Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union

11 Cal.Rptr.3d 546

117 Cal.App.4th 47

Aaron L. KATZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOS GATOS-SARATOGA JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H024944

Court of Appeal, Sixth District

March 25, 2004

Miller Brown & Dannis, Sue Ann Salmon Evans, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.

Aaron L. Katz in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WUNDERLICH, J.

Aaron Katz owns property that straddles two school districts. One of them, the Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union School District (District), refused to enroll children living at Katz's property. That prompted this legal action by Katz. At the pleading stage, the District's successful demurrer was followed by Katz's successful appeal to this court. Following our remand, Katz prevailed at trial. The District now appeals.

At issue is whether the Education Code requires a school district to admit children who live on property that lies only partly within the district's geographic boundaries. The question is one of first impression.

Based on our interpretation of the governing statute, we conclude that the District must enroll pupils residing at the property. We therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Katz owns property at 18994 Bonnet Way in Saratoga, which is improved with a single-family home. The Katz property straddles the school district boundary line, with most of it lying in the neighboring Campbell Union High School District. Only about twenty-six percent of the property and three percent of the home are located within the District's boundaries.

Katz's property has been assigned two different parcel numbers for tax assessment purposes: 389-21-014 (Parcel 14) and 389-21-015 (Parcel 15). The two assessor's parcels that comprise the property are divided by a tax rate area line, which forms the District's boundary with the neighboring Campbell school district. Parcel 15 lies to the east of the line, in the Campbell school district. It includes most of the house and it has been assigned all of the assessed valuation for improvements. Parcel 14 is located to the west of the line, within the District's boundaries. The District receives a portion of the real property taxes generated from the smaller Parcel 14. Under the applicable school funding formula, the District depends on local property taxes for most of its funding.

In July 1997, Katz's then-tenants attempted to enroll their son in one of the District's high schools, but the District denied their application. This action ensued.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 1997, Katz petitioned the superior court for a writ commanding the District to admit to its schools children currently and subsequently living at his property. In addition to the writ, Katz sought a judicial declaration of eligibility for admission. Katz also alleged estoppel against the District, based on its 20-year history of enrolling high school age children living at the Katz property. Finally, Katz sought monetary damages for negligence.

The District demurred, Katz filed an amended petition, and the District demurred again. Katz declined to amend further.

The trial court sustained the District's second demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that Katz had not exhausted available administrative remedies for boundary changes. The court entered a judgment of dismissal in October 1998.

On appeal by Katz, we affirmed the dismissal as to two causes of action but reversed as to the other two. (Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School District (Aug. 3, 2000, H019502) [nonpub. opn.].)

In our partial affirmance, we concluded that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to the third cause of action, which asserted the right to declaratory relief on the ground of estoppel. We reasoned that Katz had failed to state an estoppel claim "because the District has discretion to change its interdistrict transfer policy." (Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School District, supra, H019502, at p. 10 [nonpub. opn.].) We also affirmed the judgment of dismissal as to the fourth cause of action, which sought damages for negligence. As to that cause of action, we determined that Katz had failed to present the District with an adequate claim for damages before filing suit, as required by the Government Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 901 et seq.). (Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School District, supra, H019502, at pp. 10, 12 [nonpub. opn.].)

We reversed the judgment dismissing Katz's Education Code claims for writ and declaratory relief. With respect to the second cause of action, which sought a declaration of eligibility for enrollment under the Education Code, we observed that Katz had not sought a boundary change. We concluded that Katz was "entitled to a judicial determination of whether children residing in his property — with its current boundaries — are entitled to attend District's schools." (Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School District, supra, H019502, at p. 8, fn. omitted [nonpub. opn.].) We also said: "Depending on how the trial court answers this question, Katz's first cause of action seeking a petition for writ of mandate may also remain viable. We express no opinion on how the trial court should fulfill its obligation to interpret the statute." (Id., at p. 8, fn. 6.) We remanded the matter to the trial court to make that determination. (Id., at p. 8.)

After the case was returned to the superior court, Katz filed a second amended petition. The petition contained causes of action for declaratory and writ relief under the statute. The petition also sought statutory attorney's fees, based on allegations that the District had abused its discretion in refusing his property's residents admission to its schools. (Gov.Code, § 800.)

In June 2002, the trial court conducted a two-day bench trial. The court received testimonial and documentary evidence and entertained written and oral argument before taking the matter under submission. The court rendered its decision shortly thereafter, granting Katz most of the relief he sought.

In its statement of decision, the court identified Education Code section 48204, subdivision (d) (48204(d)), as the applicable statute.¹ That section reads in part as follows: "Notwithstanding Section 48200, a pupil shall be deemed to have complied with the residency requirements for school attendance in a school district, provided he or she is: [¶] ... [¶] (d) A pupil who lives in the home of a caregiving adult that is located within the boundaries of that school district." (§ 48204(d).) The court found the language of that provision "clear and unambiguous." Nevertheless, the court stated, to the extent it "is susceptible of two interpretations, the court must ... construe section 48204(d) liberally in favor of petitioner." Under the court's construction of the statute, children living at Katz's property are "within" the District's boundaries and thus have the right to attend District schools. Consequently, the court concluded, Katz "is entitled to the relief he seeks by way of declaratory judgment and a writ of mandate from the court."

With respect to other issues raised at trial, the court found that Katz had not proved either that the District acted arbitrarily and capriciously or that it should be equitably estopped. Katz was awarded his costs of suit as the prevailing party, but no attorney's fees.

In July 2002, the court entered judgment in accordance with its statement of decision.

The District filed this timely appeal from the judgment. Katz did not appeal.

ISSUES, CONTENTIONS, AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I. Interpretation of the Education Code

The sole issue raised by the District's appeal is whether Katz's property is located within its boundaries for purposes of enrollment under the Education Code.

Based on its reading of the statute, the District contends that it has no duty to admit children living at the Katz property, because both the land and the residence lie mostly in the neighboring school district. Katz disagrees. He maintains that the Education Code mandates enrollment so long as any part of his property lies within the District's boundaries.

The interpretation of statutes presents a question of law for our independent review. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672.) "As the matter is a question of law, we are not bound by evidence on the question presented below or by the lower court's interpretation. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)

II. Attorney's Fees

Katz seeks remand to the trial court for its consideration of an award of attorney's fees under the "private attorney general" theory. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1021.5.) The District argues that Katz is barred from presenting that request here, and it maintains that the fee request has no merit in any event.

The threshold determination of Katz's right to remand on the fee question is one of law. The decision concerning timeliness of the request turns on an interpretation of the governing statute. (See, Marini v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 829, 835, 160 Cal.Rptr. 465.) But the ultimate determination of entitlement to such fees is left to the trial court's discretion. (See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933, 938, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200. Cf., Austin v. Board of Retirement (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1535, 258 Cal.Rptr. 106 [lack of entitlement decided as a matter of law].)

DISCUSSION

I. Education Code Analysis

We first consider the statutory question presented by the District's appeal. We begin our analysis by setting forth the familiar rules of statutory construction. We then review the statutory background, giving particular attention to those provisions of the Education Code that govern this controversy. Finally, we apply the principles of statutory interpretation to the governing law.

A. Principles of Statutory Construction

"The rules governing statutory construction are well established. Our objective is to...