Kincaid v. Gov't of the D.C., 16-7066

854 F.3d 721

Patrick KINCAID, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, et al., Appellants

v.GOVERNMENT OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee

No. 16-7066

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued February 15, 2017

Decided April 25, 2017

Jeffrey Light argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were William Claiborne and Lynn E. Cunningham.

Jason Lederstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: Kavanaugh, Circuit Judge, and Sentelle and Randolph, Senior Circuit Judges.

Kavanaugh, Circuit Judge:

This case concerns the District of Columbia's post-and-forfeit statute. Under that law, certain individuals arrested for misdemeanor crimes receive an opportunity to resolve their criminal charges immediately by paying a relatively small sum of money, typically $25 to $50. An arrestee who chooses to use the post-and-forfeit procedure is released without the need to attend any criminal proceedings and without any admission of fault or record of conviction. An arrestee who declines to use the post-and-forfeit procedure is entitled to all criminal due process protections, including an initial hearing before a judicial officer and a trial on the merits.

In this case, a group of individuals who resolved their misdemeanor charges using the post-and-forfeit procedure later filed suit, challenging the procedure and the statute authorizing it as unconstitutional. They argue that the post-and-forfeit procedure deprives arrestees of their property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They also contend that the statute authorizing the post-and-forfeit procedure is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause. The District Court dismissed those claims, concluding that the post-and-forfeit statute is consistent with the Due Process Clause. We affirm.

I

A

In 2004, the Council of the District of Columbia adopted the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act. The Act took effect in 2005 following a 30-day period of congressional review. See 52 D.C. Reg. 5417 (June 10, 2005). Among other things, the Act codified D.C.'s longstanding "post-and-forfeit" procedure. See D.C. CODE § 5-335.01.¹ That procedure has been used to resolve low-level criminal charges in the District for more than 50 years. Under the post-and-forfeit procedure, police officers may offer a misdemeanor arrestee the opportunity to "obtain a full and final resolution of the criminal charge" by posting and simultaneously forfeiting an amount of money associated with the charge. Id. § 5-335.01(a)(3). In other words, the post-and-forfeit procedure allows an arrestee to pay a sum of money to resolve his or her criminal charge without having to proceed through the traditional criminal process. The post-and-forfeit amounts are pre-determined by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and are available online. Those amounts typically range from $25 to $50, but may in some cases extend up to $500 or $1,000 for certain misdemeanor offenses. See Superior Court Bond and Collateral List, Non-Traffic Offenses (June 11, 2014).

An arrestee who chooses to use the post-and-forfeit procedure must pay the amount associated with his or her misdemeanor charge. Following payment, the arrestee's charge is fully resolved and the arrestee need not attend any further criminal proceedings. The statute makes clear that an arrestee's choice to use the post-and-forfeit procedure "is not a conviction of a crime and shall not be equated to a criminal conviction." D.C. CODE § 5-335.01(b). The statute similarly specifies that resolution of a charge using the post-and-forfeit procedure "may not be relied upon by any District of Columbia court or agency in a subsequent criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or administrative action to impose any sanction, penalty, enhanced sentence, or civil disability." Id.

By statute, an arrestee who receives a post-and-forfeit offer must also be provided with a form that explains the post-and-forfeit process. The form must make clear, among other things, that the arrestee has "the right to choose" whether to "[a]ccept the post-and-forfeit offer and terminate the criminal case" or, alternatively, "[p]roceed with the criminal case and a potential adjudication on the merits of the criminal charge." Id. § 5-335.01(e)(2) ; see also id. § 5-335.01(e)(1), (3)-(7). In order to accept a post-and-forfeit offer, an arrestee must indicate his or her understanding and approval of the process by signing the required form. Id. § 5-335.01(g).

An arrestee may choose to decline a post-and-forfeit offer and instead contest the criminal charges. If an arrestee does so, the criminal process moves forward as usual. The arrestee is afforded all of the traditional due process protections associated with the criminal process. Those protections may include, among other things, a hearing before a judicial officer. Pending that hearing, an arrestee is released "on citation" with instructions to return to court. See id. § 5-335.01(e)(3) ; id. § 23-584. If the Government chooses to proceed with its case against an arrestee, the arrestee is entitled to contest the relevant charges at a trial on the merits.

If an arrestee uses the post-and-forfeit procedure but later decides to contest the criminal charges, the statute provides a mechanism to do so. Any person who uses the post-and-forfeit procedure may seek, within 90 days of the forfeiture, to "set aside the forfeiture and proceed with the criminal case." Id. § 5-335.01(e)(4).

B

In 2014, Metropolitan Police officers arrested Patrick Kincaid and charged him with possession of an open container of alcohol. The officers transported Kincaid to the local station house. At the station house, the officers offered Kincaid the opportunity to resolve his misdemeanor charge through the post-and-forfeit procedure. Kincaid accepted. Kincaid signed a form acknowledging that, by accepting the post-and-forfeit offer, he was making the choice to forfeit both the sum of $25 and his "right to a hearing in court." Kincaid Collateral/Bond Receipt Form, J.A. 37. The form that Kincaid signed also stated that Kincaid could seek to set aside the forfeiture and proceed with the criminal case within 90 days. Id.

Although Kincaid chose to resolve his charge through the post-and-forfeit procedure, he maintains that his arrest was improper. But Kincaid declined to file a motion to set aside his forfeiture and challenge his arrest in a criminal court proceeding. Instead, Kincaid filed a class action lawsuit in the District Court on behalf of himself and other individuals who used the post-and-forfeit procedure to resolve misdemeanor criminal charges. The suit challenged the post-and-forfeit statute as unconstitutional on a number of grounds.

As relevant here, Kincaid's complaint asserted that the post-and-forfeit procedure violates arrestees' due process rights because it deprives them of their money without a hearing. In addition, Kincaid claimed that the post-and-forfeit statute is unconstitutionally vague because it grants too much enforcement discretion to law enforcement officials. The District of Columbia moved to dismiss Kincaid's complaint for failure to state a claim. The District Court granted the District of Columbia's motion and dismissed Kincaid's constitutional claims. See Kincaid v. District of Columbia , 177 F.Supp.3d 548 (D.D.C. 2016).

Kincaid now appeals the District Court's dismissal of his procedural due process and vagueness claims. We review the District Court's decision de novo.

II

A

We first address Kincaid's claim that the post-and-forfeit procedure violates due process because it deprives individuals of their money without a hearing. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars D.C. officials from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. As a general matter, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to provide certain "procedural protections" before depriving individuals of their property interests. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ). The due process test set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge requires a judicial balancing of the Government's interests against the individual's interests. See id. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893.

"In the field of criminal law," however, the Bill of Rights "speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure." Medina v. California , 505 U.S. 437, 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). For that reason, the Supreme Court has stated that "the Due Process Clause has limited operation" beyond the "specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights." Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). According to the Supreme Court, "expansion of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order." Id.

Therefore, when examining due process claims in the realm of criminal procedure, courts apply a test that is somewhat more deferential than the Mathews v. Eldridge test: A rule of criminal procedure usually does not violate the Due Process Clause unless it (i) "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," or (ii) "transgresses any recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness' in operation." Id. at 445, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (quoting Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) ; Dowling v. United States , 493 U.S. 342,...