Kelly v. Mueller, 2004 PA Super 425 (PA 11/4/2004)

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2004 PA Super 425

BETH ANN KELLY v. JAMES C. MUELLER, JR APPEAL OF: JAMES C. MUELLER, JR., and JAMES C. MUELLER, SR.

No. 3449 EDA 2003.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: November 4, 2004.

Appeal from the Orders entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Civil Division, No. 03-17830.

Before: STEVENS, TAMILIA and JOHNSON, JJ.

OPINION BY TAMILIA, J.:

¶ 1 In this extraordinary case, appellants, James C. Mueller, Sr. (father) and James C. Mueller, Jr. (son) appeal from an Order and Supplemental Order entered under the Protection from Abuse (PFA) Act. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6101, et seq. The Muellers contend the trial court abused its discretion and exceeded its authority by ordering the search of their residence and father's hunting cabin, and the seizure of son's weapons and father's handgun. In its Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court declined to address the appropriateness of its Orders and simply asserts that the Muellers do not have standing to appeal. Upon review, we conclude that the Muellers do have standing.

¶ 2 Beth Ann Kelly and son were girlfriend and boyfriend. Shortly after their relationship ended, Kelly filed a PFA petition on September 15, 2003, alleging son had threatened to kill her. The trial court granted a temporary PFA Order and scheduled a final hearing for September 25. On September 25, son and Kelly both appeared for the hearing without counsel. Son requested a continuance so he could hire an attorney. The court rescheduled the hearing for October 14, 2003.

¶ 3 Kelly attended the October 14 hearing with her attorney, but son did not appear. Kelly testified at the hearing that son had threatened to kill her while pointing father's loaded handgun at her. She also testified to incidents of physical and verbal abuse. Kelly said son lives with his parents and when asked by the court, Kelly listed the weapons in son's home, including father's handgun. She listed, "[t]here are a couple shotguns for hunting. There are, I think, three . . . bow[s] and arrows. He has brass knuckles. He has numchucks [sic] .... And he has a BB gun." N.T., 10/14/03, at 15. Kelly did not testify to any incidents of abuse involving any of son's weapons. She did, however, list son's bows and arrows, brass knuckles, nun chucks, and hunting gun in her PFA petition as weapons son "used or threatened to use... against [her]." Petition for Protection from Abuse, 9/15/03, at 3.

¶ 4 The resulting Order entered by the trial court excluded son from Kelly's residence, prohibited him from having contact with Kelly and required him to turn over to police all weapons "used or threatened to be used by Defendant [son] in an act of abuse against [Kelly]." The Order listed those weapons as "any and all weapons, including but not limited to, father's handgun, [son's] hunting gun, [son's] bow and arrow, [son's] numchucks [sic], [son's] brass knuckles." Final Order, 10/14/03, at 3.

¶ 5 Kelly and her attorney returned to the court that same day to request a Supplemental Order. According to Kelly's attorney, when the sheriff went to son's residence later that day to collect the weapons listed in the order, son signed a statement saying there were no weapons. N.T. at 21. Following testimony from Kelly that she had seen the weapons at son's home, the court entered a Supplemental Order directing the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department to search both the residence of father and son and the family's Pocono Mountain hunting cabin. The Order directed the sheriff to seize any weapons and use whatever force necessary to enforce the Order. Supplemental Order at 1.

¶ 6 The trial court, upon ruling on an emergency motion for hearing filed by son seeking reconsideration of the October 14, 2003, Orders, dismissed the motion, finding son was not an aggrieved party and father was not a party to the action, and that therefore, neither party had standing. In so holding, the court further found,

It is this Court's belief that the broad power granted to the Court in order to protect a party from potential danger would include the right to remove all weapons within a party's control that could cause serious or grave physical injury and danger to a party. Such broad grant of power is embodied in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a)(10). Nonetheless, if Father is contending that he is an aggrieved party, this court would most certainly schedule proceedings to entertain the issue should such be raised in an appropriate petition seeking relief from this Court upon a return of jurisdiction to the trial court.

Trial Court Opinion, Dickman, J., 12/18/03, p. 4.

¶ 7 Before addressing the issues presented on appeal, we must first consider whether the Muellers have standing to appeal the trial court's orders. "[U]nless the right of appeal is enlarged by statute, only parties aggrieved from appealable orders may appeal therefrom." Clairton Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 916, 921 (Pa. Super. 1995); see also Pa.R.A.P. 501. The trial court concluded father does not have standing because he is not a party, and that son does not have standing because he is not an aggrieved party. On appeal, we must determine whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion. See In re Hickson, 765 A.2d 372, 376 (Pa. Super. 2000), aff'd, 573 Pa 127, 821 A.2d 1238 (2003). Because standing "is a question of law, our scope of review is plenary." In re T.J., 559 Pa. 118, 124, 739 A.2d 478, 481 (1999).

¶ 8 We begin by assessing father's standing. "Standing denotes the existence of a legal interest." Commonwealth v. Whiting, 767 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. Super. 2001). A party is "[a] person who commences or against whom relief is sought in a matter . . . ." 42 Pa.C.S. § 102. Here, relief is sought against father; the court ordered the seizure of his handgun and the search of his residence and cabin. Thus, we conclude father is, for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 102, a party. See Walker v. Walker, 523 A.2d 782, 783 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1987) (concluding that non-party against whom relief was sought was a party under 42 Pa.C.S. § 102 for purposes of standing). In addition, there are circumstances under which even non-parties have standing to appeal. See, e.g., Walker; Green v. SEPTA, 551 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 1988) (acknowledging that plaintiff's attorney whose fees the court reduced could file an appeal in his own name). In Walker, an individual who was neither a plaintiff nor a defendant had standing to appeal an Order because the Order directly involved her and she was aggrieved by the Order. See Walker, at 783. In this case, the Orders specifically refer to father's handgun and father's hunting cabin. Furthermore, father was directly and substantially aggrieved by the Order to forcibly search and seize his property. Thus, under our caselaw, father does have standing.

¶ 9 We next consider whether son has standing to appeal. Again, as a general rule, one must be aggrieved to appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 501. A party is aggrieved if he or she "has a direct, immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation." Insilco Corp. v. Rayburn, 543 A.2d 120, 125-26 (Pa. Super. 1988). In essence, a party is aggrieved "when the party has been adversely affected by the decision from which the appeal is taken." Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 700 (Pa. Super. 2000). Although son was adversely affected by the search and seizure of his property, he was not adversely affected by the alleged violation of father's due process rights. See Commonwealth v Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 131, 291 A.2d 89, 90 (1972) (holding that one cannot "assert the alleged deprivation of another's constitutional rights"); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 556 Pa. 216, 234, 727 A.2d 1089, 1098 (1999) (holding that "an individual whose constitutionally protected rights are not violated cannot claim any injury by a warrantless police seizure"). Son had no direct or substantial interest in father's constitutional rights. Accordingly, son has standing to challenge the search of his residence and the seizure of his weapons, but son does not have standing to challenge the search of father's cabin and the seizure of father's handgun. We now turn to the merits of the appeal.

¶ 10 The Muellers raised the following questions for our review:

1. Did the Trial Court lack jurisdiction or authority to enter an Order providing for the search of the residence of the Appellants, the search of the hunting cabin of Appellant James C. Mueller, Sr., the seizure of all weapons in the residence and/or hunting cabin of Appellant James C. Mueller, Sr., without regard to whether they belonged to Appellant James C. Mueller, Jr., or whether they were used or threatened to be used in an act of abuse against [Kelly] and in disregard of Appellants' rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures?

2. Was James C. Mueller, Sr., denied due process of law when an Order was entered substantially affecting his property rights without notice or an opportunity to be heard?

Appellants' Brief at 4. We will limit our discussion and disposition to the Supplemental Order and paragraph six of the Final Order, as those are the items being appealed. Our discussion will not address or affect the remaining paragraphs of the Final Order.

¶ 11 We begin by addressing the second question presented for our review, that is, father's assertion that the court denied his due process rights. As stated above, son does not have standing to raise this issue. "The `fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard' at a meaningful time and in a meaningful matter." Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Due process also requires adequate notice. See In re R.M., 567 Pa. 646, 653, 790 A.2d 300, 305 (2002). Father maintains, and we find no evidence of record to refute, that he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard.

¶ 12 "Unless the court has the...