Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc.

509 F.Supp.2d 210

Brian KAUFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. 04-CV-2869 (SJF)(AKT).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

September 5, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey M. Bernbach, Jason Bernbach, Bernbach Law Firm PLLC, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Eric A. Savage, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Newark, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This action by plaintiff Brian Kauffman ("Plaintiff') against defendant Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. ("Defendant"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 290 et seq. ("NYSHRL") was bifurcated for trial.¹ The liability phase, from May 21, 2007 through May 30, 2007, resulted in a jury verdict finding Defendant liable for retaliation and awarding Plaintiff one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000.00) in punitive damages. The damages phase, from July 17, 2007 through July 19, 2007, resulted in a verdict awarding Plaintiff one hundred thirty seven thousand nine hundred thirty five dollars ($137,935.00) in compensatory damages.

Defendant now moves pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 59(a) for a new trial or, alternatively, for remittitur as to the amount of punitive damages. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied and Defendant's motion for remittitur of the punitive damages award is granted.

II. Background

Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 9, 2004. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas C. Platt. Defendant moved for summary judgment on June 26, 2006. On July 13, 2006, Judge Platt denied Defendant's motion in its entirety. See Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare Service, Inc., No. 04-CV-2869, 2006 WL 1983196 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006). The case was scheduled for trial before Judge Platt on April 30, 2007. On the morning of trial, Judge Platt informed the parties that this case was being transferred to this Court as it was related to the earlier breach of contract case of Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Kauffman, No. 04-CV-1140, that was assigned to this Court.² On May 2, 2007, the case was reassigned from Judge Platt to this Court.

A jury trial on liability commenced on May 21, 2007. During the course of the trial, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claim of "association discrimination," ruling that only Plaintiffs retaliation claim and the issue of punitive damages would be submitted to the jury. Defendant objected to the submission of punitive damages to the jury. On May 30, 2007, the jury found Defendant liable for retaliation. Specifically, the jury found that Plaintiff: 1) had a good faith belief that Defendant had a policy of discrimination against women and minorities; 2) engaged in protected activity; 3) made known to Defendant his opposition to the discriminatory policy prior to his termination; and 4) his opposition to Defendant's discriminatory policy was a motivating factor in his termination. The jury also awarded Plaintiff one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000.00) in punitive damages. See Court Ex. 4.

A jury trial on compensatory damages commenced on July 17, 2007. On July 19, 2007, the jury found that Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to damages for backpay and emotional distress and awarded Plaintiff seventy four thousand one hundred eighty five dollars ($74,185.00) in back pay damages and sixty three thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($63,750.00) in emotional distress damages, for a total of one hundred thirty seven thousand nine hundred thirty five dollars ($137,935.00) in compensatory damages. See Court Ex. 3. On July 30, 2007, Defendant filed the instant post-trial motion.

III. Analysis

A. Motion for a New Trial

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may grant a new trial in a jury case for any of the reasons "for which new trials have heretofore been granted in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). "A new trial may be granted, therefore, when the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence." DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). "Unlike judgment as a matter of law, a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Moreover, a trial judge is free to weigh the evidence himself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner." Id. at 134 (citing Song v. Ives Labs., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992)). However, "[a] motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir.1998) (internal citation omitted)).

"One example of a miscarriage of justice would be an improper jury charge that `seriously affected' the jury's understanding of an issue `to the prejudice of the complaining party.' U.S. ex rel. Maris Equipment Co., Inc. v. Morganti, Inc., 163 F.Supp.2d 174, 193 (E.D.N.Y.001) (quoting Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 971 F.2d 1332, 1343 (7th Cir.1992)), aff'd, 67 Fed.Appx. 68 (2d Cir. 2003).

Citing the recent Supreme Court case of Philip Morris v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1063, 166 L.Ed.2d 940 (2007), Defendant contends that submission of Plaintiff's punitive damages claim to the jury was erroneous because the claim was, in part, based upon discrimination directed at persons who were not party to the litigation, specifically Kristen Dassylva ("Dassylva"), Julia Mastantuono ("Mastantuono"), and Andre Wright ("Wright").³ In Philip Morris, the Supreme Court held that "the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation." Id. at 1063. However, the court reaffirmed that plaintiffs may show harm to non-parties to demonstrate "a different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility." Id. at 1064. See id. ("[H]arm to others shows more reprehensible conduct."). Therefore, while a jury may consider harm to others, as evidence of reprehensibility, it may not punish a defendant for harm done to those nonparties. Id.

During the course of the trial, Plaintiff proffered proof of discriminatory statements by Defendant's executives about Dassylva, Mastantuono, and Wright based upon their race and/or gender.⁴ In presenting this information to the jury; Plaintiff was seeking to prove that: 1) he had a good faith belief that Defendant had a policy of discriminating against women and minorities; and 2) Defendant's conduct was reprehensible. Plaintiff did not seek an award of punitive damages for any individual injured by Defendant's discriminatory practices and its effects other than himself. Indeed, Defendant does not point to any remarks made by Plaintiffs counsel during the trial to the contrary. Cf. Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 484 F.Supp.2d 232, 239-40 (D.Mass.2007) (defendant specifically challenged a statement in plaintiff's summation as "raising the possibility of juror confusion on the issue of punishing [defendant] for harm done to persons other than [plaintiff]'").

Further, although Defendant now argues that the Court's jury instructions were not clear in light of the Philip Morris case, Defendant's failed to request a jury instruction based on the holding of the Philip Morris case⁵ or object to the Court's instruction on that basis. This claim is therefore unpreserved. See Philip Morris, 127 S.Ct. at 1065. ("In particular, we believe that where the risk that misunderstanding is a significant one — because, for instance, of the sort of evidence that was introduced at trial or the kinds of argument that plaintiff make to the jury — a court, upon request, must protect against that risk.") (emphasis added).⁶ "Under Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party in a civil action must make specific objections to jury instructions before the jury retires to deliberate." Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 61 (2d Cir.2002). See Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 57 (2d Cir.2002) ("`[F]ailure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.... Surely litigants do not get another opportunity to assign as error an allegedly incorrect charge simply because the jury's verdict comports with the trial courts instructions.'" (quoting Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir.1992))). See also 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller. & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2805 at 57-58 ("This principle [preservation] has particular application to claims of error in instructions that were not objected to since it is stated in so many words in Rule 51."). At the conclusion of the Court's charge to the jury, when asked by the Court if there were any exceptions, Defendant failed to except to any aspect of the charge. In fact, Defendant stated: "We have no exception to the charge. We think that the Court accurately summarized the law and the charge should remain as is." Tr. 139 (May 30, 3007).

Finally, insofar as Defendant appears to argue that a new trial is necessary because the jury's award of punitive damages was against the weight of the evidence, the motion is `denied. The jury's determination that Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages was not against the weight of the evidence nor was it "seriously erroneous" or a ...