Kerns v. RCS Trucking & Freight, Inc.

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TIFFANI KERNS, Plaintiff, v. RCS TRUCKING & FREIGHT, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-1200 (RDA/IDD)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rossie D. Alston, Jr., United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant RCS Trucking &amp Freight, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). Dkt. 7. The Court has dispensed with oral argument as it would not aid in the decisional process. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); Loc. Civ. R. 7(J). This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. Having considered the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt 7), together with Defendant's Memorandum in Support (Dkt 6), Plaintiff's Opposition (Dkt. 9) and Defendant's Reply (Dkt. 10), the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 7) for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Tiffani Kerns began working as a Driver Manager and Key Account Manager for Defendant RCS Trucking & Freight, Inc. on December 4, 2017. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 5, 14. Robert Sturgeon is the owner and President of RCS Trucking and was Kerns's supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. Sturgeon is also Kerns's uncle. Id. ¶ 16.

In March of 2020, Sturgeon and Kerns travelled together on a work trip. Id. ¶ 17. Sturgeon had specifically requested that Kerns accompany him on this trip, which consisted of driving round-trip from Virginia to Pennsylvania to make a delivery to a client. Id. During the trip, Sturgeon subjected Kerns to sexually graphic remarks and explicit sexual advances. Id. ¶¶ 18-38. Sturgeon spent many hours talking about his sex-life during the drive from Virginia to Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 18. After completing the delivery and before beginning their return trip, Sturgeon covered the in-truck camera of their vehicle. Id. ¶ 19. Sturgeon then continued to make sexually explicit remarks to Kerns during the hours-long drive back to Virginia. Id. ¶ 20.

While Kerns and Sturgeon stopped to eat lunch in the truck, Sturgeon's graphic sexual conduct escalated. Id. ¶¶ 21-25. During their lunch conversation, Sturgeon inquired repeatedly about Kerns's sex life:

• Sturgeon asked Kerns if she was attracted to him, what she liked to “do in bed,” if she had ever “had a hookup,” and the age of men she preferred to have sex with. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

• Sturgeon asked Kerns to show her tattoos to him because he thought her tattoos were “sexy.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.

• Sturgeon revealed that he thinks about “doing dirty things” to Kerns and that he believes she has the same thoughts too. Id. ¶ 25.

• Sturgeon stated that they were “both adults” and “nobody need[ed] to know” if they began having a relationship. Id. ¶ 28.

Kerns repeatedly and adamantly rebuffed all of Sturgeon's advances. Id. ¶ 27. She also told Sturgeon that his advances were “inappropriate and bizarre,” especially since they are related, and repeatedly reminded Sturgeon that he is her uncle. Id. ¶¶ 26, 34.

Despite her emphatic rejection of his advances, Sturgeon proceeded to engage in unwelcomed touching of Kerns and continued to proposition her for sex. Id. ¶¶ 29-31, 35-36. Sturgeon wrapped his arm around Kerns, pulled her next to him, and told her to wrap her arm around him. Id. ¶¶ 29, 30. Kerns refused to touch Sturgeon and moved as far away from him as possible. Id. ¶ 31. Sturgeon then expressly asked Kerns whether she had considered having a sexual encounter with him, and she once again denied having any sexual thoughts about him. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Sturgeon then told Kerns that, while staying at the same hotel as her on a work trip the year prior, he considered going to her hotel room at night. Id. ¶ 37. Kerns was uncomfortable and did not respond, and Sturgeon eventually began driving again. Id. ¶ 39. Kerns was instructed by Sturgeon to never disclose the comments he made to her during the trip. Id. ¶ 40.

After the work trip, Kerns's mental and physical health began to deteriorate. Id. ¶ 43. During the 3 months following the incident, Kerns was unable to avoid Sturgeon at work and began experiencing anxiety and depression as a result of Sturgeon's actions. Id. ¶¶ 45, 47. Since Kerns is diabetic, she was unable to begin taking medication for anxiety or depression due to her physician's concerns about the negative interactions the medication could have with her diabetes management regimen. Id. ¶ 48. As a result, Kerns “believed she had no choice other than to resign” from RCS Trucking in June of 2020 in order to protect her mental and physical health. Id. ¶ 49.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this Complaint on October 22, 2022. Dkt. 1. Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on December 28, 2022. Dkt. 7. Plaintiff filed her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January 11, 2023. Dkt. 9. Defendant filed its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss on January 26, 2023. Dkt. 10.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must set forth “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” drawing “all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff's favor. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). To be sure, “the [C]ourt ‘need not accept the [plaintiff's] legal conclusions drawn from the facts,' nor need it ‘accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.'” Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 616 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006)). Typically, “courts may not look beyond the four corners of the complaint in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Linlor v. Polson, 263 F.Supp.3d 613, 618 (E.D. Va. 2017) (citing Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015)).

III. ANALYSIS

In her Complaint, Kerns raises two Title VII claims. First, Kerns brings a claim for hostile work environment based on sex (Count I). Dkt 1 at 7. Second, Kerns brings a claim for constructive discharge as a result of that hostile work environment (Count II). Id. at 8.

RCS Trucking has moved to dismiss both Counts of Kerns's Complaint. RCS Trucking first argues that Count I of the Complaint ought to be dismissed because the alleged harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII as a matter of law. Dkt. 7 at 4-7. RCS Trucking also contends that Count II of the Complaint should be dismissed because deliberateness is a required element of a constructive discharge claim, and, according to RCS Trucking, the Complaint does not allege any facts that indicate RCS Trucking deliberately created a hostile environment in order to force Kerns to quit. Id. at 7-8. Kerns asserts that the Court should deny RCS Trucking's Motion to Dismiss and allow her to proceed against RCS Trucking on both Counts of her Complaint. Kerns contends that she plausibly alleged facts in her Complaint sufficient to demonstrate that the harassment was pervasive or severe enough to constitute a Title VII hostile work environment claim (Count I) and that RCS Trucking acted deliberately to render her working conditions intolerable (Count II). Dkt. 9 at 6-8.

A. Hostile Work Environment Claim

An employee can bring a hostile work environment claim under Title VII if “discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). For such a claim to be viable, the Complaint must plausibly allege facts showing that the workplace is “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult'” which “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (quotingMeritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67). To meet this standard, the plaintiff must allege facts evidencing that the harassment she experienced “(1) was ‘unwelcome'; (2) was based on the employee's sex; (3) was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere'; and (4) was on same basis imputable to the employer.” Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., 915 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bass v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)). “While the first element is subjective, the rest of the test is made up of objective components based on a ‘reasonable person' standard.” Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 565 (4th Cir. 2009).

RCS Trucking does not contest that the first element of the claim is met. That element— which requires Kerns to show that Sturgeon's conduct was unwelcome—is also sufficiently evidenced by Kerns's allegations regarding her repeated rejections of Sturgeon's alleged sexual advances, e.g., Dkt. 1, ¶ 27, and her explicit comments that his conduct was “inappropriate and bizarre.” Id. ¶ 26. Further, when Sturgeon allegedly hugged Kerns, Kerns claims that she refused to hug him back and moved as far away from him as possible, signaling her clear discomfort with the interaction. Id. ¶ 31.

Furthermore RCS Trucking does not appear to dispute that the second element is satisfied, and the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that Sturgeon's discrimination...