Kass-Hout v. Cmty. Care Network

DR. TAREQ KASS-HOUT, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY CARE NETWORK INC., et al Defendants.

No. 2:20-CV-441-JPK

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

August 20, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [DE 10], filed by Defendants Community Care Network, Inc., the Community Hospital, and Dr. Aamir Badruddin. Plaintiff Dr. Tareq Kass-Hout filed a response, and Defendants filed a reply. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.^[1]

BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2020, Plaintiff Dr. Tareq Kass-Hout filed his Complaint against Defendants Community Care Network, Inc. (“CCNI”), the Community Hospital, and Dr. Aamir Badruddin. (Compl., ECF No. 1). For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all plausible inferences in his favor. Jackson v. Blitt & Gaines P.C., 833 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2016).

The Complaint alleges as follows: Plaintiff is an accomplished Syrian Arab endovascular neurosurgeon specialized in stroke treatment and care. Id. at ¶ 1. In March 2018 Plaintiff began working with Rush University Medical Center (“Rush”) as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Neurosurgery, with a conjoint appointment in the Department of Neurological Services. Id. at ¶ 8. Pursuant to an agreement between Rush and CCNI Plaintiff was credentialed with the Community Hospital, which is wholly owned and operated by CCNI. Id. at ¶ 9.

During his employment, CCNI administrator Allen Kumar required Plaintiff to work seven days per week and be on call at all times, despite not being paid for part of this time. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 14. Plaintiff was further required to provide certain medical care using equipment that did not conform to the proper standard of care. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24, 31. Plaintiff was subjected to racially motivated abuse and false accusations regarding the care he provided to patients. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 25-30, 33.

In April 2019, Defendant Dr. Aamir Badruddin was hired as an interventional neurologist and assigned to be Plaintiff's superior. Id. at ¶ 32. On or about May 31 2019, Plaintiff's contract with Rush was terminated and he was replaced by Dr. Badruddin. Id. at ¶ 36. After Plaintiff's termination, Dr. Badruddin began defaming Plaintiff to other physicians within the Northwest Indiana and Chicago medical communities, as well as to specialists in Wisconsin and Houston, Texas. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff's reputation in the medical community has suffered, former colleagues have distanced himself from him, he has lost 2/3 of his salary, has suffered a significant reduction in hours, has been forced to take locum tenens^[2] work, and has suffered significant emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on January 31, 2020. Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on September 28, 2020. Id. at ¶ 42.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [that jurisdiction exists].” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “Under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1), ‘the district court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, unless standing is challenged as a factual matter.'” Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 358 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2004)).

“The purpose of a motion to dismiss [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)] is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits.” Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As described above, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all plausible inferences in his favor. Jackson, 833 F.3d at 862; see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must comply with Rule 8(a)(2) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This plausibility standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement” but, rather, “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). The factual allegations contained in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). To meet the plausibility standard outlined in Twombly, “the complaint must supply ‘enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' supporting the plaintiff's allegations.” Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

ANALYSIS

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's federal discrimination claim (Count I) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); his state defamation claim (Count II) pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and his state retaliatory discharge claim (Count III) under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court considers each count in turn.

A. Count I: Title VII Discrimination

Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint brings a claim of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Compl. ¶¶ 43-47, ECF No. 1). Defendants seek dismissal of Count I on two bases: (1) Plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than an employee, and thus cannot seek the requested relief under Title VII; and (2) even if Plaintiff was an employee, the alleged conduct is insufficient to establish a colorable claim of disparate treatment or hostile environment harassment. (Br. Supp. 11-19, ECF No. 11).

Title VII's anti-discrimination provision makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual[] or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.s § 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals “[has] stated, on numerous occasions, that a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under Title VII may allege these claims quite generally.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “[a] complaint need not ‘allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed by the claim,' and it certainly need not include evidence.” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)).

1. Employee Versus Independent Contractor

Independent contractors “[do] not fall within the protections of Title VII.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2013). Therefore, “a plaintiff ‘must prove the existence of an employment relationship in order to maintain a Title VII action.'” Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Feb. 7, 1997) (quoting Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 1991)). “In determining whether a business relationship is one of employee-employer, courts look to the ‘economic realities' of the relationship and the degree of control the employer exercises over the alleged employee.” Knight, 950 F.2d at 380 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, an employment relationship can be indirect; the parties do not need to formally define it as such, and an employee can have more than one employer. See Frey v. Coleman, 903 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2018).

The Court focuses on five factors to determine whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor:

(1) the extent of the employer's control and supervision over the worker, including directions on scheduling and performance of work, (2) the kind of occupation and nature of skill required, including whether skills are obtained in the workplace, (3) responsibility for the costs of operation, such as equipment, supplies, fees, licenses, workplace, and maintenance of operations, (4) method and form of payment and benefits, and (5) length of job commitment and/or expectations.

Alexander, 101 F.3d at 492 (quoting Ost v. W Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435, 436 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “the employer's...