King v. Brock & Scott

1

JERRYL. KING, JR., Plaintiff, v. BROCK & SCOTT, PLLC, et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-4981 (KMW-MJS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

May 24, 2023

Not For Publication

APPEARANCES:

Jerry L. King, Jr, pro se Greyson K. Van Dyke, Esquire Austin D. Skelton, Esquire Reed Smith LLP Counsel for Defendants Charles Scharf, Michael P. Santomassimo, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ^[1]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KAREN M. WILLIAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) (ECF No. 11) filed by Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) seeking to dismiss with prejudice a complaint filed by Pro se Plaintiff Jerry L, King Jr. (“Plaintiff').^[2] Plaintiff filed a November 7 2022 letter with supplemental documents (ECF No. 12) which the Court will consider in opposition to Defendant's MTD. The Court, having reviewed the submissions of the parties and considered the MTD without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), grants Defendant's MTD.^[3]

1, This matter arises from a foreclosure action that Defendant initiated against Plaintiff in New Jersey state court. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. Plaintiff appears to claim that the foreclosure action is unlawful because payments were made on the mortgage of the property and, accordingly, the loan secured by the mortgage should not be in default. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.

2. On October 19, 2004, Plaintiffs mother, Frances H. King (“King”), executed a promissory note in favor of World Savings Bank, FSB, its successors and/or assignees in exchange for a loan in the amount of $101,250.00, which was secured by a mortgage (the “Mortgage”) on the subject property located in Pleasantville, New Jersey. Certification of Austin D. Skelton (“Skelton Cert.”), ECF No. 11-3, Ex. A, ¶¶ 1-3. The note contained an agreement stating that “if the borrower defaults by failing to pay in full any monthly payments, [the] Lender may require immediate payment in full of the principal balance remaining due and all accrued interest.” Id. ¶ 6. Following a corporate merger with the originating lender, Wells Fargo became the holder of the note and Mortgage. Id. ¶ 2(a-c). Thereafter, King entered into an agreement with Wells Fargo which modified the Mortgage's maturity date but did not modify the unpaid principal balance of $101,250.00. Id. ¶ 2(d). King died on November 17, 2018. Id. ¶ 5(a).

3. On January 30, 2020, Defendant commenced a foreclosure action against several parties, including Plaintiff as an heir to King's estate, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Docket No. F-001558-20 (the “Foreclosure Action”), See Skelton Cert., Ex, A. That case is currently pending before the state court. Def's Br. 1. In the Foreclosure Action, Defendant alleged that the Mortgage installment payment due on July 1, 2019, and all payments due thereafter, were not paid and the loan went into default. Skelton Cert., Ex. A., ¶ 7. The state court entered a default against Plaintiff and certain other parties named in the complaint after they failed to file pleadings or otherwise provide a defense in the Foreclosure Action. Skelton Cert., Ex. B at 1. Default as to Plaintiff was later vacated. Skelton Cert,, Exs. C, D. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an answer to the complaint, stating, in part, Defendant “has been paid-in-full and ha[s] suffered no injury but persistfs] in attempting to unlawfully foreclose” on the subject property. Skelton Cert,, Ex. E at 2, Plaintiff asserted violations of federal law, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Id. at 2, 6.

4. Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 9, 2022. In the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant's foreclosure action is fraudulent. See Compl. ¶ 1. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is “unlawfully attempting to facilitate a fraudulent seizure of Executors' Estate & Private/Real property.” Id. ¶ 20. As such, Defendant allegedly lacked standing to bring the Foreclosure Action. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “received multiple payments on different occasions to pay off the alleged debt” but the “funds were never credited to [his] deceased Mother's account.” Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff appears to assert seven causes of action in his Complaint, some of which he repeats from the answer he filed in the Foreclosure Action: (1) fraud; (2) violations of RICO; (3) violations of the FDCPA; (4) civil rights violations, including claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and Section 1983; (5) violations of TILA; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (7) quiet title. Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint.

5. Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir, 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Pro se complaints are liberally construed and “held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). A pro se complaint will be dismissed if “it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” Mishra v. Fox, 197 Fed.Appx. 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1996)).

6, Defendant first moves for dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint on the basis that his claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. “Younger requires federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.” Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Alt 'y Gen. of New Jersey, 27 F.4th 886, 890 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Malhan v. Sec 'y U.S. Dep 7 of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019)). Younger applies to “three ‘exceptional circumstances': (1) ‘state criminal prosecutions'; (2) ‘civil enforcement proceedings'; and (3) ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.”' Id. at 891 (quoting Sprint Commc ‘ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S, 69, 78 (2013)). Here, the Foreclosure Action is neither a criminal prosecution nor “a civil enforcement proceeding ‘akin to a criminal prosecution' in ‘important respects.'” Malhan, 938 F.3d at 463 (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79). Moreover, it is not “uniquely in furtherance of the state courtf's] ability to perforin [its] judicial functions.” Id. (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78). Importantly, courts have declined to apply the Younger doctrine in the context of state foreclosure proceedings. Hernandez v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass 'n,, No. 147950, 2015 WL 3386126, at *2 (D.N.J. May 26, 2015) (collecting cases that decline to apply the Younger doctrine in the context of state foreclosure proceedings). Accordingly, the Younger doctrine is inapplicable in this case.

7. On the other hand, “[t]he Colorado River doctrine allows a federal court to abstain, either by staying or dismissing a pending federal action, when there is a parallel ongoing state court proceeding.” Tomasi v. Twp. of LongBeach, 364 F.Supp.3d 376, 388 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. Hamilton, 571 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2009)). Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). They may abstain, however, from hearing cases and controversies under “exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” Id. at 813 (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89(1959)).

8. Whether abstention is appropriate is a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the two actions are parallel. Ryan v Johnson, 115 F.3d 193,196 (3d Cir. 1997). “[P]arallel cases involve the same parties and ‘substantially identical' claims, raising ‘nearly identical allegations and issues.'” IFCInterconsult, AG v. SafeguardInt'lPartners, LLC., 438 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2005)). If the proceedings are parallel, the Court then looks to a “multi-factor test to determine whether ‘extraordinary circumstances' meriting abstention are present.” Nationwide, 571 F.3d at 308 (quoting Spring City Corp. v. American Bldgs. Co., 193 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 1999)). In determining whether an action presents “extraordinary circumstances” the Court considers the following six factors:

(1) [in an in rem case,] which court first assumed jurisdiction over [the] property; (2) the

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