Kicinski v. United States

1

AARON T. KICINSKI, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 24-cv-372

United States Court of Federal Claims

August 6, 2024

Aaron T. Kicinski, Madison Heights, Michigan, Plaintiff, appearing pro se.

Daniel A. Hoffman, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., appearing for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

ELENI M. ROUMEL, JUDGE

Plaintiff Aaron Thomas Kicinski, appearing pro se, purportedly brings this action against the United States. Though difficult to discern, the Court construes Plaintiff's claims to pertain to alleged delays regarding his receipt of social security benefits.^[1] Complaint (ECF No. 1) (Compl.) at 1-2.^[2] Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) (Def. Mot.). Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)). Def Mot. at 1. For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). Further, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had properly pleaded jurisdictional claims, this Court would nevertheless be required to dismiss his claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.^[3]

BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint, seeking relief related to the receipt of "SSDI" benefits. Compl at 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff argues he "should of [sic] walked out of [the] physc [sic] ward in 2016 with SSDI already applied for after being petitioned by police." Id. The Court interprets this as a reference to Plaintiff's November 2016 "mentally ill charge."^[4] Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff notes in the "2nd Qtr [of] 2017," he filed for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), see supra note 1, and then reapplied in "mid 2018" for the same. Compl. ¶¶ 23. While reapplying in "mid 2018" for SSDI, Plaintiff also applied for state benefits, namely a "bridge card + cash assistance." Id. ¶ 3. In December 2022, Plaintiff's SSDI application was approved. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges this approval coincided with five years of Plaintiff having "no warm water," as it had been out "since December 2017."^[5] Id. ¶ 5.

On April 30, 2024, Defendant timely moved to dismiss this action, contending Plaintiff's claims all "fail[] to articulate a claim cognizable in this Court." Def. Mot. at 1. Defendant argues that "the equitable relief Mr Kicinski appears to seek" is based upon neither "an express or implied-in-fact contract with the United States" nor a "money-mandating provision of law, as required by the Tucker Act." Id. Defendant further contends that this Court "does not possess jurisdiction to entertain suits against states or state officials." Id. at 2. Lastly, Defendant contends that "Mr. Kicinski has not alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies," thus precluding even a district court from having jurisdiction.^[6] Id.

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, arguing that a motion to dismiss "does not constitute as an answer" to a complaint, and therefore requesting the Court deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Pl. Resp. at 3. As a result, Plaintiff requests the Clerk of Court enter what the Court interprets to be a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Id. ("Therefore, I ask . . . default entry is [sic] entered by clerk."). Lastly, Plaintiff clarifies that "[t]he reason for this lawsuit is the length of time it took to get approved for SSDI benefits." Id. at 2.

On May 31, 2024, Defendant filed its Reply, which largely repeated Defendant's arguments about the jurisdictional and procedural deficiencies identified in its Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) (Def. Reply) at 1-2. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff submitted, with leave of Court, a "Letter to Court" as an additional rebuttal to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See Pl. Ltr. In his letter, Plaintiff purports to, "establish[] diversity jurisdiction with an amount over $75,000"^[7] and "asserts that he is entitled to payment by the government." Id. at 1. Plaintiff further notes he has "exhausted [his] administrative remedies with the [SSA]" and seeks "punitive and compensatory damages." Id.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

The Tucker Act vests this Court with jurisdiction over any suit against the United States for money damages "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States . . . in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity for "certain claims for monetary relief against the United States," but it does not create any enforceable right against the United States on its own. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To establish a right under the Tucker Act that falls within this Court's limited jurisdiction, a plaintiff must identify an independent "money-mandating" source. Bell v. United States, 20 F.4th 768, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Specifically, a plaintiff "must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.'" United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)). Accordingly, this Court's jurisdiction does not extend to "every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation." Id. at 216.

Additionally, while this Court's limited jurisdiction permits adjudication of monetary claims against the United States, this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against private parties, non-federal government entities, and federal officials acting in their individual capacities. See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Courts have consistently held that the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is limited to cases in which the Constitution or a federal statute requires the payment of money damages as compensation for their violation.") (collecting cases). Further, this Court's limited jurisdiction does not extend to actions against individual states or municipalities. See Trevino v. United States, 557 Fed.Appx. 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (confirming that the Court of Federal Claims "lacks jurisdiction over [Plaintiff's] claims against states, localities, state and local government officials, state courts, state prisons, or state employees").

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court "accepts as true all uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Estes Express Lines, 739 F.3d at 692; see also Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014). However, this Court must, sua sponte, dismiss claims outside its limited subject matter jurisdiction. See Rule 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").

A pro se litigant's submissions are held to "less stringent standards than [those] drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Pro se plaintiffs, however, must still prove this Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Curry v. United States, 787 Fed.Appx. 720, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Reynolds v. Army &Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). While pro se complaints are liberally construed, it "does not excuse [] failures" on the merits. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Kelley v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (observing that with due deference to the construction of a complaint, and respect to jurisdictional requirements, "a court may not similarly take a liberal view of that jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only").

DISCUSSION

Even under the most liberal construction of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). First Plaintiff's claim regarding his Social Security is not properly within the Court's jurisdiction. Second, to the extent Plaintiff's remaining claims can be understood as against state government actors or municipalities, they are also not within the Court's jurisdiction. Additionally, even if Plaintiff had pleaded claims within this Court's subject matter jurisdiction (which, he did not), Plaintiff's Complaint, even liberally construed, fails to plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief as required by Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, this Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and in the alternative, for failure to state a claim.

I. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Social Security Claims

Plaintiff avers that he applied for SSDI in the "2nd Qtr [of] 2017" and "reapplied" in "mid 2018." Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. He then alleges that his SSDI was approved in December 2022. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff clarified in his Response that the "reason for this lawsuit" was both the "length of time it took to get approved for SSDI benefits" and the "length of time to received [sic] first benefit." Pl. Resp. at 2.^[8] However, it is inapposite to this Court's review whether Plaintiff is contesting the timing of his approval for SSDI or the timing of his receipt of the same because the Court of Federal Claims cannot "adjudicate claims arising under...