). Karmue obtained counsel in September 2020 and later filed the Third Amended Complaint, doc. no. 158. The parties have had a complete opportunity to engage in discovery.

II. Karmue failed to properly oppose the defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts.

The District of Rhode Island's local rules require parties moving for summary judgment to file a statement of material facts separate from their motion. LR Cv 56(a)(1)-(2). "An objecting party that is contesting the movant's Statement of Undisputed Facts shall file a Statement of Disputed Facts," which identifies the disputed facts and the evidence supporting the dispute. LR Cv 56(a)(3). If the objecting party fails to expressly deny or otherwise controvert any fact alleged in the moving party's statement of undisputed facts, that fact "shall be deemed admitted." Id.

Defendants filed a comprehensive Statement of Undisputed Facts (doc. no. 175). In response, Karmue did not file a "Statement of Disputed Facts," nor did he identify in his objection which specific facts he opposed. Rather, Karmue's objection contains a section entitled "Disputed Material Issues of Fact," which neither identifies any of the facts from defendants' statement that are disputed nor contains any cohesive narrative of Karmue's version of events from which disputes can be reasonably ascertained. Karmue also failed to file the handful of evidentiary materials he cited to in his objection. The court noticed Karmue's oversight several months after he had filed his objection and, on its own motion, the court permitted Karmue to file his evidence late.

As a result of those deficiencies, it has been exceedingly difficult for the court to discern which facts Karmue disputes and which facts he does not. For those reasons, the court has deemed undisputed all those facts from defendants' statement of material facts that are supported by the record and neither specifically identified by Karmue as disputed nor otherwise contradicted by evidence or argument. See De la Vega v. San Juan Star., Inc., 377 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 2004) (observing that court cannot grant summary judgment in the moving party's favor merely because of the opposing party's failure to follow local rules or properly object). Regardless, the court still construes all of the facts in the light most favorable to Karmue and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor.

III. Facts

A. Transport to the courthouse

In 2014, Karmue was indicted for assorted federal crimes and was detained pending trial.² On April 23, 2015, deputy marshals Moore and DaSilva transported Karmue by van to the federal courthouse in Rhode Island for a pretrial hearing related to his criminal case. The deputy marshals placed Karmue in handcuffs, a waist chain, and leg restraints for transport in the van. Karmue requested that the deputies put him in a seatbelt,³ but they did not do so. Deputy Moore drove the van, while Deputy DaSilva rode in the passenger seat.

U.S. Marshals' policy requires prisoners to be "fully restrained" when transported, and "full restraints" consists of "handcuffs, waist chains, and leg irons." Doc. no. 176-5 at 3. The policy states that deputy marshals "are not required" to belt prisoners when transporting them. Id. at 5.

As the van neared the courthouse, it came to an abrupt stop, which propelled Karmue into a metal partition that separates the prisoner compartment from the rest of the van. Karmue hit his knees on the partition, hurting them.

Karmue's recollection about what led to the van's abrupt stop is limited. Karmue stated in interrogatory answers that "[i]n trying to beat a traffic light, the transport van came to an unanticipated and sudden stop to avoid a collision from an oncoming vehicle." Id. Karmue added that Deputy Moore was driving the van "recklessly, with excessive speed." Doc. no. 176-4 at 2.

But in his deposition taken about two weeks after he produced his interrogatory answers Karmue clarified or limited those assertions,⁴ explaining that he could not estimate the van's speed and that his belief that the van was moving with excessive speed was premised on the impact he felt upon hitting the metal partition. Doc. no. 190 at 284 ("I cannot tell you how fast we were going."). Karmue did not "recall being at an intersection," but he saw "lights crossing in front" of the deputy marshals. Id. at 284-85 ("I don't know if it was an intersection . . . . I saw lights, that's it. I saw the street light there, like I said, but I don't know if it was an intersection."); id. at 285 ("Q . . . . [Y]ou saw a street light? A. I said I saw a light, like, you know - there's a light flashing, going back. Q. You saw the emergency vehicle light? A. Yeah. Yep."). Karmue also stated that, after the van stopped, he saw "a light," but he did not know if the van had stopped at that light or if they were in front of the light. Id.

After the abrupt stop, a deputy marshal asked Karmue whether he was okay. Karmue responded that he was not okay and told Deputies Moore and DaSilva that he needed treatment, but the deputy marshals began driving again.⁵

B. Karmue arrives at the courthouse, and the deputy marshals call for medical assistance.

Deputy Moore drove the van through the intersection and into the courthouse's "sallyport," which was in a gated parking lot just beyond the intersection. The sallyport is a garage where prisoners are unloaded and brought into the court's cell block area to await court proceedings.

Most of the events after Karmue and the deputy marshals arrived at the courthouse were recorded by courthouse security cameras. At 1:26 p.m., Karmue stepped out of the van with help from Deputy DaSilva. Karmue was fully restrained, meaning that he was wearing handcuffs, a waist chain, and leg irons. Karmue walked toward the courthouse without assistance, albeit...