Kaufman v. Gen. Elec. Co.

DEMETRIA KAUFMAN PLAINTIFF v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY DEFENDANT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-00204-TBR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

May 26, 2017

Memorandum Opinion

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant General Electric Company's (GE) motion for summary judgment. [DN 13.] Plaintiff Demetria Kaufman responded, [DN 18], and GE replied, [DN 19]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, GE's motion is GRANTED.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Demetria Kaufman was hired by GE on April 13, 2012. [DN 18-1 at 116.] Part of a mass hire, Kaufman was tasked with working on the assembly line that produced GE's new model of refrigerator and freezer. [Id. at 97.] Like all other new GE employees, Kaufman was initially placed on a six-month probationary period. [Id. at 103.] Kaufman acknowledges that during their first six months on the job, GE employees are expected to abide by GE's rules, including its attendance policies. [Id. at 102-103.] Kaufman, an African-American, was terminated at the end of her probation because she did "not provide[] satisfactory reasons or documentation for [her] absences." [DN 18-7 at 1.] In this suit, Kaufman alleges GE retained several Caucasian probationary employees with similar attendance records. See [DN 1-2.]

All told, Kaufman had attendance issues on seven different occasions during her time at GE. The first occurred on April 28, 2012, a Saturday. Kaufman was scheduled to work a mandatory overtime shift. [DN 18-1 at 186.] She called in at 6:00 a.m., telling her supervisor, Sharon Lashinsky, her ankles were swollen. [Id. at 185, 249; DN 18-3 at 1.] Kaufman missed her entire eight hour shift. [DN 18-2 at 1.]

Kaufman also missed the next regular workday, Monday, April 30. [Id.] That day, she went to the chiropractor and the dentist, providing GE with documentation for both visits. [DN 18-2 at 1.]

Kaufman's next attendance issue occurred on Saturday, July 21. GE's records reflect that Kaufman clocked out twelve minutes before the rest of her department. [Id.] Kaufman admits she left early, but explains on that particular day, she was assigned to work a different assembly line than she normally worked. [DN 18-1 at 194.] According to Kaufman, the entire assembly line was dismissed early, so she left with them. [Id.]

On Wednesday, September 5, Kaufman was late to work. GE claims Kaufman was nine minutes late; however, its gate scans reflect that she arrived at 6:04 a.m., four minutes after her shift was scheduled to begin. [DN 18-2 at 1.]

Kaufman next missed work on Tuesday, September 11. Gate scans show, and Kaufman admits, she left work approximately four hours early. [Id.; DN 18-1 at 212-14.] During her deposition, Kaufman could not recall the reason for her early departure, but says she most likely left to attend her personal bankruptcyproceedings. [DN 18-1 at 213-15.] She testified that she provided HR a letter regarding those proceedings and received permission to attend. [Id. at 214-15.] However, no evidence of record supports this testimony.

Two days later, on Thursday, September 13, Kaufman missed her entire shift. [DN 18-2 at 1.] Kaufman testified that she called in prior to her shift, [DN 18-1 at 231-33], but GE's records document her September 13 absence as a "No Call, No Show," [DN 18-2 at 1].

Finally, on Tuesday, September 25, Kaufman missed a full day of work. [DN 18-2 at 1.] Kaufman called in sick to her supervisor, but did not provide a note. [DN 18-2 at 1; DN 18-6 at 1.]

In sum, during her six-month probation, Kaufman missed approximately 4.5 days, or thirty-six hours, of work. Kaufman does not dispute this calculation, and she admits that as a probationary employee, she was expected to have no absences. [DN 18-1 at 103, 174.] However, Kaufman alleges that three Caucasian employees, hired around the same time, missed a similar or greater amount of work, but were not terminated. The first employee is Nicole Turner, hired on April 5, 2012. [DN 18-12 at 1.] Like Kaufman, Turner worked on a production line. [DN 18-1 at 154-55.] Kaufman testified that shortly after her termination, "Theresa," a Team Lead at GE, called her.¹ [Id. at 156.] Theresa told Kaufman that Nicole Turner had an 8% rate of absenteeism during her first six months, but GE extended her probation. [Id. at 273.] Kaufman's rate of absenteeism during her probationary period was only 4.2%. [Id. at 236, 238.]

The second employee is Melissa Reece. She, like Turner, was hired on April 5, 2012. [DN 18-10 at 1.] Pointing to attendance records GE provided during discovery, Kaufman claims that Reece missed a total of 68.2 hours of work from April 2012 to June 2012. See [DN 18-13 at 1.] However, Jonathon Lewis, GE's Union Relations Manager, explains that Kaufman's calculation incorrectly includes "uncontrollable absence" hours, when the factory was closed for holidays or lack of work. [DN 20 at 2.] Lewis says Reece missed a total of twenty-one hours during her probationary period, all of which were documented. [Id.] In any event, Reece's probation was extended for one month, and she was kept on after her probation concluded. [DN 18-10 at 1; see DN 18-14.]

Kaufman's final potential comparator is Stephanie Roby. Roby was part of the April 5, 2012 hire group, and worked on the same production line as Kaufman. [DN 18-11 at 1; DN 18-1 at 155.] Roby missed 21.2 hours during her probationary period. [DN 18-16 at 1.] At the end of her probationary period, Roby received a letter identical to the one received by Reece, extending her probation by one month. [DN 18-11 at 1.] GE says Roby's absences were all documented, and some were excused. [DN 20 at 4-5.] Roby was kept on at GE following her extended probation. See [DN 18-13.]

In this suit, Kaufman claims that by terminating her employment but extending the probationary period for Turner, Reece, and Roby, GE engaged in unlawful race discrimination. See [DN 1-2.] GE moves for summary judgment, arguing that Kaufman was unqualified for her position at GE by virtue of herabsences, that Turner, Reece, and Roby are not similarly situated to Kaufman, and that GE terminated Kaufman for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. See [DN 13-1.] Kaufman responded, [DN 18], and GE replied, [DN 19]. Fully briefed, GE's motion is ripe for adjudication.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists where "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court "may not make credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence when determining whether an issue of fact remains for trial." Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)). "The ultimate question is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Back v. Nestle USA, Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). As the party moving for summary judgment, GE must shoulder the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to at least one essential element of Kaufman's claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).Assuming GE satisfies its burden of production, Kaufman "must—by deposition, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file—show specific facts that reveal a genuine issue for trial." Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

III. Discussion

Kaufman's sole claim is for unlawful race discrimination. She alleges that as an African-American probationary employee, she was treated less favorably than Caucasian probationary employees who engaged in similar conduct. In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a claim of disparate treatment is subject to the burden-shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The burden initially lies with the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Assuming it does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant's proffered reason is merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).

To establish her prima facie case, Kaufman must show that she was "(1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and (4) replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated nonminority employees." Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 303 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The parties agree that Kaufman, an African-American, is a member of a protected class,and that she was terminated - the prototypical adverse action. However, they dispute the final two elements of Kaufman's prima facie case. The Court will address each in turn.

A. Kaufman's Qualifications

First, GE argues that Kaufman was not qualified for her position because she "did not meet GE's expectations with respect to attendance." [DN 13-1 at 9.] In response, Kaufman points out that "[n]othing in the record indicates that [she] lacked the ability to perform the essential functions of her position," noting that she received generally satisfactory remarks during the interview process. [DN 18 at 6.]

"In...