Kennedy v. Crothall Healthcare, Inc.

321 A.3d 1065

Jamala KENNEDY, Parent and Natural Guardian of J.F., a Minor and Jamala Kennedy in Her Own Right, Appellants

v.CROTHALL HEALTHCARE, INC., General Electric Company and Datex-Ohmeda, Inc.

No. 383 EDA 2023

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued February 8, 2024

Filed August 9, 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered January 13, 2023, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at No(s): 210602210, Before Denis P. Cohen, J. Howard J. Bashman, Fort Washington, for appellant.

Nicolai A. Schurko, Philadelphia, for Crothall Healthcare, Inc., appellee.

James C. Martin, Pittsburgh, for General Electric Company and Daytex-Ohmeda, Inc., appellee.

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and Colins, J.^*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:

Jamala Kennedy, in her own right and as parent of J.F. ("Plaintiff’), appeals from the October 28, 2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County ("trial court") sustaining the preliminary objections of defendants General Electric Company and Datex-Ohmeda, Inc. ("GE" and "Datex," respectively, and "GE Defendants," collectively) and dismissing the GE Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff also appeals from the January 13, 2023 order granting the motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens filed by defendant Crothall Healthcare, Inc. ("Crothall"). After careful review, we affirm.

This matter arises out of injuries J.F. sustained on October 26, 2017, during a tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy performed at Shands Jacksonville Medical Center ("Shands") in Jacksonville, Florida. According to the complaint, J.F. sustained permanent brain damage and was left in a persistent vegetative state based upon the use of a defective and unsafe Aisys CS2 anesthesia system ("Anesthesia System"), a machine responsible for anesthesia delivery, ventilation, monitoring, and breathing assistance. Datex, a subsidiary of GE, manufactured the Anesthesia System. Crothall, an independent entity, had serviced the Anesthesia System prior to J.F.’s injury.

Plaintiff initiated this suit in the trial court in June 2021 and filed her complaint shortly thereafter on September 8, 2021. The GE Defendants subsequently removed the case to federal court; however, on June 14, 2022, the district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to remand, ruling that Crothall had not been fraudulently joined as a defendant to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction.

Following remand, the GE Defendants filed preliminary objections, asserting that the trial court lacked general and specific personal jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the preliminary objections, and the GE Defendants filed a reply. Thereafter, the trial court authorized discovery as to the jurisdictional issue and directed that the parties file supplemental briefs. The record following jurisdictional discovery revealed that GE is incorporated in New York and headquartered in Massachusetts, while Datex is a Delaware corporation, with a principal place of business of Wisconsin. GE Defendants’ Supplemental Brief In Support of Preliminary Objections, 9/21/22, Exhibit C, ¶¶3-4. The Anesthesia System was designed and manufactured in Wisconsin and sold to Shands by Datex’s agent in Florida. Id., ¶¶7-9. However, the invoice that was sent by Datex to Shands indicated that payment for the Anesthesia System was to be sent to a P.O. Box in Pittsburgh, which was maintained by Bank of America, the GE Defendants’ bank. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief In Opposition to GE Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, 9/21/22, at 5, Exhibit A at 3, Exhibit B at 102.

On October 28, 2022, the trial court entered an order sustaining the GE Defen dants’ preliminary objections and dismissing them from the case. Meanwhile, on July 25, 2022, Crothall, which is headquartered in Wayne, Pennsylvania, filed an answer and new matter, in which it asserted that the matter should be transferred to an appropriate court in Florida pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. On September 2, 2022, Crothall filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Plaintiff filed a response, and the trial court then issued an order authorizing discovery on the motion to dismiss and directing supplemental briefing. On January 13, 2023, the trial court entered an order granting the motion and dismissing the complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling in Florida or another appropriate jurisdiction.

Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal, in which it challenges both the trial court’s personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens rulings.¹ Plaintiff filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), as directed by the trial court, and on May 30, 2023, the trial court filed an opinion explaining its reasoning underlying the appealed from orders.

Plaintiff raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that personal jurisdiction was lacking over [the GE Defendants] in Pennsylvania because: (a) both corporations have registered to do business in this Commonwealth, thereby consenting to the exercise of general jurisdiction over them; and (b) these defendants had established a specific Pennsylvania address to which they directed that the significant payments for the sale and installation fees of the subject anesthesia system that caused [P]laintiff’s injuries be sent?

2. Whether, given this Court’s reversals of forum non conveniens dismissals under nearly identical circumstances in Vaughan v. Olympus America, Inc., 208 A.3d 66 (Pa. Super. [ ] 2019), and McConnell v. B. Braun Med. Inc., 221 A.3d 221 (Pa. Super. [ ] 2019), the trial court’s forum non conveniens dismissal of [P]laintiff's claims against Crothall [ ] in this case should similarly be reversed because it was predicated on legal error and otherwise constituted a reversible abuse of discretion?

Plaintiff’s Brief at 3-4.

[1–8] Plaintiff initially challenges the trial court’s order sustaining the GE Defendants’ preliminary objections based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction. We review the court’s ruling to determine whether it has committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Fulano v. Fanjul Corp., 236 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. Super. 2020). "An appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court in determining the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections." Merino v. Repak, B.V., 286 A.3d 1249, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Once the moving party supports its objections to personal jurisdiction, the burden of proving personal jurisdiction is upon the party asserting it. Courts must resolve the question of personal jurisdiction based on the circumstances of each particular case.

Id. (citation omitted) (cleaned up); see also Fulano, 236 A.3d at 12.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution limits the authority of a state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The extent to which the Due Process Clause proscribes jurisdiction depends on the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Where a defendant has established no meaningful contacts, ties or relations with the forum, the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of personal jurisdiction. However, where a defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the residents of the forum, he is presumed to have fair warning that it may be called to suit there.

Fulano, 236 A.3d at 13 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[9–11] "A corporate defendant’s activities within the Commonwealth ‘may give rise to either specific or general jurisdiction.’ " Merino, 286 A.3d at 1256 (quoting Fulano, 236 A.3d at 13); see also Hammons v. Ethicon, Inc., 662 Pa. 627, 240 A.3d 537, 555 (2020). General jurisdiction exists in "situations where a corporation’s connections are ‘so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State,’ allowing for jurisdiction over causes of action unrelated to instate activities." Hammons, 240 A.3d at 555 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011)). Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, applies where there are "more limited connections with a state which restrict jurisdiction to causes of action ‘where there is an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.’ " Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846).

[12] Plaintiff argues that the trial court was permitted to assert both general and specific jurisdiction over the GE Defendants. With respect to general jurisdiction, Plaintiff contends that Pennsylvania courts have general jurisdiction over the GE Defendants based upon the fact that they registered as foreign corporation in the Commonwealth. Under Section 5301 of the Judicial Code, "qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth … constitute[s] a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person." 42 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a)(2)(i); see also 15 Pa.C.S. § 411(a), (f) (providing that a foreign corporation "may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers" with the Pennsylvania Department of State and that the foreign corporation must also maintain an office in the Commonwealth as part of the registration process). Plaintiff notes that it submitted evidence in response to the preliminary objections showing that the GE Defendants are registered to do business in Pennsylvania. See Plaintiff’s Response to GE Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, 7/12/22, Exhibit H.

The issue of whether Pennsylvania courts may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based simply on its...