Kattan v. Kattan

2022 NY Slip Op 00856

Steven Kattan, appellant, v. Sharon Kattan, Respondent.

Nos. 2018-13619, 2019-00142

Index No. 50082/09

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

February 9, 2022

Argued - November 5, 2021

D68347 T/htr

Garr Silpe, P.C. (Glenn S. Koopersmith, Garden City, NY, of counsel), for appellant.

Mintz & Gold, LLP, New York, NY (Steven G. Mintz, Timothy H Wolf, and Alex J. Otchy of counsel), for respondent.

HECTOR D. LASALLE, P.J. COLLEEN D. DUFFY WILLIAM G. FORD DEBORAH A DOWLING, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Delores J. Thomas, J.), dated September 18, 2018, and (2) stated portions of a judgment of divorce of the same court dated December 11, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from denied the plaintiff's motion to direct the defendant to return monies allegedly taken from certain accounts. The judgment of divorce, upon a decision of the same court dated May 3, 2018, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, (1) awarded the defendant title to the marital residence and awarded the plaintiff the sum of only $1, 637, 500 for his interest in the marital residence; (2) awarded the defendant the sum of $1, 190, 301.18 for her contribution to the appreciation in value of the plaintiff's separate property in Deal, New Jersey; (3) awarded the defendant title to certain marital property on Ditmas Avenue in Brooklyn, and awarded the plaintiff the sum of only $532, 294.27 for his interest in that property; (4) awarded the plaintiff the sum of only $807, 408.60 for his interest in certain marital property on Avenue P in Brooklyn; (5) awarded the defendant the sum of $472, 500 for her interest in certain marital property on 20th Avenue in Brooklyn; (6) failed to equitably distribute certain rental income generated by marital properties after commencement of the action; (7) failed to award the plaintiff credits for support payments made prior to the judgment of divorce; (8) awarded the defendant 30% of the appreciated value of the plaintiff's premarital interest in Madison Maidens and 50% of the plaintiff's postmarital interest in Madison Maidens; (9) awarded the defendant maintenance in the sum of $5, 000 per month for a period of 18 months; (10) directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant basic child support in the sum of $2, 250 per month plus 71.08% of statutory add-on expenses for the parties' unemancipated child; (11) failed to equitably distribute certain marital monies allegedly taken by the defendant in anticipation of the divorce; (12) awarded the defendant 50% of the cash surrender value of an AVIVA life insurance policy; and (13) failed to distribute a certain 401(k) plan.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further, ORDERED that the judgment of divorce is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof awarding the plaintiff the sum of $1, 637, 500 for his interest in the marital residence, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the plaintiff the sum of $2, 133, 208.27 for his interest in the marital residence; (2) by deleting the provision thereof awarding the defendant the sum of $1, 190, 301.18 for her contributions to the appreciation in value of the plaintiff's separate property in Deal, New Jersey, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the defendant the sum of $595, 150.59 for her contributions to the appreciation in value of that property; and (3) by deleting the provision thereof awarding the defendant the sum of $472, 500 for her interest in certain marital property on 20th Avenue in Brooklyn, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the defendant $428, 492.50 for her interest in that property; as so modified, the judgment of divorce is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with entry of the judgment of divorce in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issue raised on the appeal from the order is brought up for review and has been considered on the appeal from the judgment of divorce (see CPLR 5501[a][1]).

The parties were married in 1989 and have four children together, the youngest of whom is currently 20 years old. On January 8, 2009, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief. The Supreme Court conducted a nonjury trial as to certain issues concerning equitable distribution, maintenance, and child support over 45 nonconsecutive days between May 9, 2011, and May 15, 2014, and thereafter issued a decision after trial dated May 3, 2018. A judgment of divorce dated December 11, 2018, was entered upon the decision. The plaintiff appeals.

"'Equitable distribution presents issues of fact to be resolved by the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be an improvident exercise of discretion'" (Santamaria v Santamaria, 177 A.D.3d 802, 804, quoting Loria v Loria, 46 A.D.3d 768, 769-770). In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind in a close case that the trial court had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing the testimony (see Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 A.D.3d 31, 56).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant title to the marital residence and in calculating the plaintiff's 50% interest in that property based upon the value of that property as stipulated to by the parties during the trial of this action in 2012. "In any action for divorce . . ., the court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties" (Domestic Relations Law § 234). Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(4)(b), the valuation date for an asset subject to equitable distribution "may be anytime from the date of commencement of the action to the date of trial" (see D'Angelo v D'Angelo, 14 A.D.3d 476, 477). Generally, where the asset to be valued is the marital residence, "the valuation date employed should be the date of trial" (Wegman v Wegman, 123 A.D.2d 220, 232).

Here, each party argued to the Supreme Court that they should be awarded title to the marital residence based on their respective emotional ties to the property. The court explained in its decision that it determined to award the defendant title to the marital residence upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the court's distribution awards with respect to the remainder of the parties' marital property, and the defendant's position as custodial parent of the parties' then-unemancipated child (see Domestic Relations Law § 234; Bauman v Bauman, 132 A.D.3d 791; Wells v Wells, 151 A.D.2d 474; Dayanoff v Dayanoff, 118 A.D.2d 679; see also Strohli v Strohli, 174 A.D.3d 938, 945). Given that the court determined to award the wife title to the marital residence, rather than direct that the property be sold, the court properly calculated the husband's interest in the marital residence based upon the value of that property as was stipulated to by the parties at the time of trial (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][4][b]; cf. Marino v Marino, 183 A.D.3d 813; Opperisano v Opperisano, 35 A.D.3d 686).

However, the Supreme Court should have awarded the plaintiff a credit for separate property funds he used to purchase and renovate the marital residence (see Philogene v Delpe-Philogene, 195 A.D.3d 963; Spencer-Forrest v Forrest, 159 A.D.3d 762, 765; Ahearn v Ahearn, 137 A.D.3d 719, 720; Patete v Rodriguez, 109 A.D.3d 595, 597). The plaintiff's proof at trial established that he used $991, 416.54 in separate property funds to purchase and renovate the marital residence. Accordingly, we modify the judgment so as to award the plaintiff the sum of $2, 133, 208.27 for his interest in the marital residence, constituting $991, 416.54 in credits for his separate property contribution plus $1, 141, 791.73, which is 50% of the stipulated value of the marital residence of $3, 275, 000, as reduced by the amount of the plaintiff's separate property contribution.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant was entitled to a distribution award for her contributions during the marriage to the appreciation in value of the plaintiff's separate property in Deal, New Jersey (hereianfter the Deal property). However, under the circumstances of this case, an award in the sum of $595 150.59, which represents...