Keller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

394 F.Supp.3d 345

Patti Elaine KELLER, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

1:18-CV-00547 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 16, 2019

Taylor Christine Schubauer, William C. Bernhardi Law Offices, William C. Bernhardi, West Seneca, NY, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth Rothstein, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, Richard W. Pruett, Laura Ridgell Boltz, Office of the General Counsel Social Security Administration, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Patti Elaine Keller ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and disabled widow's benefits ("DWB"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 9; Dkt. 12), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 14). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 9) is denied and the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 12) is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and DWB on January 20, 2015. (Dkt. 8 at 20).¹ In her applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning October 6, 2014, due to "spinal cord injury due to benign tumor and surgery," fibromyalgia, chronic bowel problems, accelerated heart rate, overactive bladder, "GURD," chronic colitis, and depression. (Id. at 98-105). Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on June 9, 2015. (Id. at 48-56). At Plaintiff's request, a hearing was held on July 31, 2017, in Buffalo, New York before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Sharon Seeley. (Id. at 38-73; 106-107). At the hearing, Plaintiff request a closed period of disability from October 6, 2014, to June 23, 2016. (Id. at 20). On October 10, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 20-37). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on March 19, 2018, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 6-11). This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. District Court Review

"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA") ], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).

II. Disability Determination

An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. § 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. § 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. § 416.920(e).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. § 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

A claim for DWB requires a claimant to satisfy additional criteria, as well as to show disability. In particular, to prevail on a claim for DWB, a claimant must show the following: "(1) she is the widow of a wage earner who died fully insured; (2) she is at least 50, but less than 60 years old; (3) she is disabled; and (4) her disability commenced within seven years of the month in which the wage earner died." Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 988 F. Supp. 2d 347, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ's Decision

In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2020. (Dkt. 8 at 22). The ALJ further noted that it had previously been determined that Plaintiff "met the non-disability requirements for disabled widow's benefits set forth in Section 202(e) of the Social Security Act," and that the prescribed period for Plaintiff's DWB claim ended on May 31, 2016. (Id. at 23).

At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity between October 6, 2014, and June 23, 2016, the requested closed period of disability. (Id. ).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of "thoracic intramedullary spinal cord tumor status post T2-3 laminectomy, resection of tumor, and T2-T3 laminoplasty." (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of fibromyalgia, chronic bowel problems, accelerated heart rate, dizziness, overactive bladder, hypothyroidism, sensorineural hearing loss, anxiety, and depression were non-severe. (Id. at 23-25).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. at 25-26). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 1.04 and 11.08 in reaching her conclusion. (Id. at 26).

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that between October 6, 2014, and June 23, 2016, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), with the following additional limitations:

[Plaintiff] could perform work that would allow her to alternate after 30 minutes standing to sitting for 10 minutes and after one hour sitting to standing for 10 minutes (while remaining on tasks). She needed to use a single cane when ambulating. She could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She could not operate foot controls or perform work that required driving a motor vehicle as an intrinsic part of the job. Finally, [Plaintiff] could have had no exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights or moving machinery.

(Id. ). At step four, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, during the requested closed period, Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as an accounting clerk. (Id. at 30). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act during the requested closed period of disability. (Id. at 31).

II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the Commissioner's decision and "remand solely for the calculation and payment of benefits, or, alternatively, for further administrative proceedings[.]" (Dkt. 9-1 at 23). Plaintiff makes the following three arguments in support of this request: (1) the ALJ failed to develop the record and reached an RFC finding unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff's spinal cord condition did not meet or medically...