Kauer v. Kijakazi

1

JAMES C. KAUER, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI,^[1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-2580

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

November 29, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CRAIG M. STRAW, U.S.M.J.

Plaintiff James C. Kauer (“Plaintiff” or “Kauer”) seeks review of the Commissioner's decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The matter was referred to me^[2] on consent of the parties.^[3]Doc. 15. For the following reasons, I deny Kauer's request for review, and affirm the Commissioner's decision.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kauer is college educated, earning his bachelor's degree and taking retirement classes in computer engineering at the University of Delaware. R. 26; 30; 45; 95. Kauer's previous job titles included: quality control, customer service agent, plant operator, project manager, production supervisor, janitor, and order processor. R. 45-51.

Kauer applied for DIB on January 10, 2019, alleging disability since September 15, 2017. R. 105.^[4] His application was denied on February 25, 2019. R. 124-27. Kauer filed a request for a hearing. R. 128-29. The ALJ held an in-person hearing on December 13, 2019.^[5]R. 39-67. A supplemental hearing was held on October 13, 2019, via teleconference due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. R. 68-104. At both hearings, Kauer was represented by counsel. R. 39; 68.

On November 3, 2020, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Kauer was not disabled and denied benefits. R. 20-38. On November 10, 2020, Kauer requested review of the ALJ's decision. R. 260-62. The Appeals Council denied Kauer's request for review. Thus, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. R 9-14; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Kauer then filed this action in federal court. Doc. 1.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

To qualify for DIB, a claimant “must demonstrate some medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period.” Burnett v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1).

The Commissioner engages in a “five-step sequential evaluation process” to evaluate whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). This process considers:

1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

2. If not, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly limits their physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

3. If so, whether based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the listing of impairments (“Listings” see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1), which results in a presumption of disability;

4. If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment, whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform their past work; and

5. If the claimant cannot perform their past work, whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to establish that the claimant can perform other jobs in the local and national economies, in light of his or her age, education, work experience, and RFC. See Poulos v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

The court's role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91; Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is not “a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence but may amount to less than an evidentiary preponderance. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427); Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Stunkard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988)). It is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431).

III. ALJ'S DECISION AND PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR REVIEW

The ALJ determined Kauer had not engaged in substantial gainful employment from his alleged disability onset date of September 15, 2017 through his date last insured of December 31, 2017. R. 25. The ALJ found that Kauer suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder and essential tremors. R. 25; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The ALJ also assessed Kauer's medically determinable impairments finding that they significantly limited his ability to perform basic work activities. R. 26. The ALJ determined, however, that these impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments. Id.; 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

Considering the full record, including Kauer's testimony, medical evidence, and nonmedical evidence, the ALJ found that Kauer had the RFC to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c), except that he is restricted to simple, routine tasks with few workplace changes and no interaction with the general public. R. 27. Kauer was also limited to frequent fine manipulations with either hand. Id.

Relying on the testimony of VE Katherine A. Young, the ALJ decided that Kauer was unable to perform any past relevant work. R. 31; 97-98; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569(a). However, considering Kauer's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the VE's testimony, a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that Kauer can perform, including bed frame assembler, industrial cleaner, and machine packager. R. 32; 97-99. Therefore, the ALJ determined that Kauer was not disabled. R. 32.

In his request for review, Kauer raises four issues. First, Kauer argues that the ALJ improperly discredited Plaintiff's testimony about the severity of his symptoms. Doc. 10, at 4. Second, Kauer contends that the ALJ found Dr. Saul's opinion unpersuasive for erroneous reasons. Id. at 14. Third, Kauer asserts the ALJ failed to assess the consistency of Plaintiff's wife's testimony and explain why he rejected her testimony. Id. at 28. Finally, Kauer argues that the ALJ failed to include all of Plaintiff's credibly established limitations in his RFC and hypothetical questions to the VE. Id. at 29. The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinions, Kauer's subjective symptoms, and Kauer's wife's testimony. Doc. 11, at 6-20. Moreover, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC assessment and hypothetical questions to the VE. Doc. 11, at 19-20.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Before addressing Kauer's claims, I discuss the medical opinions, evidence in the record, and additional information pertinent to his claims.^[6]

A. Medical Evidence^[7]

a. Dr. Saul's Opinion

Dr. Saul is Kauer's primary psychiatrist and has treated his bipolar disorder for twenty-two years. R. 43-44; 54; 834. Dr. Saul provided a Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental) (“MSS”) and Treatment Source Addendum relating to Kauer's bipolar disorder and treatment history. R. 395; 834. In Dr. Saul's Treatment Source Addendum, she opined that Kauer's mental health symptoms and functional restrictions worsened after he was laid off in 2017. R. 834. She stated that Kauer's flat affect, slowed down actions, and motivational issues have prevented him from obtaining and keeping employment. Id.

In Dr. Saul's MSS completed on November 7, 2019, she noted that Kauer showed extreme limitation in the following categories: ability to understand and remember instructions/information, ability to carry out and apply instructions/information, and ability to make judgment on simple work-related decisions. R. 395. Dr. Saul described Kauer's challenges as “problems thinking in a direct way,” “slowed down responses,” and “unmotivated but tries to answer questions.” Id. She further found that Kauer had extreme limitations related to his ability to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work pressures in a work setting. R. 396. Dr. Saul reported that Kauer seems distracted and unmotivated to work. Id. She opined that Kauer has experienced extreme limitations since 2003. R. 397. She noted that Kauer is “off task” 25% (or more) of the time. R. 396. Although she noted that Kauer's impairments would affect his work attendance, she did not anticipate him being absent more than once a week. R. 397. Kauer was taking medication to treat his bipolar disorder. Id. Dr. Saul noted slowness as a side effect of Kauer's medication, but she did not mention tremors during her evaluation. Id.

Throughout Dr. Saul's treatment records from January 2008 to November 2019, she generally noted that Kauer's mood was stable on medication, he had no outbursts or hospitalizations, and that he struggled with maintaining a job but was employed for various periods of time. R. 393-434. Significantly, Dr. Saul noted an uptick in depressive symptoms and anxiety at the beginning of 2019, during this time she observed...