King v. Mansfield Univ. of Pa.

PATRICK KING, Plaintiff, v. MANSFIELD UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE SYSTEMOF HIGHER EDUCATION, JOHN HALSTED,and CHRISTINE SHEGAN, Defendants.

Civil No. 1:15-CV-00159

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

November 3, 2016

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM

In this civil action, Plaintiff alleges that a Mansfield University maintenance worker sexually harassed and assaulted him while he was a student and employee of the university, and that school officials and campus police did not properly record, investigate, and act upon his complaints. Plaintiff brings state law discrimination claims pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-953, and Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act, 24 P.S. §§ 5001-5010, as well as a § 1983 claim for an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated the Criminal History Record Information Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9101, by not maintaining any records of his sexual harassment complaints.

Presently before the court is Defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I, II, and VI. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background¹

A. Facts

In January of 2001, Patrick King ("Plaintiff") enrolled at Mansfield University ("Mansfield"), which is part of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education ("PASSHE"). (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 12, 15.) Plaintiff also worked in the student activities office in a work-study program. (Id. at ¶ 16.) According to the complaint, in June of 2001, John Estep ("Estep"), a maintenance worker for Mansfield, sent Plaintiff an email asking about Plaintiff's sexual orientation. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-20.) Despite Plaintiff's refusal of Estep's sexual advance, Estep continued to email Plaintiff and also called his home frequently. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.)

In the summer of 2001, Estep orchestrated a meeting with Plaintiff at the student activities building. (Id. at ¶ 23.) During this meeting, Estep asked to see Plaintiff's penis, then blocked Plaintiff's exit and asked him to have sex in a nearby closet. (Id.) Once again, Plaintiff rejected Estep's sexual advances. (Id.) After the incident, Plaintiff met with Mansfield's Vice-President of StudentAffairs, Joseph Maresco ("Maresco"), provided him copies of Estep's emails, and officially complained of Estep's sexual advances. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff alleges that Maresco never forwarded the emails to Human Resources, which also never contacted him regarding Estep's conduct. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.)

Estep continued to pursue Plaintiff on Mansfield's campus, offering him gay pornography and even trying to forcibly enter a bathroom stall occupied by Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 32-33.) On one occasion, Estep grabbed Plaintiff's testicles and caused him sever pain. (Id. at ¶ 35.)

Plaintiff alleges that Estep's persistent sexual harassment caused him severe depression which eventually culminated in a "complete mental breakdown." (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.) Plaintiff underwent treatment for his depression, but it did not alleviate his symptoms and his academic performance declined. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-45.)

In April of 2004, two Mansfield professors urged Plaintiff to report Estep's sexual harassment and assault to the Mansfield University Police Department (the "Police Department"), which he did. (Id. at ¶ 48.) A day or so later, the Police Department called Plaintiff for some follow-up questions, but did not take any further action. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Eventually, Plaintiff was referred back to Mansfield's Human Resources director, who assured Plaintiff that his complaints would be promptly investigated. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-57.) Shortly thereafter, the Human Resourcesdirector retired from Mansfield, but did not forward his complaint or order a thorough investigation. (Id. at ¶ 57.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") alleging that Mansfield failed to adequately accommodate his debilitating depression which caused his grades to drop. (See King I, 2014 WL 3734551 at *6.) Plaintiff dual-filed the PHRC complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id.) On May 16, 2005, Plaintiff amended his PHRC complaint to include the sexual harassment by Estep. (Id.) On August 12, 2010, the PHRC determined that Plaintiff's discrimination claims lacked probable cause. (Id.) On March 8, 2011, the EEOC sent Plaintiff a "right to sue" letter after it adopted the PHRC's findings. (Id.)

Plaintiff initiated his first federal action by filing a complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on June 9, 2011. (See King v. Mansfield Univ., Civ. No. 11-cv-1112, 2014 WL 3734551 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2014) ("King I"), Doc. 1.) After amending his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he endured a hostile work environment because Mansfield did not promptly investigate and address Estep's alleged misconduct, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that Mansfield did not properly accommodate his resulting depression, which violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") as well as Section504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA"). (King I, 2014 WL 3734551 at *6.) Plaintiff also alleged violations of state law pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA") and the Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act ("PFEOA"). (Id. at *14.)

Defendants answered Plaintiff's amended complaint on August 2, 2013. (Id. at *6.) Once discovery closed, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Title VII as well as Plaintiff's RA and ADA claims were barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.) The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. (Id. at *11). As to the Title VII claim, the court held that the statute of limitations had expired and Plaintiff did not demonstrate that equitable tolling applied under federal law. (Id.) The court also held that Plaintiff's ADA and RA claims were similarly time barred by the statute of limitations which could not be equitably tolled because Plaintiff presented no evidence that Defendant thwarted his claims by fraud or other concealing conduct.² (Id. at *12-13.) The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled as soon as he filed a discrimination complaint with the PHRC because neither the ADA nor RA require that administrative remedies be exhausted before discrimination claims arepursued in court. (Id. at *13-14.) The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims and dismissed them pursuant to its discretionary power under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Id.)

After dismissal in federal court, Plaintiff filed state law discrimination claims as well as a § 1983 claim alleging an equal protection violation in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. (Doc. 19, p. 1 of 23.) As previously stated, Plaintiff alleged that Estep's sexual harassment and assault created a hostile work environment in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA") ("Count I") as well as a hostile education environment which violated the Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act ("PFEOA") ("Count II"). (Doc. 18, p. 6 of 24.) Plaintiff further claimed that Mansfield failed to accommodate his resulting depression ("Count III"), which in turn created a hostile education environment ("Count IV"), both violations of the PFEOA. (Id.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Count V"), Plaintiff alleged that President Halstead ("Halstead") and Christine Shegan ("Shegan"), Chief of the Police Department, violated his civil rights and denied him equal protection of the laws because they treated his complaint of sexual harassment and assault differently from other Mansfield students. (Id. at p. 7 of 24.) Plaintiff also claimed that Mansfield, PASSHE, and Shegan violated Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record Information Act("CHRIA") ("Count VI") by failing to record Plaintiff's complaints about Estep's alleged sexual misconduct. (Id.)

On January 23, 2015, Defendants removed the action to federal court. (Doc. 1.) On August 5, 2015, the court denied Plaintiff's motion to remand back to state court. (Doc. 12.). Defendants then moved for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I, II, and VI. (Doc. 17). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), all pleadings have been filed and are closed. Both parties have filed briefs with the court (Docs. 18-20), and therefore, Defendants' motion is ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Any party may seek judgment on the pleadings once they are closed "but early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Such motions "will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Sprague v. Am. Bar Ass'n., Civ. No. 01-cv-0382, 2001 WL 1450606, *1 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting Soc. Hill Civic Ass'n. v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980)). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must view the facts alleged in the pleadings as true and draw any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I and II because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff's state law discrimination claims. They contend that such a conclusion is inescapable based on the court's summary judgment ruling in King I, which held that Plaintiff's federal discrimination claims were untimely and that the statute of limitations could not be tolled under federal law based upon the filing date of Plaintiff's PHRC and EEOC complaints. Plaintiff argues in response that his PHRA and PFEOA clai...