Kelley v. Bohrer

93 F.4th 749

Kenneth KELLEY, Petitioner - Appellee, v. William S. BOHRER, Acting Warden; Maryland Attorney General, Respondents - Appellants.

No. 23-6179

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: January 25, 2024

Decided: February 28, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:20-cv-03697-GJH)

ARGUED: Andrew John DiMiceli, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Mary Claire Davis, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants.

Before AGEE, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Richardson and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

The State of Maryland (the "State") appeals the district court's grant of Kenneth Kelley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the petition, Kelley asserts that his state-court guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he wasn't informed of the nature and elements of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty and that the state post-conviction court erred in concluding otherwise. The district court agreed with Kelley, but in doing so, it failed to give due deference to the state-court decision. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to deny Kelley's petition.

I.

On October 10, 2014, Kelley was driving his vehicle thirty-five to forty miles per hour over the speed limit with a blood alcohol concentration of .14 when he came upon a vehicle that was stopped at a red light. Without braking, Kelley slammed into the rear of the vehicle, which sent it spinning into a pole. Four of the people in that vehicle died as a result of the collision—including two children—and one of Kelley's passengers also died.

A state grand jury indicted Kelley on twenty-eight counts. Counts 1 through 5 charged Kelley with killing each of the five victims in a grossly negligent manner. Counts 6 through 10 charged Kelley with killing each of the victims "as the result of driving a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner." J.A. 58-59. Counts 11 through 15 charged Kelley with killing each of the victims "as a result of his negligent driving, operation, and control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol per se." J.A. 59-60. Counts 16 through 20 charged him with killing each of the victims "as a result of his negligent driving, operation, and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol." J.A. 61-62. And Counts 21 through 28 charged Kelley with driving under the influence per se, driving while impaired by alcohol, driving unlicensed, reckless driving, negligent driving, failure to control speed to avoid a collision with another vehicle, failure to stop at a steady circular red signal, and driving a vehicle on a highway with an expired license.

The State offered Kelley a plea deal whereby he would plead guilty to Counts 1 through 5 and receive a fifty-year sentence with all but thirty years suspended. Kelley rejected the State's offer and chose to plead guilty to the entire indictment so as to remain free to allocute on the sentence.

At the plea hearing, Kelley testified that he was twenty-seven years old and had not completed high school. He had a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute but—according to his counsel—"[n]othing like this." J.A. 71. The court asked if Kelley could read English and whether he'd read the indictment, to which Kelley responded in the affirmative. The court briefly explained the charges, stating:

[The] charges range from manslaughter by auto to driving with an expired license with additional counts of manslaughter by vehicle, criminal negligence, neglect [sic] homicide by motor vehicle, homicide by vessel. Many of these merge you understand. They're the same thing. DUI per se, driving while impaired, driving without a valid license, reckless driving, negligent driving, failure to control motor vehicle to avoid a collision, failure to stop at a steady red light, and, again, driving with an expired license.

J.A. 73 (emphasis added). The court also noted "that there are statutory penalties with these that could be 60, 70 years," J.A. 73, even though defense counsel and the prosecutor had agreed that the maximum sentence was fifty years' imprisonment.

The State then provided the factual basis for the indictment, which matched the facts given above. Kelley did not have any "significant additions or corrections" to the factual basis. J.A. 79.

Finally, the court asked Kelley if he "discussed this matter thoroughly" with his counsel, to which Kelley responded in the affirmative. J.A. 80. Kelley also indicated that he didn't have questions for the court or his counsel and that he was "freely, knowingly and voluntarily entering a plea to the entire indictment because in fact [he was] guilty and for no other reason." J.A. 80-81. The court therefore found that Kelley entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

Kelley signed a waiver of rights related to his guilty plea, in which he acknowledged that he "fully underst[oo]d the charge[s] of [the] Indictment and the elements of the offense(s)." S.J.A. 2. His attorney signed the same form, certifying that he advised Kelley of "[t]he nature of the charge(s)" and "the elements of all of the charges." S.J.A. 3.

The court sentenced Kelley to fifty years' imprisonment. He received ten years' imprisonment for negligent manslaughter-auto on each of Counts 1 through 5, to be served consecutively, and one year for Count 21 (driving under the influence per se), to be served concurrently.¹

After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Kelley filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Maryland state court, raising (as relevant here) the issue of whether his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary when he allegedly was not advised of the nature and elements of the offenses.

The state post-conviction court held a hearing, during which Kelley testified that his plea counsel read him the charges he faced, that they went over the indictment together, and that he asked no follow-up questions about those charges. When asked to describe his understanding of the charges, Kelley stated: "I don't know. I understand that they was [sic] law breaking, that I broke the law." J.A. 233. He further testified: "I didn't know what the importance of the elements of a criminal offense was until I went over my case a couple of times . . . with a dude who worked at the prison library . . . . I mean, I still haven't found out what the elements to the charge that I pled guilty to are. I'm still unaware of the elements." J.A. 236-37. He also admitted to signing the waiver form. Finally, he indicated that he didn't complete high school, didn't read well, and had never previously been charged with manslaughter.

Kelley's plea attorney also testified at the post-conviction hearing. He stated that he "explained to [Kelley] that the fact that he was speeding under the influence of alcohol and ran into the rear of another vehicle was enough for him to have a conviction." J.A. 288-89. And when asked if he and Kelley went over the elements of the charges, plea counsel elaborated that he

explained to [Kelley] what would be necessary for the jury to find -- for him to be found guilty which in my opinion, the fact that he was the driver, his car was speeding, he ran into the rear of a car, and he was under the influence of alcohol would be enough for him to receive -- the maximum sentence he could receive for any of them was ten years, because that's what the issue is. You can't get two convictions on indifferent [sic] theories and be sentenced to both of them. So that's what I told him. So, in my opinion . . . that would be the elements in this particular case.

J.A. 289.² He also indicated that he went over the waiver form with Kelley—who he opined was of average intelligence—including the provision that said that defense counsel advised the defendant of the nature and elements of the charges.

However, he wasn't sure that he differentiated between the levels of negligence in the charges. See J.A. 287 (Q: "How would you describe the difference between gross negligence and criminal negligence to Mr. Kelley?" A: "I'm not sure -- I'm not even sure I did. I may have done that. I'm not sure I did."); J.A. 288 (Q: "[Y]ou're not sure that you described the difference between those levels of negligence to Mr. Kelley. Right?" A: "Yes, but in this, the facts in this case he is speeding. He ran into the rear of . . . another vehicle, and he is under the influence[ ] of alcohol. That would augment -- that would suffice for all of them."); J.A. 290 ("I don't believe I set up and distinguished each count[.]"). He also didn't believe he "ever g[ave] [Kelley] the statute[s]." J.A. 290.

Following the hearing, the state court issued a decision denying the petition for post-conviction relief. Its decision contained a seventeen-paragraph section considering the voluntariness of Kelley's plea based on his purported lack of knowledge of the elements of the charges, as well as two paragraphs in the conclusion on this claim. The state court reasoned that Kelley's plea was knowing and voluntary because, inter alia, he told the plea judge that he was "freely, knowingly and voluntarily entering a plea to the entire indictment" because he was in fact guilty; he "clearly acknowledged his guilt and had a sufficient understanding of the nature of the charges"; and "[t]he statement of facts [was] read into the record with little to no changes made which put [Kelley] on notice of his actions while driving that resulted in the deaths of five people." J.A. 146. The state appellate court then denied Kelley...