Keister v. Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FLORENCE Y. PAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Kim Keister was employed by the American Association of Retired Persons, Inc. (“AARP”) before suffering a stroke that required him to stop working due to lost language and cognitive skills. Keister was awarded short-term disability payments, but he was denied long-term disability benefits. When separating from AARP, Keister signed a Severance Agreement that barred him from pursuing any claim for long-term disability benefits. Keister brings this lawsuit, arguing that AARP made misrepresentations about the Severance Agreement and interfered with his right to seek additional disability benefits, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. See generally ECF No. 1 (Complaint). Before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 6 (Defendant's Motion).^[1] AARP argues that Keister's claims are barred by res judicata because he brought

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claims based on the same facts in a prior lawsuit. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees that Keister's claims are barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Court therefore will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND

AARP hired Keister as a news and policy executive editor around April 2004. See Compl., ¶ 11. Keister was covered by the company's Long-Term Disability Insurance Plan. Id., ¶¶ 12-13. On August 19, 2016, Keister suffered a stroke and went on medical leave. Id., ¶¶ 17- 21. The stroke caused Keister to suffer a significant loss of language and cognitive skills. Id., ¶¶ 19-21. On January 11, 2017, Keister attempted to return to work, but his cognitive skills had not yet returned to pre-stroke functionality. Id., ¶ 21. Keister requested medical leave and applied for short-term disability benefits on February 3, 2017. Id., ¶ 23.

On April 21, 2017, Aetna Life Insurance Co. (“Aetna”) approved Keister for short-term disability benefits. Id., ¶ 26. The short-term disability benefits ended on August 2, 2017. Id., ¶ 29. Keister also applied for long-term disability benefits but the claim was denied on July 18, 2017. Id., ¶ 28. Keister appealed the denial of his claim, but Aetna affirmed its decision on June 13, 2018. Id., ¶ 40.

Meanwhile, after Keister's initial application for long-term disability benefits had been denied but before he filed his appeal, AARP offered Keister a Severance Agreement. Id., ¶ 35; see ECF No. 6-2 (Severance Agreement, Ex. A to Def. Mot.). Under the Severance Agreement, Keister would receive severance pay in exchange for a general release of claims (“Release”). See Severance Agreement, ¶ 2. The Release provided

In consideration of the promises and benefits contained in this Agreement . . . you hereby fully and forever waive discharge, and release AARP . . . from any and all claims for damages, personal injuries, discrimination, retaliation reinstatement, or other relief

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that you may have . . . based upon your employment separation, and/or any event or transaction that occurred prior to your signing this Agreement

Id. The Release specified that it encompassed “any claims of race, sex, age, and other prohibited discrimination, and any other legal or equitable claim of any kind, whether based upon statute, contract, tort, common law, ordinance, regulation or public policy . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

The Release further provided:

It is expressly agreed and understood that this Agreement constitutes a GENERAL RELEASE. You understand that you are releasing claims that you may not know about. This is your knowing and voluntary intent, even though you recognize that someday you might learn that some or all of the facts you currently believe to be true are untrue and even though you might then regret having signed this release. It is further agreed that this consideration shall settle and compromise any claims you have, or may have, whether known or unknown, that existed prior to the date of your signature.

Id.^[2] Keister signed the Severance Agreement on September 27, 2017. See Id. at 5.

I. Prior Litigation

On October 16, 2018, Keister filed a lawsuit against Aetna and AARP Benefits Committee (“AARP Benefits”), a wholly owned subsidiary operated by AARP, claiming that those defendants wrongfully denied his claim for benefits under the Long-Term Disability Insurance Plan, in contravention of ERISA. See Keister v. AARP Benefits Committee, 410 F.Supp.3d 244, 248 (D.D.C. 2019) (Keister I).

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In that case, AARP Benefits filed a motion for summary judgment on December 10, 2018, arguing that Keister was barred from bringing the lawsuit because he expressly waived his claim for benefits when he signed the Severance Agreement. See Id. at 249. Aetna filed its own motion for summary judgment on January 23, 2019, making the same argument. See id.

On September 30, 2019, the court in Keister I entered an order granting both Motions for Summary Judgment. See Id. at 261. The court issued a Memorandum Opinion laying out its reasoning on October 7, 2019. See generally Id. The court stated that “by signing the separation agreement, Keister waived his right to bring [his] claim for long-term disability benefits, which means that his case cannot proceed as a matter of law.” Id. at 247. The court determined that the Release in the Severance Agreement was “facially unambiguous with respect to the scope of its coverage, ” id. at 258, and there was “no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation, ” id. at 261.

Keister appealed the decision in Keister I, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment on February 23, 2021. See generally Keister v. AARP Benefits Committee, 839 Fed. App'x 559 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The Court of Appeals held that “the district court correctly concluded the release was unambiguous.” Id. at 560. The court further noted, “[i]t's hard to imagine how the contract could be any clearer.” Id.

II. Instant Case

After the court issued its Order in Keister I, but before the docketing of the Memorandum Opinion, Keister filed the instant lawsuit against AARP on October 1, 2019. See generally Compl. Keister claims that AARP violated ERISA by (1) misrepresenting the effect of the Severance Agreement on his claim for long-term disability benefits; and (2) intentionally

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interfering with his right to claim benefits.^[3] See id., ¶¶ 46, 51-52. Keister alleges that AARP human-resources representatives were aware of his medical condition and limitations when he was presented with the Severance Agreement, and they gave no indication that his claim for benefits would be forfeited if he signed the agreement. See id., ¶¶ 37-38. Keister further claims that AARP breached its fiduciary duty to tell Keister the truth about how the Severance Agreement would affect his benefits under the Disability Plan. See id., ¶ 50.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 552 (2007). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, id. at 555, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe a complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor, “treat[ing] the complaint's factual allegations as true” and granting “plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although a plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if “‘recovery is very remote and unlikely, '” the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

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ANALYSIS

AARP argues that Keister's claims are barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata. See Def. Mot. at 1. The doctrine of “res judicata prevents repetitious litigation involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

I. Claim Preclusion

Claim preclusion operates as a bar when a prior case “(1) involve[d] the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a final judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Middleton v. Dep't of Labor, 318 F.Supp.3d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Whether a claim involves the same cause of action depends on “whether they share the same ‘nucleus of facts.'” Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). To make this determination, the Court considers “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.” Stanton v. D.C. Ct. of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). A final decision on the merits “prohibits any future cases arising from ‘the same nucleus of facts,' for ‘it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of...