King v. Okmulgee Cnty. Jail Tr. Auth.

1

CHRISTINE KING, Plaintiff, v. OKMULGEE COUNTY JAIL TRUST AUTHORITY, OKMULGEE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and OKMULGEE COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-367-JFH-GLJ

United States District Court, E.D. Oklahoma

March 16, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GERALD L. JACKSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Plaintiff filed this action on September 13, 2021, in Okmulgee County District Court of Oklahoma, alleging the Okmulgee County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) Okmulgee County Criminal Justice Authority (“OCCJA”) and the Okmulgee County Jail Trust Authority discriminated against her with respect to certain sick leave and paid leave rights. The Board and the OCCJA (collectively, the “Defendants”) subsequently removed the action to this Court [Dkt. 1]. On February 13 2023, the Court referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings in accordance with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 [Dkt. 34]. This matter is now before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 21]. The Defendants seek judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement and Brief in Support (“Motion”) [Dkt. 21] should be GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present case alleging violations of unspecified provisions of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), Pub. L. No 116-127, 137 Stat. 178 (2020), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, et seq. Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against because the Defendants did not accommodate her expanded sick leave under the FFCRA and the FMLA and was unlawfully retaliated against or otherwise discriminated against because of conduct protected by the FFCRA. See Docket No. 2-2. The Defendants filed the Motion on September 22, 2022, alleging that the OCCJA was Plaintiff's employer, not the Board, and that Plaintiff was not entitled to and did not request any leave under the FFCRA or FMLA. See Docket No. 21. Plaintiff responded on October 12, 2022, well past the required response time-period, alleging that both the Board and the OCCJA were her employer for liability purposes and that she was terminated before she could file a FMLA claim and was not granted leave as required under the FFCRA. See Docket No. 24.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Defendant's statement of undisputed facts reflects that Plaintiff began working at the Moore Detention Center in Okmulgee, Oklahoma in August 2017. Docket No. 21 at p. 2, ¶ 1. While at the Moore Center, Plaintiff served in several capacities, including initially as an RN and ultimately as the Heath Services Administrator and Responsible Health Authority. Id. at pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 1, 3-4. Plaintiff's role as the Health Services Administrator involved more administrative tasks, but she continued to perform physical assessments of inmates until she began working from home in May 2020. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 4. Plaintiff had undergone treatment for breast cancer before she began working at the Moore Center and believed she had incurred some damage to her lungs from her previous cancer treatment that resulted in her being immunocompromised. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 8. In May 2020, Plaintiff began working from home due to her concern regarding contracting COVID-19. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 5. At the time Plaintiff began working from home, Plaintiff and her direct supervisor, Shimika Goudeau, discussed Plaintiff working from home. Id. at p. 4 ¶ 10. Although Ms. Goudeau was aware Plaintiff had previously been treated for cancer, she never discussed the matter directly with Plaintiff and Plaintiff did not request any time off to undergo any cancer treatments. Id. at p. 4, ¶¶ 10-11. While working from home, Plaintiff maintained a full-time schedule and she never returned to work in person at the Moore Center. Id. at p. 4, ¶¶ 12-13. In June or July of 2020, Plaintiff's new supervisor, Leighton McComas, asked Plaintiff for a doctor's note regarding her working from home and on July 14, 2020, Plaintiff provided a letter from Keri Enus, APRN-CNP, stating that “[d]ue to her age and medical history and current conditions, [Plaintiff] is considered to be high risk for complications if she contracts COVID-19. I recommend that she work from home indefinitely.” Id. at p. 4, ¶¶ 15-16. All nursing and medical department positions at the Moore Center are hands-on and Plaintiff's job required that she perform her job duties on site as it was not a remote position that could be successfully and thoroughly done remotely. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 19. No other employees in the medical department or any other department of the Moore Center worked from home. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 14.

On July 23, 2020, Shannon Clark became the new jail administrator of the Moore Center, a position previously held by Plaintiff's ex-husband and her then roommate. Id. at pp. 4-5, ¶ 17. After noticing Plaintiff's office was always empty, Mr. Clark inquired and learned that Plaintiff was working from home. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 18. After reviewing the July 14, 2020 letter from Ms. Enus, Mr. Clark, who had ultimate authority to hire and fire Moore Center employees, instructed his assistant to tell Plaintiff that she needed to return to work in person at the Moore Center or complete the required paperwork to take FMLA leave. Id. at p. 5, ¶¶ 20, 22-23. On July 28, 2020, Mr. McComas left Plaintiff a voicemail informing her that she could n2o longer work for the OCCJA because there were no light duty positions available. Id. at p. 6, ¶ 24. After a follow-up call with Mr. McComas in which he told her to call human resources to complete FMLA leave paperwork, Plaintiff spoke to Amber Pryor, in H.R. at OCCJA, and informed Ms. Pryor that: she was not sick; she was working full-time at home; she was not undergoing any chemotherapy or other treatment; she would not complete any FMLA paperwork; she would resign before filling out any FMLA leave paperwork; and she asked Ms. Pryor where to send a resignation email. Id. at p. 6, ¶¶ 26-28. Ms. Pryor provided her email address to Plaintiff, but Plaintiff never sent her anything. Id. at p.6, ¶ 29. Shortly thereafter, Mr. McComas texted Plaintiff asking her if she had resigned and informing her that her resignation had been accepted. Id. at p.6, ¶ 30. Plaintiff subsequently applied for unemployment benefits, but the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission ultimately determined that she was not entitled to such benefits because she refused FMLA leave and quit her job at the Moore Center. Id. at p. 7, ¶¶ 32-33.

Although Plaintiff's untimely response fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) and LCvR. 56.1(c), in the body of the response Plaintiff purports to controvert or offer material facts on the issues of whether she was fired or resigned and that Ms. Goudeau gave her permission to work from home. See Docket No. 24 at pp. 3-4.

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgement Standard

Summary judgment should be granted if the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), and the evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A party “asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Indeed, “[i]f the movant carries this initial burden, the non-movant may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Kaul v. Stephen, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court has stated that the “plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

II. Plaintiff's Failure to Timely and Properly Respond

The Defendants filed their Motion on September 12, 2022 [Dkt 21] and, pursuant to LCvR 7.1(d), Plaintiff's response was due not more than 14 days later, or by September 26, 2022. Plaintiff filed her response October 12, 2022, or sixteen days after the deadline [Dkt 24]. Moreover, Plaintiff did not seek leave to extend the time to file her response or subsequently provide a basis for finding any excusable neglect for the late filing. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1). Indeed, despite the Defendants raising the late filing issue in their October 26, 2022 reply brief [Dkt. 26], Plaintiff did not subsequently attempt to belatedly seek leave or offer a justification for her late filing.

Plaintiff's response also fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) and LCvR. 56.1(c). Plaintiff's response does not have “a section responding, by correspondingly numbered paragraph, to the facts that the movant contends are not in dispute and shall state any fact that is disputed,” LC...