Kendrick v. Bowen

657 F. Supp. 1547

Chan KENDRICK, Reverend Robert E. Vaughn, Reverend Lawrence W. Buxton, Dr. Emmett W. Cocke, Jr., Shirley Pedler, Reverend Homer A. Goddard, Joyce Armstrong, John Roberts and the American Jewish Congress, Plaintiffs, v. Dr. Otis R. BOWEN, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant and Sammie J. Bradley, Katherine K. Warner and United Families of America, Defendant-Intervenors.

Civ. A. No. 83-3175.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 15, 1987.

As Modified May 15, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Janet Benshoof, Nan D. Hunter, Lynn M. Paltrow, Suzanne M. Lynn and Verna C. Sanchez, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, and Bruce J. Ennis, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Theodore C. Hirt, Thomas Millet, Charles Sorenson and Jeffrey Paulson, Dept. of Justice, Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Brook Hedge, Branch Director, Lewis K. Wise, Asst. Branch Director, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Joel Mangel, Deputy Asst. Gen. Counsel for Public Health, Carol Conrad, Sr.Atty. and Susan K. Ruby, Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

Edward R. Grant, Chicago, Ill., and Paul Arneson, Washington, D.C., for defendant-intervenors.

Wilfred R. Caron, Gen. Counsel, and Mark E. Chopko, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae U.S. Catholic Conference.

Patricia Hennessey, New York City and David B. Hopkins, Washington, D.C., for the amici curiae United Church of Christ Board of Homeland Ministries, Catholics for a Free Choice, Unitarian Universalist Ass'n, Union of American Hebrew Congregations and American Ethical Union.

Mari Anne T. Hamilton, Silver Spring, Md., Edward R. Grant, Maura K. Quinlan and Thomas Balch, Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund, Chicago, Ill., for amicus curiae Americans United for Life.

                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                                         Page
 I. INTRODUCTION                                                                        1551
II. BACKGROUND                                                                          1552
III. BECAUSE THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT
     IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE.                                                            1553
IV. THE FEDERAL TAXPAYER PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION
    BECAUSE THEY RAISE AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE TO THE

    AFLA, WHICH WAS ENACTED PURSUANT TO THE TAXING AND SPENDING
    CLAUSE.                                                                                  1554
 V. BECAUSE THE AFLA DOES NOT MAKE EXPLICIT AND DELIBERATE DISTINCTIONS
    AMONG RELIGIONS, THE COURT MUST USE THE TRIPARTITE TEST SET
    FORTH IN LEMON V. KURTZMAN TO EVALUATE THE STATUTE.                                  1556
VI. ALTHOUGH THE AFLA HAS A VALID SECULAR PURPOSE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
    ON ITS FACE BECAUSE IT HAS THE PRIMARY EFFECT OF ADVANCING
    RELIGION AND FOSTERS AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
    AND RELIGION, AND IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED BECAUSE IT
    HAS THE PRIMARY EFFECT OF ADVANCING RELIGION.                                        1557
    A. The AFLA Has a Valid Secular Purpose of Combating Teenage Pregnancy and
       Associated Ills.                                                                  1558
    B. On Its Face and As Applied, the AFLA Has the Primary Effect of Advancing Religion
       Because of Its Use of Religious Organizations for Education and Counseling of
       Teenagers on Matters Relating to Religious Doctrine.                                  1560
       1. The legal standard of primary effect                                          1560
       2. On its Face, the AFLA has the primary effect of advancing religion because it funds
           teaching and counseling of adolescents by religious organizations on matters
           related to religious doctrine.                                                    1562
       3. As applied, the AFLA has the primary effect of advancing religion.            1564
    C. Because Organizations Funded by the AFLA Have a Religious Character and Purpose
       and the AFLA Programs Concentrate on Counseling and Education, the Degree of
       Government Monitoring Necessary to Prevent Grantees From Advancing Religion
       Would Necessarily Rise to the Level of Excessive Entanglement.                        1567
    D. Because the AFLA Funds Religious Organizations to Provide Services Intrinsically
       Related to Fundamental Beliefs Upon Which Religions and Politicians Strongly
       Disagree, the AFLA Is Likely to Incite Political Division.                            1569
VII. CONCLUSION                                                                         1569

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z—300z-10 (1981), on the ground that on its face and as applied the statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.¹ The fundamental question in this case is the constitutionality of a statute that allows religious organizations to use government funds for, inter alia, the counseling and teaching of adolescents on matters related to premarital sexual relations and teenage pregnancy. Although the Court finds that the AFLA has a valid secular purpose, it also finds that the AFLA, on its face, has the primary effect of advancing religion and fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion. Moreover, the undisputed facts show that AFLA grants awarded to religious organizations have the primary effect of advancing religion. Therefore, the Court must hold that the AFLA is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied.² Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and will deny defendant's and defendant-intervenors' cross-motions for summary judgment by Order of even date herewith.

The Court is sensitive to the fact that its Opinion discusses particular beliefs and also discusses practices in which particular religious organizations have engaged. The Court intends nothing in this Opinion to reflect adversely on any religion. The Court notes that it is apparent from the party plaintiffs, defendant, and defendant-intervenors in this case that members of the same religious groups do disagree about the validity of the AFLA and hold differing, religiously based, beliefs about the program's goals. The Court also notes that this division obtains among Protestants, Catholics, Jews and others, and wishes to be quite clear that it discusses particular religions only insofar as is absolutely necessary for this Opinion.

No judge enjoys deciding a constitutional challenge to a United States statute. Because federal laws are enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive, courts rightly employ a variety of doctrines in order to avoid overruling our co-equal branches of government. In deference to the considered judgments of the other branches, a court must strive, if possible, to avoid the constitutional issue altogether. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1011, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As this case raises only constitutional issues, however, the Court does not have that option.

A second principle of judicial abstention is that a Court must avoid, if possible, finding that a statute does not conform to the requirements of the Constitution. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419, 91 L.Ed.2d 1666 (1947). Equally fundamental, if compelled to find a statute unconstitutional, a Court's decision should be so circumscribed as to wreak the least havoc on the law. As such, courts ought not leap to declare a statute invalid where they can merely proscribe a practice under that law. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-16, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2275-76, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 569, 67 S.Ct. at 1419. But, after careful study, the Court has concluded that these principles, which the Court wholeheartedly accepts, are somewhat at odds with Establishment Clause case law.

While little else is clear in Establishment Clause case law, it is obvious that the distinction between a challenge to a statute on its face and as applied has not been clearly delineated. The precedents take as their form of analysis a consideration of the possible applications of a particular statute, see, e.g., Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-83, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2968-70, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), then analyze the statute's actual application, see, e.g., id.; Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-82, 93 S.Ct. 2814, 2818-20, 37 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973), and finally, even if the application is the only constitutionally offensive element to which the court has pointed, strike down the statute on its face. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 2609, 53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 2354, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976).

This method of analysis, so different from that usually employed when considering constitutional claims, leaves this Court only one alternative if it is to abide by the teachings of the Supreme Court, which trial judges must. Accordingly, even though the Court does not relish the task, it has no alternative but to consider the statute both on its face and as applied. In the end, however, this double duty matters little because the AFLA is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied.

II. BACKGROUND

The AFLA is a Congressional response to the severe and manifold problems resulting...