Kingston v. AngioDynamics, Inc.

DEBRA KINGSTON, Plaintiff, v. ANGIODYNAMICS, INC. & NAVILYST MEDICAL, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 21-cv-10234-DJC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

July 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, J.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Debra Kingston ("Kingston") has filed this lawsuit against Defendants AngioDynamics, Inc. ("AngioDynamics") and Navilyst Medical, Inc. ("Navilyst") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging that she suffered injuries from a defective implantable medical device manufactured by Defendants. D. 1-3. Defendants have moved to dismiss Kingston's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. D. 7. Kingston has also moved to remand to state court. D. 16. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion to remand, id., and ALLOWS Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 7.

II. Standard of Review

A. Motion to Remand

Upon the filing of a motion to remand, the Court must assess whether it "would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in [this] court" initially. BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., IAMAW Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d 824, 832 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff files an action in state court and the defendant responds by invoking federal jurisdiction through removal, the defendant has the burden of establishing that removal to the district court is proper. Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999). The defendant "must . . . make a 'colorable' showing that a basis for federal jurisdiction exists." Id. (quoting BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 832). "Generally, '[d]oubts about the propriety of removing an action should be resolved in favor of remand.'" Miara v. First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Giannetti v. Mahoney, 218 F. Supp. 2d 8, 10 (D. Mass. 2002)).

B. Motion to Dismiss

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, a district court must apply the prima facie standard of review. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the prima facie standard, a plaintiff must "demonstrate the existence of every fact required to satisfy both the forum's long arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution," to meet their burden pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Id. (citing United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 987 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1993)). The Court considers the facts alleged in the pleadings as well as the parties' supplemental filings. Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1385 (1st Cir. 1995); Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994). The Court will "take specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not disputed) and construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff's jurisdictional claim." Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). In doing so, the Court will "not creditconclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences," Ticketmaster-N.Y., 26 F.3d at 203, and must keep in mind that the plaintiff needs to "do more than simply surmise the existence of a favorable factual scenario; [they] must verify the facts alleged through materials of evidentiary quality." Killion v. Commonwealth Yachts, 421 F. Supp. 2d 246, 252 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2001)). "Thus, allegations in a lawyer's brief or legal memorandum are insufficient, even under the relatively relaxed prima facie standard, to establish jurisdictional facts." Id. (quoting Barrett, 239 F.3d at 27). The Court is also required to "add to the mix facts put forward by the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted." Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 34.

III. Factual Background

These facts are taken from the operative complaint. D. 1-3. For the purposes of the motions, the Court presumes the factual allegations put forth by Kingston are true and also considers the Defendants' uncontradicted factual allegations.

In or about 2010, Defendants received clearance via the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") 510(k) Premarket Notification Program to market and sell the SmartPort CT, id. ¶ 15, a port/catheter system designed, manufactured, marketed, sold and distributed by Defendants, id. ¶ 17. The SmartPort CT is an implantable vascular access device, designed to provide repeated access to the vascular system for the delivery of medication, intravenous fluids, blood products and parenteral nutrition solutions. Id. ¶ 18. It consists of two primary components—an injection port and as silicone catheter. Id. ¶ 20. The Fluromax Catheter is a high-radiopacity catheter, comprised of a polymeric mixture of silicone and barium sulfate. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Barium sulfate is known to contribute to the reduction of the mechanical integrity of silicone in vivo as the particles of barium sulfate dissociate from the surface of the catheter over time. Id. ¶ 25. Kingston allegesthat Defendants' manufacturing process in constructing the Fluromax Catheter involved too high a concentration of barium sulfate particles, leading to the improperly high viscosity of the raw silicone before polymerization and causing improper mixing of barium sulfate particles within the silicone matrix. Id. ¶ 28. Although surface degradation and resultant mechanical failure can be reduced or avoided with design modifications, Defendants elected not to incorporate such design elements into the SmartPort CT. Id. ¶ 30. Years before Kingston was implanted with the device, Defendants received adverse event reports ("AERs") from health care providers reporting that the SmartPort CT was fracturing post-implantation and that fractured pieces were migrating throughout the human body, including to the heart and lungs. Id. ¶ 38.

On September 13, 2016, Kingston underwent placement of an implantable vascular access device in Paducah, Kentucky. Id. ¶ 46. Defendants manufactured, sold and/or distributed the SmartPort CT to Kingston's doctors, who used the SmartPort CT to deliver Kingston's chemotherapy. Id. ¶ 47. In October 2017, at Baptist Health Medical Center, Kingston underwent surgery to remove the SmartPort CT and catheter. Id. ¶ 48. During the procedure, her surgeons observed that the catheter to the SmartPort CT had fractured, sending catheter fragments into her superior vena cava, right atrium and ventricle. Id. Kingston has experienced significant mental and physical pain and suffering, has sustained permanent injury and permanent and substantial physical deformity, has undergone and will undergo corrective surgeries and has suffered financial or economic loss as a result. Id. ¶ 56.

IV. Procedural History

Kingston instituted this action in Middlesex Superior Court on October 26, 2020. D. 1. On December 31, 2020, Kingston filed the first amended complaint. D. 1-3. Defendants removed to this Court on February 11, 2021, D. 1, and subsequently moved to dismiss, D. 7. Kingston thenmoved to remand to state court. D. 16. The Court heard the parties on the pending motions and took these matters under advisement. D. 29.

V. Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

Defendants removed this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, claiming diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. D. 1 at 1. For purposes of the diversity statute, corporations are deemed to be "citizens" of the state in which they are incorporated and have a principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). There are "'three distinct, but not necessarily inconsistent tests' for determining a corporation's principal place of business." Chin v. Holiday Cruises II, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 367, 369 (D. Mass. 1992) (quoting Roman Ramos v. H.B. Fuller Co. Puerto Rico, 729 F. Supp. 221, 222 (D.P.R.1990)). "The 'nerve center' test 'searches for the location from where the activities of the corporation are controlled and directed.'" Id. This test is principally used when dealing with companies "whose activities are 'complex and farflung.'" Id.

The "center of corporate activity" test looks to "where the corporation's day-to-day management takes place," id. (citing Ortiz Mercado v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (D.P.R. 1990)), and "the 'locus of operations' test focuses on 'where the bulk of the corporation's actual physical operations are located,'" id. Pursuant to the "forum defendant rule," removal based on diversity jurisdiction is not permissible if "any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see Rizzi v. 178 Lowell St. Operating Co., LLC, 180 F. Supp. 3d 66, 67 (D. Mass. 2016).

Applying any of these tests leads to the conclusion that the Defendants' principal place of business is not in Massachusetts. Both AngioDynamics and Navilyst are incorporated in Delaware. D. 1-3 ¶¶ 3-4. According to the affidavit of AngioDynamics' Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), Navilyst's operations in the United States are carried out by AngioDynamics and the individuals who carry out work on behalf of Navilyst in the United States are employed directly by AngioDynamics. D. 23-1 ("Trowbridge Aff.") at ¶¶ 6, 9. AngioDynamics' global headquarters is in New York. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 11. AngioDynamics' chief executives, financial and accounting departments, legal department, human resources and other executive and control functions take place in its New York office, id. ¶ 8, and all significant corporate decisions for both AngioDynamics and Navilyst are made by, subject to review by and approved by executives in the New York Office, id. ¶ 11. Accordingly, under all tests, Defendants' principal place of business is New...