King-White v. Feenstra

A.W. and HER MOTHER MARY KING-WHITE, Plaintiffs, v. AMANDA MICHELLE FEENSTRA, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-3551

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

July 27, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, A.W. and her mother, Mary King-White ("King-White"), brought this action against defendants, the Humble Independent School District ("HISD"), Amanda Michelle Feenstra ("Feenstra"), Guy Sconzo, Charles Ned, Juan Melendez, Tammy McHale, Craig Stowers, and Alicia Narcisse, for violation of civil rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 ("§ 1983" and "§ 1988"), and Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ("Title IX"). Plaintiffs also asserted claims against all defendants under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the common law of the State of Texas for the failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline employees, sexual assault and battery, negligence and gross negligence, bystander recovery, and infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and exemplary damages, pre-and post-judgment interest, costs of court, attorney's fees, andother relief available at law and in equity to which they might be entitled. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on June 11, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 35), the court dismissed the claims asserted against HISD and all the individual defendants except Feenstra. Pending before the court are Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 58), and Defendant Amanda Michelle Feenstra's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry No. 59). For the reasons set forth below, Feenstra's motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted as to all of the federal law claims that plaintiffs have asserted against her, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims against Feenstra, and Feenstra's motion for partial summary judgment will be denied as moot.

I. Plaintiffs' Factual Allegations

King-White is the mother of A.W. who was a minor during most of the events giving rise to this action. Plaintiffs allege that between 2009 and 2011 while A.W. was a student at Humble High School, A.W. was sexually molested on multiple occasions by her same-sex dance teacher, defendant Feenstra. Plaintiffs allege that the abuse began in the spring of 2009 when A.W. was 16 years old, and continued until 2011 when A.W. graduated from Humble High School. Plaintiffs allege that when the abuse began Feenstrainstructed A.W. to remain quiet, and A.W. remained quiet. Plaintiffs allege that while the abuse was occurring, A.W.'s grades changed, A.W. withdrew from her classmates and dance teammates, and that with King-White's consent, A.W. went to live in Feenstra's home. Plaintiffs allege that Feenstra spent excessive amounts of time with A.W. behind closed doors, and that Feenstra took A.W. on personal trips during the school day and on out-of-town trips during which she and A.W. shared a room and a bed. Plaintiffs allege that after A.W. graduated from Humble High School Feenstra called A.W. on the phone and stalked A.W.¹

Eventually A.W. told a former dance instructor about Feenstra's actions. After the dance instructor reported A.W.'s story to authorities, Feenstra was arrested. On October 13, 2013, Feenstra pleaded guilty to an improper relationship with a student and was sentenced to 10 years deferred adjudication and probation.²

II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Feenstra's motion for judgment on the pleadings seeks dismissal of all the claims asserted against for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

A. Standard of Review

Once a responsive pleading has been filed, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is properly filed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). "'A motion brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.'" In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation, 439 F.Supp.2d 692, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) and Herbert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). "A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)). Accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the court considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Young v. City of Houston, 599 F. App'x 553, 554 (5th Cir. 2015).

B. Analysis of Plaintiffs' Federal Law Claims

Plaintiffs assert federal law claims against Feenstra for violations of Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, and violations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³

1. Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims Will Be Dismissed

Count 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts a claim pursuant to Title IX based upon sexual harassment, rape, and abuse. Feenstra argues that plaintiffs' Title IX claims should be dismissed because (1) Title IX claims are not actionable against individuals, (2) King-White lacks standing to assert Title IX claims on her own behalf, and (3) the Title IX claims asserted in this action are time-barred.⁴ Plaintiffs have not responded to any of Feenstra's arguments that plaintiffs' Title IX claims should be dismissed.

(a) Applicable Law

Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). TheSupreme Court has held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of private action against federal funding recipients, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1968 (1979), and that monetary damages are available in such actions. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038 (1992). See also Gebser v. Lago Vista I.S.D., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (1998) (recognizing that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of private action against federal funding recipients). The Court's holding in Franklin established that a federal funding recipient can be held liable for damages in cases involving a teacher's sexual harassment of a student. The Court explained that

"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L.Ed. 49 (1986). We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.

Id. at 1037. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario I.S.D., 106 F.3d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that under Title IX "[m]inor students who have been subjected to a sexual relationship with their teachers have a private cause of action for monetary damages"); Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas I.S.D., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX).

(b) Application of the Law to the Alleged Facts

(1) Plaintiffs' Title IX Claims Are Not Actionable

Citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009), Feenstra argues that she is entitled to dismissal of the Title IX claims asserted against her because claims based on Title IX are not cognizable against individual school employees.⁵ In Fitzgerald the Supreme Court acknowledged that Title IX applies to "institutions and programs that receive federal funds, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), . . . but [Title IX] has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals." Id. at 796. See also Rowinsky v. Bryan I.S.D., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) ("The fact that title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power is evidence that it prohibits discriminatory acts only by grant recipients. As an exercise of Congress's spending power, title IX makes funds available to a recipient in return for the recipient's adherence to the conditions of the grant. While it is plausible that the condition imposed could encompass ending discriminatory behavior by third parties, the more probable inference is that the condition prohibits certain behavior by the grant recipients themselves."); Chestang v. Alcorn State University, 820 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778 (S.D. Miss. 2011) ("Title IX permits actions only against 'programs or activitiesthat receive federal financial assistance' and not against individuals."). Plaintiffs do not dispute defendants' contention that Title IX claims asserted against individuals are not actionable. Therefore, Feenstra is entitled to dismissal of the Title IX claims asserted against her in this action.

(2) King-White's Title IX Claims Are Not Actionable

Citing Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006, Feenstra argues that King-White's Title IX claims are not actionable for the additional reason that she "has no standing to assert an individual claim under Title IX."⁶ King-White's attempt to assert a Title IX claim against Feenstra is foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit's holding in Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010 n.4, that

nothing in the statutory language provides [a parent] with a personal claim under title IX. Even assuming that

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