Khalil v. Gen. Elec. Corp.

1

AHMED S. KHALIL, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CORP., et al. Defendants.

No. 5:22-CV-312 (GTS/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

May 16, 2022

AHMED S. KHALIL, Plaintiff, pro se

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

ANDREW T. BAXTER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Clerk sent to the court for review a civil rights complaint together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed by plaintiff Ahmed S Khalil.^[1] (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2). The court has reviewed the plaintiff's IFP application and finds that plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient economic need. Therefore plaintiff has met the financial criteria for proceeding IFP.

However in addition to determining whether plaintiff meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Although the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, and must use extreme caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and has had an opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee).

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Complaint

Plaintiff has filed this action on a form for civil rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleges that this action includes claims against a federal official under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and Breach of Contract claims pursuant to New York State Law.^[2](Compl. at CM/ECF p.10).^[3] The complaint includes 27 named defendants, together with at least 70 John or Jane Doe defendants. (Compl. at 2-10). The complaint lists a summary of claims which plaintiff states apply to “all defendants.” (Compl. at 11). Because the complaint is so difficult to decipher, the court has attempted to determine what plaintiff's basic claims might be and then match plaintiff's lengthy recitation of fact to the alleged legal claims.^[4]

Although plaintiff begins his recitation of the facts with a discussion of GE and his work at that company, in essence most of the remainder of plaintiff's complaint deals with conduct which appears to relate to criminal prosecutions against him for various charges as will be discussed below.^[5] Most of the named defendants appear to be individuals who were involved in the investigation or the prosecution of these charges, including the prosecutors themselves.

Plaintiff claims that “all” of the defendants engaged in malicious prosecution, conspiracy, fabricating evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, equal protection violations,^[6] “involuntary” prosecution in violation of the First Amendment, due process violations, “stigma-plus” defamation,^[7] municipal and corporate liability, First Amendment religious freedom violations, and deprivations of medical care.^[8]Plaintiff also alleges that he “asserts the following state law claims against all defendants”: negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; false imprisonment; false arrest; breach of contract; and abuse of process. (Compl. at 11).

Plaintiff has divided the complaint into five “claims,” thus, the court will assess each of the plaintiff's claims as he has listed them, discussing the relevant facts in each section.

III. Claim # 1 (General Electric) (Compl. Claim # 1 at 1-3)^[9]:

A. Relevant Facts

In this claim, plaintiff begins by stating that he worked in various capacities for defendant General Electric (“GE”) until 2017. He states that in 2013, GE asked him to go to Pakistan, but plaintiff declined to do so on the advice of his attorney. (Compl. Claim #1 at 1 ¶ 1). Plaintiff states that, while he was working for GE, “in or around” 2016 to 2017, he filed “integrity” complaints and “EEO” complaints. (Id. at 1-2 ¶ 2) Plaintiff states that, after applying for eleven different jobs within GE, he was finally promoted in December of 2016. (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 2 at 2). Plaintiff states that on March 31, 2017, he was told that he was being laid off. (Id. ¶ 3). On an unspecified date, plaintiff alleges that an unknown Greene County Sheriff^[10] came to plaintiff's house without calling and told plaintiff that he was sent by GE and that he was “reportedly suicidal.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that in April of 2017, GE informed plaintiff that he was under investigation by two investigators who introduced themselves as former police officers and told plaintiff that GE was “too big,” that GE worked with the Government, “intel and law enforcement,” and that the New York State Police “has [sic] building inside the [GE] factory” in Schenectady. (Id. Claim #1 ¶ 4 at 2). Plaintiff states that, on April 30, 2017, GE breached its contract with plaintiff and attempted to have him sign a document waiving his “right to pursue covered claims against [GE].”^[11] (Id. Claim #1 ¶ 5 at 2).

Plaintiff claims that on August 24, 2018, defendant St. Lawrence County (“SLC”) Deputy Sheriff defendant John E. Jones came to plaintiff's residence and told plaintiff that he knew plaintiff worked for GE. (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 6 at 2). Plaintiff claims that at 10:40 p.m. on August 24, 2018, a State Police officer, named “Eng”^[12] told the SLC Sheriff that plaintiff was suicidal. (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 7 at 3).

Plaintiff claims that on May 4, 2019, there were “text messages” between Ms. Farideh Hosseini-Norovei and defendant Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in which plaintiff was described as “professional.” (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 8(a) at 3).^[13] In July of 2019, Fran Krosania^[14] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) discussed some of the details of plaintiff's contract with GE. (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 8 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that, on October 30, 2019, Ms. Hosseini-Norovei was “contacting a typed analysis to make [sic] connection between myself and the Central Intelligence Agency.” (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 8(a) at 3).

In the last paragraph of Claim #1, plaintiff states that he is a “citizen,” he has lived in New York State since 2011, he has obtained various educational degrees, and was the recipient of three awards while he was working at GE. (Compl. Claim #1 ¶ 9 at 3). Plaintiff also states that he traveled to at least thirty states while working for GE, and that the company charged $350.00 per hour for his time. (Id.)

B. Legal Standards

“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-5369 (JS/ARL), 2012 WL 1657362, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (citing Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-701 (2d Cir. 2000)). “‘To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants violated plaintiff's federal rights while acting under color of state law.'” Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 354 F.Supp.3d 185, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014)).

“Section 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement means that ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,' is excluded from its reach.” Megginson v. Bridge, Inc., No. 21-CV-9626 (LTS), 2021 WL 6064409, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2021) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); United States v. Int'l. Bd. of Teamsters, 941 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes ‘state action.'”)).

The activity of a private entity may be attributed to the state in three situations: (1) where the entity acts using the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state (the “compulsion test”); (2) where the entity willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its functions are entwined with state policies (the “joint...