Kew v. Town of Northfield

681 F.Supp.3d 247

Debra KEW, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF NORTHFIELD, VT, Brian Hoar, Officer, and Michael Gero, Officer, Defendants.

Case No. 5:19-cv-78

United States District Court, D. Vermont

Signed July 10, 2023

K. Heather Devine, Tarrant, Gillies & Shems, Montpelier, VT, Ronald A. Shems, Esq., Stephen F. Coteus, Esq., Tarrant, Gilles & Richardson, LLP, Montpelier, VT, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Leddy, Esq., McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, P.C., Burlington, VT, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Geoffrey W. Crawford, Chief Judge

Defendants removed this civil rights case to federal court in 2019. (Doc. 1.) As part of its Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motions for summary judgment, the court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff Debra Kew's claims under Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Kew v. Town of Northfield, 2023 WL 4172741, at *36 (D. Vt. Apr. 17, 2023). Ms. Kew now moves for reconsideration of that portion of the court's Order, arguing that the court should have remanded those claims to Vermont state court rather than dismissing them. The court agrees and grants Ms. Kew's motion for the reasons explained more fully below.

Analysis

Ms. Kew pled claims for false imprisonment and excessive force in Counts III and VI under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. (Doc. 57 ¶¶ 62-68, 83-88.) The court granted in part and denied in part Ms. Kew's claims under § 1983 and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the novel and complex issue of state law raised by Ms. Kew's claims under Article 11. See Kew, 2023 WL 4172741, at *32-33, *36. The court, therefore, dismissed Ms. Kew's claims under Article 11. Id., 2023 WL 4172741, at *36.

Ms. Kew now moves for reconsideration of the portion of the court's order dismissing her claims under Article 11. (Doc. 108 at 3-5.) Defendants oppose this motion. (Doc. 110.) Ms. Kew filed a reply memorandum. (Doc. 113.) The court heard oral argument on this matter on July 5, 2023 and took the matter under advisement at that time.

The court begins by defining the proper legal standard.

I. Applicable Legal Standard

Ms. Kew moves the court to reconsider its dismissal of her claims under Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. However, "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration." Lareau v. Nw. Med. Ctr., No. 17-cv-81, 2019 WL 4963057, at *1 (D. Vt. Oct. 8, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, "such a motion may be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Kew filed her motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. 108 at 1-2.) Defendants understand Ms. Kew's reference to Rule 59(e) as a "mis-citation." (Doc. 110 at 2 n. 4.)

The court agrees with Defendants that Rule 59(e) is inapplicable here. Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a "motion to alter or amend a judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). There has been no judgment in this case yet. The challenged Order granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions for summary judgment; the case remains ongoing. Ms. Kew's "mis-citation" of Rule 59(e), however, is not fatal to her request.

The issue of a motion for reconsideration "becomes more complicated when, as in this case, the reconsideration motion is filed after an interlocutory ruling rather than the sort of final judgment contemplated by Rules 59(e) and 60(b)." Lareau, 2019 WL 4963057, at *1. "Rule 54(a) defines a judgment as 'a decree and any order from which an appeal lies,' and an appeal generally does not lie after denial of a summary judgment motion." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a)). Still, "Rule 54(b) allows that 'any order or other decision . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.' " Id. at *2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).

Under Rule 54(b), a court may not change an order absent " 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest injustice.' " Id. (quoting Off. Comm. of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc.v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (same). This is the same standard applicable to a motion under Rule 59(e). See, e.g., Montanio v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 3d 212, 216 (D. Vt. 2017); R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 508-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Therefore, the court will excuse Ms. Kew's "mis-citation" of Rule 59(e) and construe it as a motion under Rule 54(b).

Construing Ms. Kew's motion as one under 54(b), however, raises a timeliness issue under Local Rule 7(c). As Defendants correctly point out (Doc. 110 at 2 n.4), a motion for reconsideration not governed by Rule 59 or 60 must be filed within 14 days. See D. Vt. L.R. 7(c). Ms. Kew's motion, filed 28 days after the court's Order, was timely under Rule 59(e); it also would have been timely under Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(c). But, under Local Rule 7(c), it is not timely under Rule 54(b).

However, the timeliness issue does not prevent the court from reaching the merits of the reconsideration motion in this case. "Although the Court generally requires full compliance with its Local Rules, the Court may also excuse noncompliance where 'strict application of the local rules would lead to an unjust result.' " Pietrangelo v. Alvas Corp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 420, 431 (D. Vt. 2009) (quoting Phoenix Glob. Ventures, LLC v. Phoenix Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 422 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2005)). Here, the court excuses Ms. Kew's "mis-citation" of Rule 59(e)—which also caused the timeliness issue—to prevent the unjust result of dismissing Ms. Kew's motion based on a procedural technicality. Id.; see also Sony Corp. v. Elm State Elecs., Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing the Second Circuit's "strong preference for resolution of disputes on their merits"); Lareau, 2019 WL 4963057, at *2 ("It is therefore within the Court's discretion to reconsider its Order, applying the reconsideration standard, notwithstanding the deadline set forth in the Local Rule.").

Therefore, the court proceeds to consider the merits of Ms. Kew's motion.

II. Merits

Ms. Kew argues that the court should have remanded, rather than dismissed, her claims under Article 11. (Doc. 108 at 3-5.) As part of that argument, she contends that the court may have abused its discretion by not offering the parties a chance to be heard on the issue of dismissal. (Id. at 5.) In the alternative, Ms. Kew argues that the court should have certified the question to the Vermont Supreme Court. (Id. at 5-7.) Defendants argue that the court properly dismissed the claims and considered the possible effect of the statute of limitations. (Doc. 110 at 4-6.) In addition, Defendants argue that the court did not abuse its discretion by sua sponte dismissing the Article 11 claims because Ms. Kew failed to argue for remand as part of her briefing in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motions. (Id. at 6-7.)

Although a federal court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims has discretion to dismiss the claims or to remand them to state court, Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1988), "remand generally will be preferable to dismissal when the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's state-law claims has expired before the federal court has determined that it should relinquish jurisdiction," Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351-52, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). Here, as the court noted, it is not entirely clear whether the statute of limitations has run on Ms. Kew's Article 11 claims. Kew, 2023 WL 4172741, at *33. The Vermont Supreme Court recently implied the private cause of action under Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution and has not yet established the applicable statute of limitations for such a claim. See Zullo v. State, 2019 VT 1, ¶ 47, 209 Vt. 298, 205 A.3d 466.

Defendants argue that Ms. Kew's Article 11 claims will not be time-barred should she seek to refile them in state court because Vermont has a savings clause, 12 V.S.A. § 558(a), and Vermont courts have construed that statute liberally. (Doc. 110 at 6-7.) That may be true. But "[e]ven when the applicable statute of limitations has not expired, a remand may best promote the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 353, 108 S.Ct. 614. The court agrees that remand would better serve the parties' "interest in the prompt and efficient resolution of controversies based on state law." Id.

Here, remanding will promote the values of economy and convenience because it will save Ms. Kew the time and expenses associated with refiling the same claims. Id. (noting time and expense in refiling). Remanding here will also promote fairness to Ms. Kew by preventing her claim from being time-barred in state court even though she properly filed it there in 2019. Defendants do not argue that Ms. Kew's claim was untimely when she initially filed it. As a result, the court concludes that it would be manifestly unjust to dismiss these claims and possibly put Ms. Kew in the position of having the claims be time-barred. And, although Defendants may wish to litigate the issue of timeliness in state court, remanding will also promote the value of economy by saving both parties from litigating and the state court from needing to decide that issue. Therefore, the court grants Ms. Kew's motion for reconsideration on this basis.

Because the court concludes that remand, rather than dismissal, was the appropriate course of action once the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Kew's Article 11 claims, the court does not reach...