Keller v. The Town of Monson

1

JOI LYNN KELLER and JOEL KELLER, individually and on behalf of their minor child, REECE KELLER, Plaintiffs, v. THE TOWN OF MONSON, CHERYL CLARKE, WILLIAM METZGER, SUZANNE MORNEAU, JILL FOULIS, VERONICA SLATTERY, JESSICA COLDWELL, LORI HESS, ERIC DEGNAN, and JOHN LEMPART, Defendants.

CIVIL No. 3:20-cv-30187-KAR

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

March 22, 2024

REVISED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT NO. 48)

KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Joi Lynn Keller (“Joi Lynn”) and Joel Keller (“Joel”) (collectively, “the Kellers”), individually and on behalf of their minor child Reece Keller (“Reece,” and collectively with Joi Lynn and Joel, “Plaintiffs”), bring this action against the defendants the Town of Monson (“the Town” or “Monson”), Cheryl Clarke (“Clarke”), William Metzger (“Metzger”), Suzanne Morneau (“Morneau”),^[1] Jill Foulis (“Foulis”) Veronica Slattery (“Slattery”), Jessica Coldwell (“Coldwell”), Lori Hess (“Hess”),^[2] Eric Degnan (“Degnan”), and John Lempart (“Lempart”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II), as well as state law claims for violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) (Count III), negligence (Count IV), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count V), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI), and loss of consortium (Count VIII).^[3] Presently before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all remaining counts of Plaintiffs' amended complaint. The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 6). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 48) is GRANTED with respect to Counts I and II alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count III for violation of the MCRA insofar as it is based on the deprivation of Reece's right to be free from the excessive use of force under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, and Count VI for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the motion is DENIED with respect to Count III for violation of the MCRA insofar as it is based on Reece's right to a public education under the Massachusetts Constitution, Count IV for negligence, Count V for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and Count VIII for loss of consortium. These state law claims are remanded to state court.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue is ‘genuine' when a rational factfinder could resolve it either direction.” Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.), rev. denied, 885 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B. W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)). “A fact is ‘material' when its (non)existence could change a case's outcome. Id. (citing Borges, 605 F.3d at 5).

A party seeking summary judgment is responsible for identifying those portions of the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant can meet this burden either by “offering evidence to disprove an element of the plaintiff's case or by demonstrating an ‘absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.'” Rakes v. United States, 352 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). If the moving party meets its burden, “[t]he non-moving party bears the burden of placing at least one material fact into dispute.” Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The record is viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, and reasonable inferences are drawn in the nonmoving party's favor. See Garcia-Garcia v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878 F.3d 411, 417 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc., 777 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2015)).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[4]

At approximately fourteen months old, Reece Keller became non-verbal and began to engage in self-injurious behaviors, including banging his forehead on his crib and the floor, leading to a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶¶ 2, 4, 6). As a result of his condition, Reece is hypersensitive to certain audio stimulation, particularly high frequency sounds, which can trigger agitation, anxiety, and self-injury (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 5). Reece can become aggressive in response to attempts to prevent his self-injurious behaviors, and he has a history of being restrained in school (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 66 at ¶ 19). Before high school, however, Reece had never sustained a serious injury or had to consult a doctor due to the imposition of a restraint in school (Dkt. No. 66 at ¶ 18).

The Monson School District held an annual IEP meeting for Reece in the spring of 2017, in advance of Reece starting high school in the fall (Dkt. No. 66 at ¶ 24). The IEP team formulated a plan to replicate the process of Reece's transition from elementary school to middle school, wherein staff from the elementary school trained the teacher and paraprofessionals at the middle school in how best to respond to and work with Reece (Dkt. No. 66 at ¶¶ 4-5, 42). Morneau, who had taken over as Director of Pupil Services/Special Education Director shortly before Reece's eighth grade year, proposed eliminating a provision that had been part of Reece's IEP since at least the fourth grade requiring that all staff working with Reece complete a state-recognized restraint program with certification (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 66 at ¶¶ 8, 22, 26). Joi Lynn rejected this change to Reece's IEP and invoked “stay put,” meaning that this requirement remained in place (Dkt. No. 66 at ¶ 27).

In late May and early June of 2017, Lempart, a special education teacher who taught Reece from fifth through eighth grade, attended a three-day training on the Safety Care restraint methodology and become a certified Safety Care trainer (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶¶ 11, 36). Lempart then trained others, including Principal Metzger, Dean of Students Foulis, special education teacher Hess, general education teacher Degnan, and paraprofessionals Slattery, Coldwell, and Valencourt, in the Safety Care method (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 37)^[5]. The trainings, which consisted of both a classroom and a hands-on component and included instruction on de-escalation techniques, were held in multiple small group sessions lasting two-to-three days each (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶¶ 38-40). Lempart's training sessions were intended for general application, not just for working with Reece (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 41). Staff were not trained to restrain Reece using specific techniques in a rote manner, but rather to apply their training as necessary to specific circumstances confronting them (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 41). According to Defendants, Reece's behavior support plan (“BSP”) did not specify how Reece was to be restrained or prescribe the use of particular techniques or methodologies (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 35). Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fact, noting that a June 14, 2017, update to Reece's BSP provided that when Reece engaged in self-injurious behavior level 3, which is defined, he was to be prompted to “take a break on his mat” (Dkt. No. 53-11 at p. 3; Dkt. No. 66 at ¶ 14). Staff carried the referenced 3' x 6' foam mats with Reece throughout the school day; according to Plaintiffs, the mats were intended to give Reece a soft place to go and to reduce the amount of space between him and the floor, thereby minimizing the possibility of injury to his head (Dkt. No. 66 at ¶¶ 11-12). Joi Lynn maintains that before Reece's ninth grade year, if a restraint became necessary, staff were trained to direct Reece down onto his mats to avoid injury (Dkt. No. 66 at ¶ 15). Valencourt testified that it was the normal course before Reece began high school for Reece to go down to the floor on his mats himself before a restraint (Dkt. No. 69-6 at 4).

The Safety Care methodology was a new one for Monson; in previous years, Monson had contracted with Crisis Intervention Solutions, Inc. (“CIS”) to provide annual restraint training in its methodology (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 66 at ¶¶ 9-10). Morneau, who had experience with Safety Care in an earlier role as assistant director of student services for another school district, had recommended the change from CIS to Safety Care (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶¶ 28-29).

Clarke, the Superintendent of the Monson School District, approved the change because she understood that Safety Care was used across the state and country, while CIS “was kind of a one-man show,” and because of Safety-Care's “train-the-trainer” model that allowed for training to be conducted in district (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶¶ 27, 31-32). Joi Lynn learned CIS would no longer be providing restraint training to the District in April 2017, but maintains that Morneau assured her that Reece would continue to use the mats, and the District would continue with what had been in place (Dkt. No. 67 at ¶ 16).

In connection with Reece's transition to high school administrators and staff from the middle school and high school held multiple planning meetings, which Joi Lynn and Joel attended (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 19). In addition, Reece visited the high school multiple times so that he could become familiar with his classroom, in which Monson had installed carpets to deaden sound, and with Hess, who was to be his high school special education teacher (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶¶ 21, 22). Hess, in turn, observed Reece at the middle school at least five times before he started at the high school (Dkt. No. 50 at ¶ 21). N...